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                                                               ABSTRACT 
      This dissertation focuses on labour market returns of migrants and non-migrants in 
transitional urban China. Literature on internal migrants in urban China reveals different 
perspectives on whether internal migrants have higher or lower labour market returns than urban 
residents. Labour market segmentation theory highlights the effect of an institutional barrier, the 
Hukou system, and suggests that migrants are placed in the lower segment of the market while 
urban residents have many advantages over migrants. On the contrary, migration selectively 
literature suggests migrants in urban China are positively selected and have higher quality than 
non-migrants, thus suggesting that migrants have higher-level returns than non-migrants. Market 
transition theory provides a transitional view and suggests the inequality caused by the Hukou 
system is decreasing with the development of a market economy, with competitiveness 
increasing among both migrants and urban non-migrants.  
     The main objective of this research is to examine the differences in earnings and occupational 
attainments among different population groups - urban non-migrants, temporary migrants and 
permanent migrants - and their changes over time, and to examine factors that contribute to the 
changes. Three key factors, Hukou reforms, development of market mechanisms and migration 
selectivity, are highlighted in this study.  
   Using CGSS 2003 and 2008, the empirical analysis shows that first, the independent effect of 
migrant status on earnings was significant in 2003 but not significant in 2008, however, migrant 
status had a significant independent effect on individuals’ occupational attainments in both 2003 
and 2008.  Second, migration selection had significant and positive effects on individual’s 
earnings and occupational attainments in both 2003 and 2008. Third, migrants with urban Hukou 
status have an advantage in labour market returns. Urban migrants (temporary and permanent 
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migrants from urban to urban) had a net earnings advantage over urban non-migrants in two 
years of 2003 and 2008; permanent migrants (permanent migrants from rural to urban and from 
urban to urban) had an advantage in occupational attainments over urban non-migrants in both 
2003 and 2008.    
     The mixed findings of decreased effects of migrant status on individual’s earnings from 2003 
to 2008 and the remaining effect of migrant status on individual’s occupational attainment from 
2003 to 2008 indicate that both segmentation and competition exist in urban labour markets in 
China. This reflects the nature of China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, where 
growing market forces co-exist with institutional legacies. Migrants in China are positively 
selected and migration experience contributes positive returns on earnings and occupational 
attainments.  
Key Words: Hukou system, Labour market returns, Migration selection, Market transition 
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                                         CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction and research questions 
   Since the beginning of economic reform and opening in late 1978, with its transition from a 
planned to a market economy, China has experienced a great economic and social transformation. 
One of the most significant features of China’s social change is the dramatically increased 
internal migration within the population which is dominated by rural to urban migration and 
migration from northwest inland to southeast coast regions. In 1990, the Chinese Census 
recorded  30 million migrants (SSB, 1991); the number increased to 104 million people by 
the2000 Census (SSB, 2001) while, according to the latest 2010 Census, the number of migrants 
is 221 million persons and  accounts for 16% of the total population in China (SSB, 2012). Some 
scholars assert that China has witnessed the largest internal migration in human history (Cai, 
2006).  The large size of China’s migrant population is the major component of demographic 
process and highly related to China’s development model.  
    In the planned economy era, migration rate in China was very low and internal migration was 
strictly controlled through household registration system (Hukou system). First started in cities in 
1951 and extended to nationwide in 1955, the Hukou system classified every Chinese citizen into 
“agricultural” (rural) or “non-agricultural” (urban) category according to their Hukou location 
(registration location). Every newborn in China has been assigned a Hukou status according to 
the status of the parents. Only through proper authorization of the government can one 
permanently change his/her Hukou location and especially his/her Hukou type from a rural to an 
urban one. Virtually no self-initiated migration occurred, as people could not survive without 
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local hukou status which was directly linked to entitlement to rationed food, housing, jobs and 
other necessities (Cheng and Selden, 1994). Together with other institutions like the ration 
system and work unit system, the Hukou system created two very different societies in the 
planned economy era: on the one hand the urban class, whose members worked in the priority 
and protected industrial sector and who had access to social welfare; and on the other hand the 
peasants, who were tied to the land to produce an agricultural surplus for industrialization and 
who had to fend for themselves (Chan, 2009). After market economy reform, the rising demand 
for labour in the newly developed non-state enterprises such as foreign invested, joint-venture, 
and privately owned enterprises coupled with the erosion of the rigid rationing system for food 
and housing and loosened the migration restrictions of Hukou system created social space for 
rural migrants (Liang & White, 1997; Wu, 2002). Thus internal temporary migration, mainly 
from rural to urban areas and without changing their Hukou type and Hukou locations, increased 
dramatically during last 30 years. The massive rural migrant population in urban area are shaking 
the old system of the rural/urban hierarchy but bringing new type of inequality: the inequality 
between migrants and urban residents in urban labour market. 
      There has been considerable interest in the consequences of migration, or to be specific, how 
migrants have fared in the new destinations, posing questions as to whether there are any 
differences in labour market returns between migrants and local residents. On the one hand, both 
Chinese and western scholars have long subscribed to the view that the Hukou system is the 
major source of hardship for migrant workers living in cities (Solinger, 1999; Chan and Zhang, 
1999; Fan, 2002; Lu, 2003; Alexander and Chan, 2004; Zhan, 2011). Migrants without urban 
household registration status are regarded as marginal workers and treated as outsiders and 
second class citizens in the cities (Chan, 1996). Rural migrants tend to make less money, receive 
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far fewer benefits, and have no health insurance (Chan, 1996; Lu, 2006; Liu, 2005). On the other 
hand, research in recent years has pointed out that the role of the Hukou system in maintaining 
social exclusion is declining (Zhan, 2011; Huang et al, 2010) and migrants, especially the 
permanent migrants, have higher incomes than non-migrant urban residents (Fan, 2001; Lu, 2008; 
Li, 1997). Scholars posed questions such as “are all migrants really worse off in urban labour 
market in China?” (Gagnon, 2009), is there “segmentation or competition in China’s urban 
labour market?” (Knight & Yueh, 2009) or “Does Hukou system still matter?” (Lu, 2008) as a 
consequence of these trends.  
    Based on these controversies, my examination of  labour market returns of migrants and non-
migrants in urban China involves two dimensions of social exclusion of institutional arrangement 
and migration in general. This thesis on the one hand examines the role of institution, the Hukou 
system, in determining individuals’ labour market returns and on the other hand highlights the 
effect of migration selection on labour market returns. Specifically, this study is guided by the 
following questions: 
    First, do migrants receive higher or lower returns compared to urban non-migrants,  and what 
is the relationship between migrants and urban non-migrants (are they still segmented or do they 
become more competitive with each other?     
   Second, to what extent do differences in labour market returns between migrants and urban 
non-migrants result from the institutional arrangements of the hukou system? 
   Third, what is the role of Hukou system and migration selection in determining labour market 
returns in contemporary China, and does institutional reform and development of market 
mechanism reduce or increase the inequality of Hukou system? 
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1.2 Theoretical framework and method 
   I propose a theoretical framework that integrates theories of labour market segmentation theory 
and migration selectivity theory with market transition theory. This framework allows me to 
examine comprehensively the relationship between migrants and urban non-migrants and to 
explore whether institutional reform and development of market mechanism reduce or increase 
the inequality among migrants and non-migrants.This framework will be elaborated in literature 
review in Chapter 3. Here I outline its major features. 
   In the context of China’s social transition, three main dimensions should be considered when 
examining labour market returns of migrants and non-migrants, which are effects of institutional 
rules inherited from planned economy era, effects of market mechanism and effects of migration 
selectivity. The labour market segmentation theory clearly suggests that market segmentation is 
the result of institutional rules that differ across labour market segments. In urban China, 
migrants and urban residents with different Hukou status belong to different segments, and 
migrants are placed in the lower tier of the market while urban residents have many advantages 
over migrants. On the contrary, from the perspective of migration selectivity, migrants in China 
are positively selected and they have higher quality than those who are not migrants. They tend 
to be younger, more educated, have higher skills, and are more motivated, ambitious, and have 
relatively higher aspirations than non-migrants. Thus, migrants would have higher-level returns 
than non-migrants in urban China. Market transition theory claims that inequality under one 
system can be reduced by introducing an alternative mechanism; thus, the penetration by market 
factors will undermine the socialist inequality created by redistribution (Szelenyi, 1983). In 
understanding effects of Hukou system on labour market returns, market transition theory 
provides a transitional view to explain the declining role of the Hukou system and the changing 
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relationship between migrants and urban residents. According to this theory, the development of 
a market economy, the inequality caused by the Hukou system is decreasing, and migrants and 
urban non-migrants will become more competitive.  
   To investigate the relationship of Hukou system, migration and inequality of labour market 
returns, I employ data from the China General Social Survey 2003 and 2008 to examine the two 
important aspects of labour market returns, earnings and occupational attainments, of migrants 
and urban non-migrants in contemporary China. Five groups which are urban non-migrants, 
temporary migrants from rural to urban areas, temporary migrants from urban to urban, 
permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent migrants from urban to urban  are 
included in my analysis. Classification of these five groups is based on their different Hukou type, 
Hukou location, Hukou origin and whether they have migration experience or not. Thus this 
thesis can separate the effect of Hukou type, and Hukou origin from the general term of Hukou 
effect and highlight the mostly neglected effect, the effect of migration selection. 
      Using urban non-migrants as reference group, difference in earnings and occupational 
attainments between urban non-migrants and other four migrant groups are examined separately 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Multiple regression analyses are conducted to examine the gross and 
net earnings difference between urban non-migrants and other four migrants groups in 2003 and 
2008. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is then used to decompose the original log earnings 
gap into components of explained gaps (gaps can be attributed to difference in characteristics) 
and unexplained gaps (gaps can be attributed to discrimination).  Logistic regression models are 
conducted to compare the likelihood of urban non-migrants and four migrants groups of being in 
ordinary, service and sales work rather than managerial & professional work before and after 
controlling for the effects of human capital variables and ownership sectors in 2003 and 2008. 
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Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analyses are then conducted to examine how much of the 
occupational differentials is attributed to discrimination. By comparing the results of 2003 with 
those of 2008, this thesis can provide evidence to assess whether the effects of an institution 
associated with socialist regulation, the Hukou system, would decrease with the development of 
a market economy.  
 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
    This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a historical account of the 
Hukou system and related state policies, exploring internal migration and inequality under the 
Hukou system in both the socialist period and the market reform era. This chapter describes how 
the Hukou system was implemented in the 1950s, and examines internal migration and rural-
urban inequality in the socialist period. It also depicts the reform of the Hukou system within a 
changing political-economic context, the massive population migration since market reform and 
dimensions of inequality within the Hukou system in the reform era. The objective of this chapter 
is to set a descriptive background for the discussion of effect of Hukou based difference on 
individual’s labour market returns and its changes over time. 
    Chapter 3 describes the three major theoretical perspectives of labour market segmentation 
theory, migration selectivity literature and market transition theory. These three theoretical 
perspectives have provided opposing explanations of the effects of institutional rules on labour 
market returns of migrants and non-migrants in urban China. In addition to these three 
theoretical perspectives, several debates in the empirical studies such as debated on segregation 
and competition, debates on role of the Hukou system and debates on heterogeneity of migrants 
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are also reviewed. The chapter ends with an explanation of what this thesis is trying to 
accomplish. 
    Chapter 4 describes the data used in this thesis and five groups in my analysis: urban non-
migrants, temporary migrants from rural to urban, temporary migrants from rural to urban, 
permanent migrants from rural to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban. The final part 
of this chapter describes the research methods and analytical strategy employed in this study.  
    Chapter 5 examines economic returns of migrant groups and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 
2008 to see first whether non-migrants have higher earnings than migrants and second whether 
the effect of migrant status decreases in 2008 compared to in 2003. Descriptive, multiple 
regression and decomposition analyses were used in this chapter.  
   Chapter 6 examines occupational attainment of migrant groups and urban non-migrants using 
data from CGSS 2003 and CGSS 2008 and to test whether migrant status affects individual’s 
occupational attainments and whether the effect of migrant status decreases in 2008 compared to 
in 2003. As in the previous chapter, descriptive, logistic regression and decomposition analyses 
were used in this chapter.  
   Chapter 7 further investigates the separate effect of Hukou type, migration selection and Hukou 
origin on labour market returns. In this chapter, I selected four pairs of groups, first, temporary 
migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban, they differ from each 
other only in different Hukou type; second, urban non-migrants and permanent migrants urban-
urban, they differ from each other only in whether have migration experience or not; third, 
permanent migrants rural-urban and permanent migrants urban-urban, they differ from each 
other in different Hukou origin; fourth, Urban non-migrants and Temporary migrants rural-urban. 
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Using multivariate regression and logistic regression, earnings and occupational attainments of 
these four pairs of groups are compared separately.  
   Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings presented in previous chapters, points out the 
limitations and direction for further studies, and discusses the theoretical and empirical 
implications of those findings.  
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     CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONAL    
          ARRANGEMENTS AND CHANGES, RURAL-URBAN INEQUALITY 
  
       Rural-urban inequality has been salient in China throughout the Mao and reform periods. 
The rural-urban gap has further deteriorated since the market reform, becoming the most 
important contributor to dramatic distributive inequality in China. Although growing rural-urban 
disparity is hard to avoid during the process of industrialization (Lipton 1977), what 
differentiates China from other countries is that the persistence and aggravation of the rural-
urban inequality from the Mao era to the market reform period has largely stemmed from 
state institutional arrangements and related policies (Han, 2007).  
    This chapter provides a brief  introduction to the hukou institution, the root cause of rural-
urban inequality, and to related state policies, as well as discussing their consequences for 
inequality between rural and urban areas under the socialist system and since the market reform. 
The purpose of this overview is to lay an empirical background for the comparison of labour 
market returns of five migrant groups in the chapters that follow. 
 
2.1. Institutions and Inequality in the Planned Economy Era 
  2.1.1 Establishment of the Hukou system 
  The Hukou system was implemented initially in Chinese cities in 1951 to record the residence 
of the urban population and to track down any anti-government people with the officially stated 
purpose of maintaining social peace and order, safeguarding the people’s security, and protecting 
their freedom of residence and movement (Liu, 2005).  However, in response to the huge influx 
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of farmers into the cities, the government issued a directive in 1955 to expand the Hukou system 
to cover both the rural and urban populations. In the meantime, the Hukou system shifted its 
emphasis from registration purposes to a regulatory purpose of preventing unplanned migration 
and rural influx into the cities. In 1958, the promulgation of a more far-reaching Hukou 
regulation (Hukou dengji tiaoli) marked the final step of codification in this direction. Even 
today, the 1958 regulation represents the only national legislation on migration and residence 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress (China’s highest legislative body), and it 
remains fully in force (Zhu, 2003). The decree required that each person had to be registered in 
the locale where they resided, and they were then categorized as having either an agricultural or 
non-agricultural status; for newborns, the Hukou classification followed that of the mother (Chan, 
2009). Secondly, all internal migration was subject to approval from the authorities at the 
destination.  
   The gradual development of the Hukou system during the 1950s was an inevitable outcome of 
the establishment of a planned economic system, which required meticulous planning and 
control of all macro- and micro-facets of society, and pursuit of a Stalinist-type, Big Push 
industrialization strategy premised on the unequal exchange of industry and agriculture (Chan, 
1994; Alexander & Chan, 2004; Naughton, 2007). The state not only overwhelmingly favored 
industry through government investment, but also monopolized the trade between the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. Through the well-known process of “scissors prices” which 
deliberately set low prices for grain and high prices for industrial products, the state siphoned off 
resources in the rural sector for capital accumulation in industry (Lardy, 1983; Chan, 1994). 
Several institutional practices were exercised coercively in both rural and urban areas to enforce 
such an extraction. In rural areas, as Yang and Cai (2003) observed, the compulsory procurement 
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and monopoly of sales of farm produce and the rural collective (commune) system were 
implemented. The first tool was to generate an unequal inter-sectoral exchange, and the second 
was designed to bind farmers to their land. In urban areas, a ration system1 and work units  were 
introduced; the first was for state distribution, and the second was to enforce state control of 
urban employment. The Hukou system covered both rural and urban areas and controlled the 
population’s mobility. In this way, the Hukou system is recognized by some scholars as the 
major institutional pillar underlying the deep rural-urban chasm in China in the last half century 
(Chan, 1994; Knight & Song, 1999; Solinger, 1999; Whyte, 2010).  
    The Hukou book has been dubbed “China’s No. 1 Document” (Tian, 2003) and records the 
attributes of a household: Hukou type and Hukou location. The Hukou type is generally classified 
as an “agricultural” and “non-agricultural” hukou or a “rural” and “urban” hukou (Chan & Zhang, 
1999: 821-822). The Hukou location is the place of registration and is based on one’s residential 
location.  
   Hukou Type. The hukou type is differentiated into “agricultural” or “non-agricultural.” Since 
the early 1960s, this classification has determined one’s entitlements to state-provided goods and 
services (Chan, 2009). Those with a non-agricultural status were entitled to state-provided grain 
rations (1955-1992), housing, education, employment, and access to medical care, as well as 
other benefits (Cheng & Selden, 1994). The non-agricultural population were loosely considered 
to be holders of an urban Hukou (Chan & Xu, 1985). 
   Hukou Location. In addition to the Hukou type, each person was also categorized according to 
his or her place of Hukou registration. This was the individual’s official and only “permanent” 
                                                          
1 Under the ration system, basic staples such as grain, meat, cooking oil, sugar, and cotton could be bought only in 
state-run stores using ration certificates or coupons, which were distributed in cities to local residents with an urban 
Hukou; rural residents were excluded from the ration system and were expected to be self-sufficient in food. This 
system was abolished in 1992.  
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residence. The local regular hukou registration defined one’s rights to pursue many activities and 
eligibility for services in a specific locality—a not inconsequential status given that levels and 
availability of services still vary from place to place even today (Chan, 2009). 
 
2.1.2 Population Migration in the Planned Economy Era 
  Since the establishment of the Hukou system, the overall rural-urban migration rate until 
recently has been very low (Wu, 1994). An individual would have to obtain approval from the 
state to convert one’s hukou type from agricultural to non-agricultural and, subsequently, to 
change the place of hukou registration (from a specific village to a particular town/city or from a 
specific city to another city). Hukou conversion was tightly controlled and permitted only under 
very limited conditions. The latter process (changing the place of Hukou registration) usually 
happened at the same time as converting Hukou type from agriculture to non-agricultural. The 
criteria for converting Hukou type from agricultural to non-agricultural were stipulated by the 
central government and were designed to serve the needs of the state. In Mao’s period, 
converting Hukou type from agricultural to non-agricultural was conferred mainly on those 
persons: (a) recruited as permanent employees by a state-owned enterprise (zhaogong); (b) 
displaced due to state-initiated land expropriation (zhengdi); (c) recruited for enrollment in an 
institution of higher education (zhaosheng); (d) promoted to administrative positions (zhaogan); 
(e) relocated because of family crises (such as moving to a city to live with and look after a sick 
parent); (f) joining the army (canjun) and demobilized to cities; and (g) deemed to belong to 
special categories (either recipients of compensation for past policy mistakes or people who had 
endured personal sacrifices and hardships because of their work for the state).  
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   In each locale, the annual quota of converting Hukou type from agricultural to non-agricultural 
was set by the central government at 0.15 to 0.2 percent of the non-agricultural population (Chan, 
2009). The overall growth of the non-agricultural population was very slow, averaging, for 
example, 1.47 percent annually for the period 1966–1976 (Chan, 2009). 
 
  2.1.3 Inequality under the Hukou system during the Planned Economy Era 
   In line with the priority on socialist industrialization, the state adopted differential resource 
allocation policies biased toward the city, which largely shaped rural-urban inequality during this 
time. Although the state also employed a rational, low-wage system for urban workers during 
much of the central planning period and even enacted a wage freeze in 1957, real wages were set 
at a level that allowed city dwellers to keep a higher living standard than rural households 
(Knight & Song 1999). As a result, the gap in the average incomes between rural and urban 
citizens expanded from the 1950s to 1970s, with the urban-rural per capita income ratio growing 
from about 2:1 in 1952 to 2.5:1 or even 3:1 in 1976 (Whyte 1995; Han, 2007). 
   The inequality in consumption between the two types of hukou holders was grave due to the 
installation of the rationing system biased in favor of city people (Han, 2007). Various types of 
food could not be purchased by farmers and were only obtainable by urban residents; 
additionally, the food available to farmers to purchase was not of very high quality (Potter 1983). 
In general, the ratio of consumption of food and other necessities including vegetable oils and 
cotton and cloth between urban and rural populations widened dramatically from the 1950s to 
1970s (Lardy, 1982, 1983). 
   Rural-urban disparities were exacerbated by starkly unequal access to welfare benefits.  For 
urban Hukou holders, the state-run work units (danwei) distributed a wide range of state-funded 
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fringe benefits to urban employees, particularly heavily subsidized public housing, paid 
maternity leave, and retirement pensions (Walder, 1983). Most state enterprises provided 
additional social services and facilities, such as meal halls with subsidized meals, nurseries and 
kindergartens, bus transportation to and from work, and tickets for sports or cultural events 
(Whyte & Parish, 1984). For rural Hukou holders, fringe benefits were quite scarce compared 
with those enjoyed by city dwellers. Housing was built by farmer households without state 
subsidies. Unlike the urban dweller's reliance on retirement pensions, children were the primary 
source of support for their parents in old age (Potter & Potter, 1990). Although the provision of 
those benefits varied depending on the ownership type (state-owned or collectively-owned), rank, 
and size of work units and the category of employees (e.g., permanent vs. temporary), urban 
residents as a group were much more privileged than their rural counterparts in their access to 
those benefits (Han, 2007). It is estimated that these non-cash compensations amounted to 
around 82% of the state employee's average wage in 1978 (Lee, 1997). If these additional 
benefits are factored in, the estimated gap between urban and rural incomes in the 1970s was as 
high as 5 or even 6 to 1 (Rawski, 1982).  
    State investment in education in the countryside and the city was also inequitable. Education 
in cities was virtually fully covered by the state budget, whereas the inputs from the state budget 
in rural education were quite limited (Sun, 2003). The commune or the production brigade had to 
bear the responsibility for a sizable share of the expenses of primary and secondary education. 
The wages of non-state employed teachers (minban jiaoshi) had to be paid by farmers. Despite 
the imbalance in state financial investment, the enrollment of rural students in basic education 
achieved impressive improvement. The share of rural students in lower secondary schools 
increased from 37.1% in 1962 to 73% in 1971 and to 77.5%in 1978. The share for upper 
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secondary schooling was only 7.8% in 1962, and climbed to 61% in both 1971 and 1978 (Whyte, 
1995; Han, 2007). 
     To sum up, the hukou system and related policies of the commune system, ration system, and 
work units effectively restricted internal migration from the less-developed countryside to 
industrializing cities during the socialist period. Farmers were bound to the land, while urbanites' 
livelihoods were secured. Differential state polices of resource allocation favoring the urban 
hukou holders resulted in expansion of rural-urban gaps in income, consumption, and access to a 
wide range of fringe benefits with only a few exceptions (Han, 2007). In essence, the hukou 
system was not merely a means of limiting rural/urban population and labor mobility as it is 
commonly depicted, but also a system of social control aimed at excluding the rural population 
from access to state-provided goods, welfare, and entitlements (Chan, 2009). 
 
2.2. Institutional reform and Inequality in the Market Economy Era 
   In 1978, China began to reform its highly centralized economic system to create a socialist 
market economy. Two stages were carried out. The first stage, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
involved the de-collectivization of agriculture, the opening up of the country to foreign 
investment, and permission for entrepreneurs to start-up businesses. However, most industry 
remained state-owned. The second stage of reform, in the late 1980s and 1990s, involved 
the privatization and contracting out of much state-owned industry and the lifting of price 
controls, protectionist policies, and regulations, although state monopolies in sectors such as 
banking and petroleum remained. The State no longer has the ability to directly control the firms 
or the pricing mechanism, but the Chinese government still has a semi-visible hand in term of 
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macro controls via the manipulation of many upstream factor prices, and periodically tweak the 
incentive structures as leverage (Hou, 2002). 
     The market reform has brought dramatic changes to economic and social spheres in China. 
Reform first started in rural areas with the abolition of the commune system and the introduction 
of the “household responsibility system,” which made individual households responsible for 
particular plots and allowed producers to sell any surplus grain on the open market. This 
institutional change greatly improved the efficiency of agricultural production and farmers were 
thus freed from the land to seek jobs in the industrial and service sectors (Liang, 2001; Lin, 1988; 
Wu, 2004). Secondly, in urban areas, the erosion of the rigid danwei-based rationing system 
created social space for rural migrants (Liang & White, 1997; Wu, 2004). Furthermore, the rapid 
development of non-state enterprises such as foreign invested, joint-venture, and privately owned 
enterprises created a great demand for migrant workers. Even some state-owned work units 
preferred to hire rural peasants either because they had no commitment to peasant-workers’ 
housing and other social benefits, or because the jobs were unattractive to urban workers (Wu, 
2004).  
     Like other remnants of the central planning system, the Hukou system has been subject to 
revisions and reforms since the 1980s (Sun & Fan, 2011).  New policies were introduced to 
accommodate the growing demand for low-skilled workers to fill positions shunned by urban 
locals, and the even larger number of factory jobs created by China’s new export-oriented 
industrialization strategy in the late 1980s (Chan, 2009). 
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  2.2.1 Reform of the Hukou System 
   A small breakthrough occurred in small towns in 1984 with the introduction of a new hukou 
category called “hukou with self-supplied food grain” (Chan & Zhang, 1999). This category 
applied to migrants moving to small towns who didn’t convert their Hukou type from agricultural 
to non-agricultural, meaning that the state was not fiscally responsible for the welfare of the new 
migrants in these towns (Chan, 2009). A wider door was opened to migration with a national 
policy of allowing temporary residences in 1985 (Solinger, 1999; Chan, 2009). In July 1985, the 
Ministry of Public Security promulgated a document titled “Provisional Regulations on the 
Hukou Management of Temporary Urban Residents,” which established a temporary urban 
Hukou system and began to issue “temporary residence permits.” People were permitted to move 
and stay “temporarily” at a location different from that where they had been registered, including 
in large cities, but again without local hukou and all the associated rights and benefits (Chan, 
2009).  In an effort to improve the Hukou system, in September 1985, the National People’s 
Congress passed a regulation introducing the personal identification card, which carries a 
national serial number, the individual’s personal information, and the Hukou location.  
  The management of the Hukou system devolved from the central government to lower-level 
government in the late 1980s. Some city and town governments began to offer new forms of 
urban hukou to eligible migrants. Eligibility for these new hukou was usually tied to home 
purchase, investment, age, education, and skills, although the specific criteria varied from place 
to place and changed frequently (Sun & Fan, 2011). Shanghai, for example, offered a “blue 
stamp” hukou in the mid-1990s to investors, new homeowners, and professionals (Wong & Huen 
1998). In 2002, Shanghai replaced the blue stamp with a new resident card to accommodate 
skilled workers, overseas Chinese, and foreigners. Between 2007 and 2009, Tianjin adjusted its 
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criteria for the blue stamp Hukou several times to boost or monitor home purchase (Sun & Fan, 
2011). Cities such as Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou also experimented with plans in the early 
2000s to allow some qualified migrant laborers to acquire a city hukou (Chan, 2009). 
     At the same time, efforts have been made to extend the urban Hukou to a larger spectrum of 
rural migrants. In 1997, the State Council approved a pilot scheme to award an urban Hukou to 
migrants who have stable jobs and have resided in their place of residence for more than two 
years. After being tested in 450 cities and towns, in 2001 the scheme was further expanded. In 
1998, the State Council approved guidelines making it easier for urban residents’ immediate 
family—spouse, parents, and children—to obtain the urban Hukou (Yu, 2002; Sun & Fan, 2011). 
For example, spouses and children of existing residents with a local urban Hukou could be 
granted the urban Hukou. Other changes included issuing new forms of identity to rural migrants. 
Shenzhen, for example, rolled out a new resident permit system in August, 2008 that enabled 
migrants who have worked in the city for more than a month, who own a property, or who have a 
business to enjoy a range of free public services including low-cost housing (Sun & Fan, 2011). 
In recent years, an increasing number of cities have eliminated the distinction between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2005; 
Chan & Buckingham 2008).  
    Not only are the multitude and variety of Hukou reforms complex and confusing, but they also 
make it difficult to assess if the reforms have made it easier or harder for migrants to change 
their Hukou (Sun & Fan, 2011). After focusing on Hukou research for 20 years, Chan (2009) 
claimed that there has been no fundamental change in the Hukou system. In the post-1984 period, 
the one substantive change has been the removal of obstacles to geographical mobility outside 
the Hukou conversion framework (Chan, 2009). Thus, population migration in China consists of 
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permanent migration and temporary migration, which has been called two-track migration 
system by Sun and Fan (2011).  
   
2.2.2 Population Migration and the “Two Track Migration System” in a Market Economy 
   The institutional changes make it possible for rural people to migrate to and survive in the city. 
Migration began to rise in the 1980s when, in general, the proportion of migrants was still small. 
In 1987, when China first included information on migration in a national survey, only 15.2 
million respondents had migrated, which amounted to about 1.5% of the total population (Chan, 
2001; Han, 2007). In 1990, population migration increased drastically, and it has been called the 
“age of migration” by scholars (e.g., Liang, 2001). In 1992 when China adopted full-blown 
market reforms, the number of rural migrants seeking jobs in the city reached 46 million, or 4% 
of the total Chinese population of 1.17 billion (Wen, 2006). According to the census in 2000, the 
number of migrants who had been away from the place of their hukou registration swelled to 121 
million (at which time the population of the whole country was 1.3 billion); 88.4 million of these 
migrants were moving from rural to urban areas (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2002). 
According to a 2010 census, the number of migrants accounted for 221 million people (SSB, 
2012).  
    What is unique about migration in China is the difference between permanent migration and 
temporary migration. Permanent migrant refers to migrants who have changed their registration 
from their original place to their place of residence; for migrants from rural to urban areas, they 
also have converted their Hukou type from agricultural (rural) to non-agricultural (urban).  
Temporary migrant refers to migrants whose place of residence differs from their place of 
registration; they have moved to a new place, but do not possess the local Hukou, meaning that 
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they are not de jure residents even though they are de facto residents (Chan, 2009).  Rural 
migrant workers are temporary migrants. It is where individuals are registered, rather than the 
duration of stay, that defines them as permanent migrants or temporary migrants (Goldstein & 
Goldstein, 1991). A variety of terminologies have been used to describe this dichotomy—hukou 
versus non-hukou migrants, “plan” versus “non-plan” (or self-initiated) migrants, formal versus 
informal migrants, and de jure versus de facto migrants (Gu, 1992; Yang, 1994; Li, 1995; Chan, 
Liu, & Yang, 1999; Fan, 1999). Regardless of which terminology is used, this two-track system 
is key to explaining the persistent divides and inequality between rural and urban China (Sun & 
Fan, 2011). While the volume of annual permanent migrants remained quite stable in the last 30 
years, Temporary migrants have expanded significantly. ‘Rural migrant workers’, numbering at 
166.7 million in mid-2012, are the major constituent group of temporary migrants, whose size 
reached 221 million in 2010 (NBS, 2012b; SC & NBS, 2012).  
    Research has shown that permanent migrants are sponsored by the State and are more skilled 
and highly educated, whereas temporary migrants mostly are self-initiated, market-driven, and of 
lower socioeconomic statuses (e.g., Li, 1997; Chan, Liu, & Yang, 1999; Fan, 2002; Shen, 2002). 
Temporary migrants do not enjoy the same institutional, economic, and social statuses as 
permanent migrants and local residents (Sun & Fan, 2011).    
    Overall, it is well established that temporary migrants in China are disadvantaged compared to 
permanent migrants. Permanent and temporary migrants belong to two very different segments 
of the population (Li & Siu, 1997). 
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       Table 2.1 Selected Characteristics of Permanent and Temporary Migrants 
 Permanent Migrants          Temporary Migrants 
Hukou Status Non-Agricultural and Local    Agricultural and Non-Local 
Access to state-supplied benefits Full    None 
Educational attainment High share of college    
educated 
   High share of junior    
   secondary 
Migration origin More urban     More rural 
Reasons for migration  Education/training, job 
assignment, job transfer 
   Employment in industry     
   and business 
Employment  Mostly Permanent     Temporary or contract work 
Occupation More in professional and 
technical categories 
   Mostly industrial workers 
Housing Same as other local 
residents 
   Company quarters and   
   rented housing 
Source: Sun (2011); Chan, Liu, &Yang (1999); Fan (2002) 
     
2.2.3 Inequality under the Hukou system in the reform era 
   Since market reform in late 1978, the inequality under the Hukou system has been reflected in 
two ways: first, the persistent and aggravated rural-urban inequality; and second, the so-called 
“two class urban society” (Chan, 1996).  
   The rural-urban inequality first decreased after market reform and then began to increase in the 
mid-1980s. The period between 1978 and 1984 witnessed a reduction in the urban-rural income 
ratio. Based on official statistics, the urban-rural income ratio dropped from 2.36:1 in 1978 to 
less than 1.9:1 in the mid-1980s (Zhao, 1993). This trend favouring rural people reversed since 
the mid-1980s when the government turned its attention to urban reforms (Han, 2007). The rural-
urban income gap during this period has been consistently found in empirical studies. For 
example, Wang (2006) estimates that, with inflation taken into account, urban citizens' real 
income grew by 2.4 times between 1985 and 2000, compared with 1.8 times for the rural 
population. In fact, by the mid-1990s, the rural-urban income gap had returned to the level it had 
been in the late 1970s before the market reform. Khan and Riskin (1998, 2005) find that the ratio 
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of urban-rural per capita income changed from 2.42 in 1988 to 2.47 in 1995 and to 3.01 in 2002. 
Calculations based on the definition of income by the National Statistics Bureau reveal that the 
income ratio of urban to rural households rose from 1.82 in 1983 to 3.23 in 2003 (Li & Luo, 
2006). Despite the slight differences in the ratio number, these studies share a consensus that the 
rural-urban income gaps have increased in China since the mid-1980s. Corresponding to the 
trend in the income gap, inequalities in consumption of food and daily necessities between rural 
and urban populations have continued to expand despite improvement in absolute terms both 
within cities and in the countryside (Han, 2007). The rural-urban gap in entitlement to social 
welfare also widened during the reform era. Li and Luo (2010) estimated the monetary value of 
various forms of social protection that rural and urban people received based on the data from the 
Chinese Household Income Project Survey for 2002. They found that the per capita disguised 
subsidies were RMB 247 Yuan for rural households compared to RMB 4,275 Yuan for urban 
households: the rural-urban gaps in incomes and entitlement to social welfare that developed in 
the socialist period have increased substantially during the reform era.  
      In addition to the increasing rural-urban inequality, segregated urban society in the reform 
era also reflects the continuing exclusionary and discriminatory functions of the Hukou system. 
With the easing of restrictions on population migration and especially the migration from rural to 
urban, rural migrant workers were allowed to enter the cities. “Rural migrant labour” 
(nongmingong) has a specific meaning in China: it refers to industrial and service workers with a 
rural hukou. These labourers, though working in urban jobs and residing for the most part in 
towns and cities, are not considered legally to be urban workers and belong to the temporary 
migrant category (Chan, 2010).  The legally “temporary” status of this group’s members and 
their permanent ineligibility for local “citizenship” in the form of an urban hukou makes them 
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forever vulnerable and easily expendable (Chan, 2010), and they stay at the bottom of the urban 
pyramid (Chan, 2009).  They work in a segmented labour market, are trapped in low-end factory 
jobs, service jobs,  low-skilled 3-D (“dangerous, dirty, and demeaning”), and often physically 
demanding  jobs, work for longer hours, and live in inferior housing (Knight & Song, 1999; Park 
& Wang, 2006; Wang, 2010; Chan, 2010). They are paid less for working the same job as their  
urban colleagues and are almost entirely excluded from various forms of social insurance and 
protection such as medical care, housing, and urban unemployment relief or “minimum 
protection” benefits (Khan & Riskin, 2005; Wang, Zuo, & Ruan, 2002). They even have to pay a 
large amount of extra fees if their children want to attend schools in the city. Their difficulty in 
integrating into the city is further intensified by the segregation of their networks from those of 
city dwellers (Solinger, 1999).  
   Feng and Zuo (1999) identify five major consistent gaps between temporary migrants and 
urban residents: (1) segregated labour market and occupations, (2) low income and poor benefits, 
(3) temporary housing and residential segregation, (4) individual instead of family migration, and 
(5) absence of social integration. Based on social and economic disparities between temporary 
rural migrants and urban residents, Chan (1996) claims that a two-class social structure has been 
emerging in the cities of China. The structure is an extension of the rural-urban segmentation 
from the planned economy era. In the reform era, while the geographical divide has been largely 
broken down and tens of millions of peasants have been freed from the structures of the planned 
economy, their old position in the social hierarchy has not fundamentally altered (Chan, 1996).  
Hukou status is an important ascribed status in determining one’s social and economic 
achievements. 
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2. 3. Summary 
   Despite the many far-reaching and dramatic social and economic changes taking place in China 
over the last 30 years, the hukou system remains one of the most enduring remnants from the 
1950s. Through immobilizing and binding farmers to the land, the Hukou system has been a 
mechanism for organizing labour in pursuit of the Big Push forced industrialization during  the 
first three decades of the People’s Republic. In the reform era, the hukou system gradually 
adapted to serve the state’s new industrialization agenda of making China the world’s low-cost 
supplier of manufactured goods— this time, ironically, by “freeing” the farmers to create a vast 
class of extremely cheap, mobile labour (Chan, 2009). 
    Together with other institutions, the Hukou system created two very different societies in the 
planned economy era: on the one hand the urban class, whose members worked in the priority 
and protected industrial sector and who had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full 
citizenship; and on the other hand the peasants, who were tied to the land to produce an 
agricultural surplus for industrialization and who had to fend for themselves (Chan, 2009). The 
geographical, social, and economic segregation of rural and urban populations continues in the 
reform era. To an individual, hukou status is an important ascribed attribute in determining one’s 
social and economic circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORY ON INSTITUTION AND LABOUR    
       MARKET RETURNS TO MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS 
 
   Overall, the greater part of the research on labour migration has focused on theorizing the 
determinants and consequences of migration, as well as the dynamics of the migratory process. 
The determinants of migration are factors affecting migration, including characteristics of the 
sending and receiving locations and those of the migrants and their families. These factors 
include personal characteristics, geographic factors, economic factors, and policy factors 
(Massey et al.,1993, 1994). The consequences of migration include the impact of migration on 
the sending and receiving locations, as well as on the migrants themselves, including the 
performance of migrants in their new locations. 
   By comparing earnings and occupational attainment of migrants and non-migrants, the focus of 
this thesis is on the consequences of migration. This chapter describes the three major theoretical 
perspectives that have been used to study the effects of institutional rules on labour market 
returns for migrants and non-migrants in urban China. In addition to these three theoretical 
perspectives, several debates in the literature are also reviewed. The chapter ends with an 
explanation of what this thesis is trying to accomplish. 
 
3.1 Labour Market Segmentation Theory 
   3.1.1 Labour market segmentation theory and its application 
    Labour market segmentation theory can be traced back to the early 1960s, and was initially 
developed by American economists to understand exclusion from the labour market. However, it 
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has gradually challenged the underlying assumption of neo-classical economics about the 
competition embedded in the labour market and constant allocation of employment and workers 
(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 2006). Specifically, this theory assumes that there is no market for 
labour where both purchasers and sellers can compete with each other in a fair competition 
environment. Also, this theory holds that the differences in compensation for labour 
(e.g., earnings) cannot be attributed to the supply side only, but must also include demand side 
factors, which cannot be explained by an individual’s characteristics. Accordingly, labour market 
segmentation theory verifies the existence of differences in the demand side, which cannot be 
explained by individuals’ characteristics. In this sense, having realized that labour market is not 
perfect, this theory implicitly considers some non-market institutional and sociological factors, 
which may lead to differentiated consequences for employees with equivalent characteristics 
(Jain & Sloane, 1981). 
    Segmentation theorists emphasize barriers in the labour market. In contrast to economic 
approaches, labour market segmentation theories emphasize how social stratification variables 
affect the labour market. Leontaridi (1998) argues that there are several key tenets central to 
segmentation theory: 1) the labor market consists of a few clearly identifiable segments; 2) 
mobility barriers exist and prevent individuals from obtaining jobs in other segments; 3) each 
segment is subject to a different set of occupation, industry, employment, and wage setting 
mechanisms, and respondent characteristics; and 4) neoclassical theory for returns on human 
capital is not applicable for the lower segment of the labor market (Leontaridi, 1998; Zang, 
2002). Contrary to neoclassical labor economists who posit that wage differentials are primarily 
the result of differences in acquired human capital, labour market segmentation theorists argue 
that market segmentation is the result of institutional rules that differ across labor market 
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segments and have thus replaced the market processes of supply and demand (Leontaridi, 1998). 
Labour market segmentation theory often describes a dual labor market where all jobs fall into 
one of two separate sectors: primary and secondary. The primary sector represents good jobs in 
the labor market, which are marked by high negotiated wages, fringe benefits, and high 
employment security, whereas the secondary sector represents bad jobs, marked by low skill 
requirements, low wage rates, and little or no access to career advancement opportunities (Zang, 
2002). 
   In many Western industrialized countries, including the U.S., a large body of labour market 
literature dealing with racial, gender, and migrant discrimination exists. Researchers have used 
empirical evidence to support the existence of wage inequality amongst differing social groups 
who possess similar human capital characteristics; many experts conclude that minority groups 
are overrepresented in the secondary sector or the bottom tier of the labour market, face wage 
and other forms of discrimination, and are oftentimes unable to achieve inter-sectoral mobility 
(Bauder, 2001; Constant & Massey, 2005; Gordon, 1995; Hayter & Barnes, 1992; Hiebert, 1999; 
Hudson, 2007; McLafferty & Preston, 1992; Reich, Gordon, & Edwards, 1973). Vulnerable 
groups become trapped in the lower segment of the labour market because of mobility barriers  
for example, place of residence, poor work histories, and discrimination—which reduces inter-
sectoral job transfers while occupational stratification increases (Bauder, 2001; Gordon, 1995). 
Labour market segmentation theory posits that even after controlling for human capital factors, 
minority workers will earn less money than members of the majority and are less likely to be 
hired for employment (Becker, 1971). 
  Although most of the labour market segmentation theory literature has been developed and 
applied in a Western context, more recently scholars have applied and modified labour market 
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segmentation theory to better capture social and economic dynamics in developing countries. In 
his research on developing countries, Fields (2008) concludes that labour market segmentation 
exists if one or both of the following conditions exist: jobs for individuals with the same skill 
level differ in terms of wages or other characteristics, and access to good jobs is limited in that 
people who want better jobs are unable to obtain them (Fields, 2008). According to Fields’s 
(2008) definition, labour market segmentation in developing countries reflects similarities in 
developed countries. Similar to cases in developed countries, findings from developing countries 
show minorities, females, and, in many cases, migrants have limited access to good jobs and are 
disproportionately placed in lower segments of society (Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1980; Coverdill, 
1988; Hiebert, 1999; McLafferty & Preston, 1992; Reid & Rubin, 2003; Stolzenberg 1990).  
 
  3.1.2 Labour market segregation in China 
  In the case of China, conventional labour market segmentation theory is used to posit rural-
urban labour market segmentation as well as labour market segmentation within the urban labour 
market.  
    Within the urban labour market in China, the two-tier and three-tier labour market based on 
different Hukou status is examined by scholars. The two-tier labour market refers to the 
segregation between rural migrants and urban residents; scholars noticed the heterogeneity of 
migrants groups and urban residents and examined the three-tier labour market of  permanent 
migrants, urban residents and temporary migrants segregation and non-retrenched urban workers, 
re-employed urban workers, and rural-urban migrants segregation. 
     Primarily, the segregation between rural migrants and urban residents has been studied. 
Scholars conclude migrants without an urban Hukou status are more likely to be placed in lower 
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tiers of the market, not allowed to obtain permanent positions even if they are employed in the 
state-owned sector, earn fewer wages relative to urban non-migrant workers, and are not eligible 
for accessing to the subsidies and benefits enjoyed by urban residents. Knight et al. (1999) 
conducted an analysis of migrants using the 1995 national survey. They found a large wage 
disadvantage for migrants remained after standardization for differences in characteristics in 
human capital, and argue that this reflects labour market segmentation and lack of competition 
between migrants and non-migrants. Migrant wages were influenced more by market forces. 
Urban residents were protected by preferential access to urban employment, institutional 
determination of wages and benefits in kind, and the job security provided by their work units 
(danwei). Knight et al. (1999) also found that migrant and non-migrant workers were highly 
imperfect substitutes or even complements: migrants did jobs that non-migrants shunned.  The 
China Center for Economic Research (1998) investigators claim that within the urban area of 
Shanghai, the old rural-area/urban-area dualism is being replaced by a new rural-migratory-
worker/urban-resident-worker dualism. Rural people who have successfully overcome the 
migratory barriers now face discriminatory treatment and even types of social exclusion (Yao, 
2001b), which are far more difficult to conquer. The exclusion is comprehensive and striking. 
The migrants are geographically segregated, politically ignored, and financially discriminated 
against (Yao, 2001b). The well-known “Zhejiang Village” formed by migrants in a suburb of 
Beijing provides an example of this kind of exclusion. Knight, Song, and Jia (1999) found that 
only 1 percent of migrants hold managerial and technical positions, compared with 19 percent of 
non-migrants. Controlling for personal characteristics, a migrant is 17.6 percent less likely to 
have a white-collar job than a local resident (Yao, 2001b). Meng (2001) studied the migration 
population alone and found that, among migrants, individuals with higher labour market quality, 
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such as those who are more educated, more trained, and have more city work experience, are 
more likely to be self-employed in the informal sector. 
      Segmentation between rural migrants and urban residents is largely due to state policy and 
institutional barriers. Government at various levels restricts the employment of temporary rural 
migrants by imposing fees and controls on enterprises, and by erecting a labyrinthine system of 
permissions and fees through which rural migrants have to pass (Knight & Yueh, 2009). There is 
evidence that city governments have pursued these regulatory policies in order to protect their 
residents. For instance, Solinger (2004) reported that regulations in various cities across China 
excluded workers without local hukous from a range of occupations and required employers to 
obtain permits for hiring such labour. Using data from the 1995 national survey, Knight et al. 
(1999) found that no less than 81% of their surveyed enterprises reported to be officially 
restricted in recruiting migrant workers. In some cities, the labour bureau classified jobs into 
three types: urban hukou jobs, rural migrant jobs, and jobs open to all but with urban workers 
receiving preference. They also imposed quotas on the number of migrants that each enterprise 
could employ. The restrictions were sensitive to the state of the city labour market, being 
tightened if unemployment among city residents rose. Until the mid-1990s, urban residents were 
protected by government policy to ensure their employment and avoid competition with rural 
migrants. 
      By classifying migrant groups and urban residents into different sub-groups, the three-tier 
labour market based on different Hukou status was also examined. Chan (2002) indicates that, in 
terms of human capital attributes, mobility resources, and labour market entry and shifts, 
permanent migrants are the most privileged and successful elite, followed by non-migrant 
natives, and finally by temporary migrants at the bottom of the hierarchy. Resident status (Hukou 
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status) is central to explain migration processes and labour market segregation in the Chinese 
cities. Fan (2001) also believes the Hukou-based opportunity structure has segmented the urban 
labour market and shaped the differential returns to labour. Peasant migrants are relegated to jobs 
with poor compensation not only because of their disadvantaged personal attributes, but also 
because they lack an urban Hukou. The barriers they experience are similar to those of illegal 
immigrants and some minority groups in the USA who are shut out from certain segments of the 
labour market because of their lack of citizenship and their ethnicity. Permanent migrants, on the 
other hand, are the most privileged group because of their affiliations with state sponsorship and 
institutional channels, and because of their advantaged personal attributes  
     Classifying workers into three categories of recently retrenched and re-employed urban 
workers, non-retrenched urban workers, and rural–urban migrants, Appleton et al. (2004) 
investigated whether wage levels and structures differed across these categories of workers using 
a 1999 household survey and panel data. The results indicate that non-retrenched urban workers 
enjoy a wage premium, although migrants receive similar returns to education. Re-employed 
workers receive no return to education and appear to have lost out on the wage increases enjoyed 
by the non-retrenched. These findings suggest that the urban labour market is segmented into 
these categories.  
 
   3.2. Migration selectivity  
   3.2.1 Migration Selectivity Literature 
   Migration is selective (Lee, 1966). Migrants do not represent random samples of the population 
at the origin. Those who respond primarily to plus (pull) factors at a destination tend to be 
positively selected. They are of a higher quality (more educated, skilled labour, etc.) than the 
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origin population as a whole. Those who respond primarily to minus (push) factors at the origin 
tend to be negatively selected. They are of a lower quality than the origin population as a whole. 
The degree of positive selection increases with the difficulty of the intervening obstacles; for 
example, the more educated are more likely to be involved in longer distance migration (Lee, 
1966). Since urban jobs require higher skills, thus, rural-urban migrants are generally positively 
selected.  
     Most migrants are young. One of the most consistent findings of migration is the selectivity 
of age. A number of studies conducted in various contexts and at different times all come to the 
conclusion that persons in their later teens, twenties, and early thirties are more migratory than 
those in other age groups (Thomas, 1938; Shaw, 1975). Gender is another common demographic 
factor of migration selectivity/differentials. Migrants are more often males. The predominance of 
male migrants may be related to the higher labour-force participation rate of males, males’ 
greater tendency to attend college, and males’ greater freedom to travel (Shryock, 1964; Simons 
et al., 1977). Educational selectivity of migration is controversial. On the one hand, migrants are 
believed to have a higher educational level than non-migrants and educational attainment is an 
important factor that differentiates migrants from non-migrants (Shaw, 1975; Zachariah & 
Conde, 1981; Hugo et al., 1987). On the other hand, analysis also indicates that educational 
selectivity is more likely to be bimodal; that is, migrants come from both the highest and lowest 
ends of the educational distribution (Connell et al., 1976). Closely related to the educational 
dimension is that of occupation. A combination of highly marketable skills, blunted 
organizational advancement, and decentralized work units fosters high rates of migration 
(Ladinsky, 1967). Most migrants are in the middle of the socioeconomic hierarchy—those at the 
bottom might not have the resources needed for migration, and those at the top might not feel the 
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need to seek new opportunities via migration (Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994). Migrants 
must overcome uncertainties, chart new paths of migration and settlement, and develop new 
networks and inroads into the destination’s labour market. The risks and costs involved demand 
that migrants be a special group: they are adventurous, have relevant skills, and are resourceful 
to tap into opportunities at the destination. 
     Although it generalized these common characteristics of migrants, migration selectivity 
literature did not draw a conclusion as to whether temporary migrants are positively or 
negatively selected compared to permanent migrants. Temporary migrants could be either better 
educated, highly skilled, or be those who have failed in the destination. Empirically, the literature 
shows that, in general, temporary migrants are negatively selected among migrants. They tend to 
be older, poorly educated, and less skilled, and therefore face difficulties in finding a job in cities 
and adapting to urban life (Borjas, 1999; Lee, 1980; Newbold, 2001; Reyes, 1997; Stark, 1995). 
These temporary migrants are generally rejected by the city. However, there are studies showing 
that temporary migrants are positively selected. For example, Saenz and Davila (1992) find that 
younger and more educated Chicano migrants from the Southwest of the U.S. are more likely to 
return than other Chicano migrants.  
    
  3.2.2 Migration Selectivity in China 
  Internal migration in developing countries is dominated by rural-urban migration, and rural-
urban migration is dominated by young, relatively better educated adults (Lucas, 1997). Since 
the costs of moving are typically lower at a younger age (weaker ties to origin) and moving at an 
early age allows for more time to take advantage of the income differentials between origin and 
destination regions and compensate for costs, younger people tend to have higher mobility than 
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older people (Clark, 1986; Lucas, 1997). Meanwhile, urban jobs require higher skills. Thus, 
rural-urban migrants are generally positively selected. 
    In China, the dichotomy of permanent migration and temporary migration reflects two forms 
of migration selectivity. Permanent migrants, who converted their Hukou type from agricultural 
(rural) to non-agricultural (urban) and changed their registration from their original place to their 
place of residence, are selected by the Hukou system to meet the needs of urban economic 
development. Temporary migrants, who migrated without possessing the local Hukou, are self-
selected migrants. 
The selection of permanent migrants by Hukou system is quite strict. In planned economy 
period, converting Hukou type from agricultural to non-agricultural was conferred mainly on 
those persons, recruited as permanent employees by a state-owned enterprise (zhaogong), 
displaced due to state-initiated land expropriation (zhengdi), recruited for enrollment in an 
institution of higher education (zhaosheng), promoted to administrative positions (zhaogan), 
relocated because of family crises (such as moving to a city to live with and look after a sick 
parent),  joining the army (canjun) and demobilized to cities. In market reform era, the decision-
making power of granting Hukou devolved from the central government to local governments. 
City Governments have used these new powers mostly to attract the very rich and the highly 
educated (by granting local permanent hukou mostly to those who are mostly millionaires and 
are able to purchase a high-end apartment in the market or make large investments to open a 
company, or those who have a degree or professional qualifications), and to those who are 
immediate family members (usually spouses and children) of existing urban residents (Chan, 
2009). Through restriction and selection of Hukou system, the volume of annual permanent 
migrants remained quite stable in the last 30 years (Chan, 2012), 
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    As for the self-selection of temporary migrants, both the censuses and national migrant 
surveys in China indicate that rural temporary migrants tend to be young, between the ages of 18 
and 40. While men dominated internal migration in the 1980s and early 1990s, more women 
have recently participated in migration, and family migration has been on the rise. The 2004 
migrant survey shows that 34 percent of rural migrants were female; 20.9 percent migrated with 
their family members, an increase of 1.6 percent since 2003 (LSSB, 2006). Most rural migrants 
have finished the nine years of compulsory schooling. Although on average they are better 
educated than peasants who do not migrate, their educational levels are lower than urban 
residents, reflecting the huge rural-urban divide and its impact on educational opportunities 
(Chen, 2011). 
     Using 1990 and 2000 census data, Sun and Fan (2011) conducted a comprehensive study on 
migration selectivity in China and the selectivity differentials between temporary migrants and 
permanent migrants. 
    Age  
Sun and Fan (2011) claim that, in general, migrants are younger than non-migrants. The mean 
age of migrants and the general population is respectively 27.4 and 31.3 in the 1990 census, and 
26.9 and 33.7 in the 2000 census. Based on the 1990 census, the mean ages of permanent and 
temporary migrants are very similar, at 27.2 and 27.6 respectively. But in the 2000 census, the 
mean age of permanent migrants declined to 25.2, resulting in a two-year gap with that of 
temporary migrants (27.2). 
Education Attainments  
     Migrants tend to be positively selected in terms of educational attainment. For both 1990 and 
2000, the proportion of migrants with senior secondary and higher levels of education (i.e., sum 
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of “senior secondary” and “college and above”) is higher than that of the general population. 
Between 1990 and 2000, although the educational attainment for all three groups—the general 
population, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants—increased, the improvement is the 
least among temporary migrants and the greatest among permanent migrants. This shows that, 
over time, permanent migrants are increasingly selected and temporary migrants are less selected 
(Sun & Fan, 2011). 
   Occupational attainments 
In terms of occupational attainment, Sun and Fan (2011) found that permanent migrants have 
higher occupational attainment than temporary migrants. According to the 1990 census, 38.1 
percent of permanent migrants and only 5.2 percent of temporary migrants were in professional, 
government, and administrative occupations—occupations characterized by high pay, good 
benefits, and job stability. Interestingly, by 2000, the proportion of permanent migrants in those 
occupations declined to 26.1 percent, whereas that of temporary migrants increased to 6.9 
percent.  Among temporary migrants, the most dominant occupation is industrial, with a share of 
58.7 percent in 1990 that increased to 66.0 percent in 2000. Their second leading occupation in 
the 2000 census was commerce and services (21.2 percent). Both industrial and 
commerce/services occupations are characterized by low pay, poor benefits, and lack of stability 
(Sun & Fan, 2011). 
Gender Selection 
The conventional wisdom about gender balance in migration is that men have greater 
migration propensity than women. Indeed, the 1990 census documents a migrant sex ratio of 142, 
much higher than the sex ratio of 106 for the general population. Temporary migrants are 
especially sex-selective, marked by sex ratio of 156. Since many temporary migrants in the 
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1980s were among the first in their communities to leave home, the high sex ratio supports the 
notion that men are more likely than women to be pioneer migrants. Notably, from 1990 to 2000, 
the sex ratio of migrants has declined sharply, indicating an increased number of women 
participating in migration and a rise in women’s mobility more so than that of men (Fan, 2008). 
The decline is especially notable among temporary migrants, whose sex ratio drops by 46, from 
156 to 110, whereas the change for permanent migrants is 22, from 128 to 106. Over time, 
therefore, the decline in sex-selectivity is more pronounced among temporary migrants and 
permanent migrants.  
 Among rural-urban migrants, however, the sex ratio of permanent migrants has increased, 
from 115 in 1990 to 160 in 2000. The increased dominance of men among rural-urban permanent 
migrants, again, reflects the prominence of “study/training” as a migration reason, as well as the 
persistent patriarchal tradition in rural areas that prioritizes boys’ access to education over that of 
girls. On the other hand, among rural-urban temporary migrants, the sex ratio has dropped from 
201 in 1990 to 125 in 2000, pointing to a massive increase in rural women’s migration 
propensity. 
     From the perspective of migration selectivity, migrants in China are responding primarily to 
plus (pull) factors at the destination and tend to be positively selected. They are of a higher 
quality (e.g., younger, more educated, skilled labour) than those who are not migrants. Inside the 
migrant category, permanent migrants are more selective than temporary migrants due to the 
highly restrictive and selective regulations of the Hukou system; it is hard to gain a permanent 
registration status after migration. 
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3.3. Market Transition Theory and Inequality 
   Since social inequalities are always generated by the dominant mode of economic integration, 
the institutional transformation of state socialism has provided a unique opportunity for 
sociologists to examine how institutions shape social stratification and how the change has 
influenced social inequality (Wu, 2002). 
 
3.3.1  Relation of Market, Institution, and Inequality 
  Szelenyi had initially expected that market reform would actually result in an overall decline of 
inequality in socialist counties (1978). Inequality under one system can be reduced by 
introducing an alternative mechanism; thus, the penetration by market factors will undermine the 
socialist inequality created by redistribution (Szelenyi, 1983). Even under partial reform, he had 
anticipated an expansion of private economy that would benefit those without redistributive 
power and ties with it (Szelenyi & Manchin, 1987). Parallel to Szelenyi’s theoretical argument, 
Nee (1989) proposed several theses about the effect of the transition to the market based on 
empirical evidence from rural China. He found that overall income inequality declined in China 
from 1977 to 1985. The income gap between urban and rural residents decreased, as did the gap 
between peasants and cadres within rural society. He argued that, with the emergence of a 
market, central distributors would lose power, direct producers would have more discretion over 
the terms of exchanges of goods and services, and the distribution of rewards would favor those 
who held market rather than distributive power (Zhou & Tuma, 1996). 
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3.3.2 Returns to Human Capital and Political Capital 
  Market transition theory suggests that market-oriented reforms in state socialist countries have 
contributed to increasing returns to human capital as well as to a decline of the influence of 
redistributive power. During this transition period, direct producers (ordinary workers and 
peasants) gained more in human capital and were rewarded more, whereas political loyalty came 
to matter less (Wu, 2002). Meanwhile, income inequality in urban China exhibited distinctive 
patterns in the state and the market sectors: there were higher returns to human capital (education 
and work experience) in the market sector than in the state sector, while advantages enjoyed by 
administrators were found only in the state sector. In the market sector, Communist party 
membership had even become a disadvantage (Nee & Cao, 1995). 
 
 3.3.3 Market Transition Debates 
  Disagreements on market transition theory are centered on the relationship between market 
mechanisms and redistributive mechanisms and on the operationalization of core concepts. 
   Conceptually, the controversy is rooted in the dichotomy of state and markets. Market 
transition theory is centered on the premise that markets and state socialist redistribution 
represent two fundamentally different logics of resource allocation. In Nee's early formulation, 
the rise of the market mechanism implies the decline of the redistributive mechanism. While 
market transition theory puts emphasis on the emerging market economy, his critics, on the other 
hand, have emphasized the coexistence and continuing importance of the state and redistributive 
institutions in resource allocation in China's economic transformation (Bian & Logan, 1996; 
Parish & Michelson, 1996; Walder, 1995). This antithetical framework is espoused within most 
literature involved in the debate. The deadlock in the ongoing market transition debate implies 
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that the division may have been improperly drawn. The market-political coevolution model 
believed that the expansion of markets has not been a self-evolving process, but is associated 
with political interests, producing a co-evolutionary transformation governed by two 
mechanisms simultaneously: market forces that compete against and undermine the redistributive 
economy, and interest politics that influence market development through establishing, enforcing, 
and changing institutional arrangements.  
   Empirically, two major explanatory variables (education and political attributes) representing 
the antithesis also deserve questioning. On the one hand, education is arbitrarily interpreted as a 
proxy for human capital in the market economy; hence, its effect indicates the increasing 
importance of market mechanisms in generating inequality. However, educational credentials 
have significant effects on the allocation of resources and life chances in state socialist societies 
as well (Szelenyi, 1988; Zhou, 2000a). On the other hand, the effects of party membership and 
cadre status, representing the role of the redistributive state, were indeed filtered by other 
intermediate institutions (Walder, 1995).  
 
  3.3.4 The Future of Market Transition Theory 
  As Zhou (2000b) comments: “When a theoretical debate generates more controversies than 
intellectual growth, it often signals that conceptual issues and theoretical logic are poorly defined 
and they are not widely shared among other scholars. Another contributing factor is that concepts 
and operationalization employed in empirical studies may no longer reflect the changing world.” 
Many scholars argue that China’s economic transition has been an interactive process of market 
growth and state transformation, and they propose views of market-hierarchy co-existence (Bian 
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& Logan, 1996), dual transformation of economic and political markets (Parish & Michelson, 
1996), and market-political coevolution (Zhou, 2000a).  
     Despite these controversies, the market transition theory provides a valuable analytical 
framework to analyze inequality in China. At the macro level, the two most influential 
mechanisms in China are the existing institution from the planned economy and the emerging 
market system. The existence and interaction of these two mechanisms influence labour market 
inequality and individual life. In debates in social transition theory, Zhou (2000b) has called for 
substantive institutional analyses of the actual process of social change ongoing in former state 
socialist societies. In this research, I focus on the concrete institution, the Hukou system, by 
which markets and political forces are coevolving the actual process of change of the Hukou 
system, and shed light on the role of the Hukou system in inequality between migrants and non-
migrants.  Hukou system is a political mechanism for regulating migration and organizing labour 
in pursuit of industrialization during the planned economy era. In reform ear, many flexible 
Hukou policies have been adopted in response to boost demand for labour in manufacturing and 
export-oriented enterprises. The change of Hukou system is closely connected with political and 
economic change in recent years. I would first examine how market reform and Hukou reform 
affect each other, and then compare the effects of the Hukou system on employment and earnings 
in different years. This research examines whether the impact of the Hukou system on 
employment and earnings has declined with the recent changes in the system, and to explore 
further whether the inequality of the socialist institution has declined with the penetration of the 
market system. 
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3.4. Debates in literature 
   3.4.1 Debate on segregation or competition 
   In China, urban residents have traditionally been protected against labour market competition 
from rural–urban migrants (Knight & Yueh, 2009). Numerous studies, as reviewed in “labour 
market segmentation in China,” provide evidence of segmentation between rural migrants and 
urban residents. However, as the reform process gained speed and migration controls were lifted, 
whether the relationship between migrants and urban residents is segregation or competition is 
under debate.  
     The urban labour market changed rapidly from the mid-1990s, and the relatively privileged 
position of urban workers in China has been challenged. From the mid-1990s, the government 
seriously tackled the problem of inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, in particular 
overstaffing. One policy response was the imposition of labour redundancies, started in 1994 and 
extended in 1997. Only urban Hukou workers had been made redundant from jobs in state-
owned work units (state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises) which was 
guaranteed for life (Knight and Yueh, 2009). Appleton et al. (2002) examined a fairly 
representative survey of urban residents conducted in 1999 to analyze the incidence and extent of 
redundancy and re-employment among them. Eleven percent of urban workers had been 
retrenched since 1992. Certain personal characteristics were associated with a greater risk of 
redundancy, including having little education, being female, being middle-aged, and having a 
manual or unskilled occupation. Registered urban unemployment was very low in 1994 (2.8% of 
the urban labour force) and redundant workers (not classified as unemployed) negligible (0.9%). 
A quarter or more of state workers were to be laid off within the four years from 1997 to 2000. 
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By the end of 2000, the official figure of the accumulated laid-off workers was 41.13 million, 
representing 28% of the workers who had been at risk.  
     Appleton et al. (2004) believe that earlier studies of the labour market, just prior to the 
redundancy policy, found clear evidence of segmentation. However, with the development of 
economic reform, did the Chinese labour market become more competitive as a result of labour 
market reforms? There are two entirely different perspectives on the consequences of these 
economic reforms—one that argues the labour market is still a segmented one, the other that a 
more competitive labour market will be created. In the first view, the labour market in China still 
has the two segments of migrants and urban residents. Alternatively, the availability of migrants 
prepared to work at low wages provides potential competition for urban residents. Redundancy 
creates an opportunity for firms to renegotiate old contracts, both formal and implicit, and may 
force urban residents to compete with migrants for work.   
     Analyzing more recent data for 1999, Dong and Bowles (2002) found no significant 
differences among firms of different ownership in the returns to human capital. This may be 
consistent with a degree of competition in the urban labour market across ownership categories. 
Appleton et al. (2004) use a 1999 household survey to test whether wage levels and structures 
differ across the categories of workers (recently retrenched and re-employed urban workers, non-
retrenched urban workers, and rural–urban migrants). There are signs of emerging 
competitiveness in the rise in the return to human capital among non-retrenched urban workers 
and the fact that it is equally rewarded for migrants. However, their evidence suggests that the 
urban labour market is still segmented into three tiers, distinguished not only by the level, but 
also by the structure of wages.  
44 
 
    Knight and Yueh (2009) use attitudinal responses from two urban surveys in 1996 and 2000. 
The 1996 survey suggested that the urban labour market was sharply segmented, while the 1999 
survey presented a rather different picture. The majority of urban workers viewed migrants as 
potential competitors, and this view was more common among women, the less educated, and 
those with long employment experience—the same variables that have been found to increase 
the probability of being laid off. The findings are consistent with the presence of continued 
labour market segmentation, but suggest also that competition between the two groups is 
increasing. 
     Using data collected from 21 manufacturing companies in Shanghai, Chen (2011) examined 
the occupational attainment and upward job mobility for rural migrants (migrants from 
countryside), urban migrants (migrants from other cities), permanent migrants, and locally-born 
workers. This study found that residential status still significantly influenced individuals’ 
occupations, but the effect of local hukou status on occupation was largely reduced at high 
educational levels. Also, urban migrants were more capable of matching their capabilities to 
better jobs. Based on these findings, Chen (2011) concluded the occupational inequalities 
reflected both market forces (rewards for differing productivity) and institutional factors 
(rewards on grounds of residential status), and both segmentation and competition existed in the 
Chinese urban labour market, which can be explained by the nature of China’s transition from a 
planned to a market economy where growing market forces co-exist with institutional legacies. 
 
 
 
45 
 
 3.4.2 Debate on earnings and employment of migrants and non-migrants, and the 
heterogeneity of migrants 
  Studies on labour market returns and migrant status have been conducted in developed capitalist 
societies, and there are three competing perspectives: information costs, socio-demographic 
characteristics, and psychosocial resources. The information costs perspective (Da Vanzo, 1983; 
Da Vanzo & Morrison, 1981; Lee, 1966) assumes an inverse linkage of distance with the amount 
and reliability of information possessed by prospective migrants, and a corresponding positive 
association between distance and uncertainty, risk, and possible failure at the destination. Thus, 
this perspective posits that migrants have lower labour market returns than non-migrants. The 
remaining two perspectives specify that migrants have higher labour market returns than non-
migrants. The explanation of socio-demographic characteristics (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Duncan 
et al., 1972) for the positive linkage of migrant status to labour market returns is that migrants 
possess resources associated with certain social-demographic characteristics to a greater extent 
than non-migrants, hence the higher-level returns. These socio-demographic characteristics 
generally are thought to reflect forms of human capital potential that employers would deem 
attractive (Stinner, 1993). The general explanation for the psychosocial resources pattern 
emphasizes psychological traits—migrants are more motivated, ambitious, and have relatively 
higher aspirations (Stinner, 1993). Furthermore, migrants are not necessarily devoid of social 
capital at destination; migrants can have informal kin and friendship links there (Harbison, 1981; 
Hugo, 1981).  
    Empirical studies on labour market returns and migrant status in China also produce 
conflicting findings regarding whether migrant workers earn more or less than urban resident 
workers and whether there is inequality and discrimination in occupational attainment between 
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migrant workers and urban residents. On the one hand, Chan (1996) claims that migrants are 
more likely than urban residents to work in the secondary sector in labour markets with less 
stable, low-paying jobs with few benefits. Empirical analyses (Liu, 2005; Lu, 2006; Li, 2007) 
have lent support to this claim. Liu (2005) analyzed national data collected from ten provinces 
and one municipality and found that people who obtained urban hukou late in their lives fared 
significantly worse than other urban residents. Using data from Tianjin, Lu (2006) found that, on 
average, migrant workers earned 762 Yuan a month in 2003, which was roughly half of the 
average of an urban worker’s earnings. Li (2007) analyzed national data from the towns and 
villages of 28 provinces and found that the average wage of migrant workers was 921 Yuan per 
month, while the average monthly income for urban workers was 1346 Yuan.  
    On the contrary, other scholars (Li, 1997; Fan, 2001; Lu, 2008) point out that the migrants, 
especially the permanent migrants, have higher incomes than non-migrant urban residents. Li 
(1997) analyzed data from the cities of Meizhou and Dongguan, both in Guangzhou province, 
and found that the permanent migrants’ mean income was higher than that of non-migrant urban 
residents in Dongguan, and the income levels of these two groups were almost the same in 
Meizhou. Fan (2001) used data from Guangzhou and found that the mean monthly income for 
non-migrants, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants was 1836 Yuan, 3654 Yuan, and 
1511 Yuan, respectively in 1998. Using national data from the China General Social Survey 2003, 
Lu (2008) found that the average monthly income for temporary migrants was 921 Yuan, while 
the average monthly income for urban residents was 705 Yuan. Lu explained that most urban 
residents work in state-owned units that provided a low salary, but good benefits, but temporary 
migrants were more likely to be self-employed or to work in private enterprises or foreign 
businesses that provided a high salary, but less welfare. Empirical studies on occupational 
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attainment of migrants and urban non-migrants also produce competing results on whether there 
is occupational discrimination on migrants.  
   Some scholars believe the Hukou status still has significant effect on an individual’s 
occupational attainment. Using data collected from 21 manufacturing companies in Shanghai, 
Chen (2010) examined the occupational attainment and upward job mobility for rural migrants 
(migrants from countryside), urban migrants (migrant from other cities), permanent migrants, 
and locally-born workers. This study found that residential status still significantly influenced an 
individual’s occupations after controlling for education, work experience, and demographic 
characteristics. This reflects occupational discrimination between workers with different hukou 
status. Gagnon et al. (2009) had similar findings as Chen’s study did. Using data from a random 
draw of the 2005 Chinese national census survey, Gagnon et al. (2009) investigated the earnings 
and the sector of work (formal vs. informal) between rural migrants, urban migrants, and urban 
residents. The authors found no earnings discrimination against rural migrants compared to 
urban residents; in contrast, urban migrants were found, in fact, to gain a large wage premium by 
migrating. Nevertheless, both rural and urban migrants are found to be discriminated out of the 
formal sector, working in informal jobs and lacking adequate social protection. The extent of 
discrimination is larger for rural migrants than for urban migrants. 
     Different from the findings of Chen (2010) and Gagnon et al. (2009), Kondo and Ou (2010) 
found that Hukou status had no effect on occupational attainment. Using data from the China 
General Social Survey 2003, Kondo and Ou (2010) investigated the occupational attainment and 
job mobility of permanent rural-to-urban migrants compared to permanent urban-to-urban 
migrants. This study examined the gaps in occupational-prestige scores between permanent 
rural- and urban-born migrants and found that they can be explained by differences in observable 
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characteristics such as gender, educational attainment, family background, and the occupational-
prestige score of pre-migration jobs. They found that the difference in occupational attainment 
between rural and urban migrants becomes statistically insignificant or even positive for some 
subgroups with controls for these characteristics. As well, in terms of job mobility, rural 
migrants were found generally more mobile and also more likely to move to better jobs by 
changing work-units, whereas urban migrants are more likely to be promoted within a work unit.   
     The controversy among these studies is partly because of the different ways of defining who 
migrants are. This confusion reflects the multitude of concepts and terms related to migration and 
the frequent changes of definition in census and census-type surveys in China (Duan & Sun, 
2006). In studies by Lu (2006) and Li (2007), the term “migrants” refers to the floating 
population that refers to temporary migrants moving from rural to urban areas. In Li’s 1997 study 
and Fan’s 2001 study, temporary migrants and permanent migrants were examined separately, 
but they do not consider the Hukou status of migrants prior to migration, so they do not 
distinguish between rural-urban from urban-urban migrations.  
 
   3.4.3 Debate on the role of the Hukou system 
  Both Chinese and Western scholars have long subscribed to the view of the Hukou system as a 
critical barrier and major source of hardship for migrant workers living in cities (Solinger, 1999; 
Chan & Zhang, 1999; Lu, 2006; Liu, 2005). However, recent articles (Zhan, 2011; Huang et al. 
2010) have argued that the Hukou system is playing a declining role in determining a migrant’s 
life chances and social exclusion. 
   First, many empirical studies have demonstrated that the Hukou system is a major source of 
hardship for migrant workers. Using data from a survey done in Tianjin in 2003, Lu (2006) 
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compared the employment and social conditions of migrants with those of permanent urban 
residents and investigates the wage determinants of both migrant and non-migrant workers. The 
results showed that after standardizing all other variables, urban workers still made more money 
than migrant workers, which suggests wage discrimination. Thus, Hukou does have a significant 
impact on the wage gap between migrant and non-migrant workers. Lu concludes that the Hukou 
system not only hinders rural-urban migration, but also contributes to a wage gap between 
migrant and urban workers. Abolishment of the hukou system will thus improve labor mobility, 
efficiency, and fairness. Using data from the Chinese Household Income Project 1995, Liu (2005) 
investigated the effect of the Hukou system on individual investment in human capital, labour 
market outcomes, and income, and found that those who obtain an urban hukou late in their lives 
fared significantly worse than other urban residents. They have fewer years of education, are less 
likely to hold state sector jobs and to have employer-provided healthcare benefits, and are more 
likely to be self-employed or unemployed. To estimate the potential economic benefit associated 
with the urban hukou, the study conducted pairwise comparisons between urban and rural 
residents of Beijing and found that the rural–urban income differential can be attributed mainly 
to the hukou system that denies rural residents the right to urban life, education, and employment. 
From these results, the study concludes that, first, the hukou system has played an important role 
in influencing social and economic outcomes at the individual level in China. Second, by 
differentiating opportunity structures for rural and urban populations, the hukou system is a 
major cause of rural–urban disparity.  
    Although it is widely believed that the Hukou system plays a fundamental role in causing the 
inequality between migrants and non-migrants, some recent studies (Zhan, 2011; Huang et al. 
2010) contend, on the contrary, that the importance of the Hukou system has declined 
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substantially. Zhan (2011) conducted fieldwork on female migrant workers in Beijing and 
Chifeng City in Inner Mongolia between March 2004 and May 2006, and examined how each of 
the three mechanisms—Hukou status, social exclusion, and the market—affected a migrant 
worker’s life chances in these two cities. Through in-depth interviews, the study finds that it is 
not Hukou status, but social exclusion and market resources that concern the majority of female 
migrant workers when they strive to find better jobs, move up the social ladder, and secure 
opportunities to settle in the city. Unlike what many scholars believe, Hukou status is no longer 
of fundamental importance in limiting a migrant worker’s life chances. The impact of Hukou-
based legal exclusion has declined substantially due to market reforms and policy changes since 
the 1980s, and market and social exclusion have become the most important factors in limiting a 
migrant worker’s life chances. A migrant worker’s life chances would not be significantly 
improved even if China were to abolish the Hukou system. 
    Huang et al. (2010) also provide a “beyond hukou” perspective to examine the social 
exclusion of rural-urban migrants in urban China. Using both quantitative and qualitative data 
collected through questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews in a village in Hubei province, 
this article empirically analyzes the extent of social exclusion of rural-urban migrants in a 
transitional period from three dimensions: geographical, opportunity, and psychological. This 
study finds that the Hukou status is relatively less important than it was during the state socialist 
period and has a declining impact in the social exclusion of rural-urban migrants. What really 
matters is their weak position in the urban labour market that restricts welfare opportunities and 
their ability to construct a new identity. 
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3.5. Summary 
   The three theoretical perspectives reviewed in this chapter have provided opposing views 
regarding the effect of the institution of labour market return of migrants and non-migrants. The 
labour market segmentation theory clearly suggests that market segmentation is the result of 
institutional rules that differ across labour market segments. In urban China, migrants and urban 
residents with different Hukou status belong to different segments, and migrants are placed in the 
lower tier of the market while urban residents have many advantages over migrants. From the 
perspective of migration selectivity, migrants in China are positively selected and they have 
higher quality than those who are not migrants. They tend to be younger, more educated, have 
higher skills, and are more motivated, ambitious, and have relatively higher aspirations than non-
migrants. Thus, migrants would have higher-level returns than non-migrants in urban China.   
Market transition theory provides a transitional view to explain the declining role of the Hukou 
system and the changing relationship between migrants and urban residents. According to this 
theory, the development of a market economy, the inequality caused by the Hukou system is 
decreasing, and migrants and urban non-migrants will become more competitive.  
      At the same time, empirical studies in China also provide conflicting findings on the effect of 
the Hukou system and labour market returns of migrants and non-migrants. Many early empirical 
studies have demonstrated that there is segmentation in the urban labour market with rural 
migrant labor at the bottom of the urban pyramid, working in the lowest rung of the occupational 
ladder (mostly frontline industrial and service workers in cities). They have lower incomes, 
while urban residents have been protected against competition from rural-urban migrants. The 
Hukou system is the key institution caused labour market segmentation. However, China is 
undergoing tremendous economic and social changes. With the economic reform that accelerated 
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in the mid-1990s and redundancies of urban workers, many studies point out that migrants and 
urban residents become more competitive and that the role of the Hukou system is declining. 
   This thesis attempts to do an in-depth study on the controversial question of what effects  the 
Hukou system has on labour market returns of migrants and non-migrants in urban China. 
Specifically, the main focus is to compare the earnings and occupational attainment of urban 
non-migrants with that of four migrant groups with different Hukou types—Hukou origin and 
Hukou location—using data from two different years. The thesis tries to explain in what ways the 
Hukou system affects occupational earning differentials between urban non-migrants and 
migrants, and whether the effect changes between years.                                  
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                                    CHAPTER 4  DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.1 Data 
   Past empirical studies on earnings and employment of migrants and non-migrants in China 
were largely based on regional data. For example, Fan (2001) uses data from Guangdong 
province, Lu’s (2006) study is based on data from Tianjin City, and Chen (2010) uses data from 
21 manufacturing companies in Shanghai. Using data from different regions to compare earnings 
and occupational attainment of migrants and non-migrants causes the controversial findings in 
the literature. The data in this study is national data from the China General Social Survey 2003 
and 2008.    
   The China General Social Survey (CGSS) is the first national, comprehensive, and consistent 
social survey in China. This survey was conducted jointly by the Sociology Department of 
Renmin University in China and the Survey Research Centre at the Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology. The survey was conducted every other year from 2003 to 2008 using a 
randomly selected sample of respondents from 125 counties (districts), 500 towns (streets), 1,000 
residential committees and 10,000 households. The first stage of the CGSS was completed in 
2008 and had five annual surveys. The second stage of the CGSS started in 2010 and has been 
conducted every other year. In total, there will be 5 surveys done up until 2019. The data 
collected in this survey includes both demographic information and respondents’ opinions on 
various aspects of China’s society. Because of the wide range of topics covered and the 
comprehensive gathering of demographic information, CGSS is regarded as the most important 
data source for studies of China’s society.  
54 
 
   This nationally representative survey adopted the four-phase stratified sampling method: 
county (district), town (street), village (neighborhood committee), and household. The samples 
of the former three phases were identified under the sampling framework of China's Fifth 
National Population Census, and families were randomly selected with the identified villages or 
neighbourhood committees. After the identification of sampled households, an interviewee was 
randomly selected among members above the age of 18 who have stayed or will stay in the 
household for more than one week. In the CGSS 2003, the survey was only conducted in urban 
areas, 5900 respondents were selected from 28 cities, 92 districts and counties, and 590 
residents’ committees. CGSS2003 ultimately includes 5,550 effective respondents, all from 
urban areas. The CGSS 2008 ultimately includes 3982 effective respondents from urban areas 
and 2018 from rural areas. Only urban respondents from the CGSS 2008 are included in my 
study.  
   The survey contains detailed information on individual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, 
education, occupation), household characteristics (e.g., family size, number of children), and 
community characteristics (e.g., location, communication conditions, related economic 
indicators). In addition, a migration module is included to provide detailed information on the 
migration histories of all household members. Besides demographic information and household 
registration status (i.e., hukou) and migration history, the CGSS provides each respondent's 
employment history from first to current job. The data include details on the nature of 
employment, including three-digit occupation codes, management level, professional title, work-
unit type, rank of the departmental supervisor for the work unit, job-related housing and medical 
benefits, and other factors. 
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4.2 Migrant Groups for analysis 
    Using different ways to define migrants is an important reason for controversy concerning 
earnings and employment of migrants and non-migrants. Some scholars (Lu, 2006; Li, 2007) 
compare earnings and employment of temporary migrants from rural to urban with that of urban 
residents, while other scholars (Li, 1997; Fan, 2001) distinguish permanent migrants from urban 
residents and compare earnings and employment of temporary migrants from rural to urban with 
that of permanent migrants and urban non-migrants. While these studies analyze the effect of the 
Hukou system based on individuals having different Hukou type (i.e., temporary vs. permanent 
migrants in the same labor market), they do not consider the Hukou type of migrants prior to 
migration; therefore, they cannot distinguish between rural-to-urban from urban-to-urban 
migrations. To provide a more intensive and comprehensive understanding of the effect of 
Hukou system and inequality of migrants and non-migrants, this study classified four migrant 
groups and one group of urban non-migrants based on the differences in current Hukou type, 
Hukou location, and Hukou origin (Hukou type and Hukou location of migrants prior to 
migration).  
    In the household registration system, Hukou location and Hukou type (agricultural/rural or 
non-agricultural/urban status) are recorded separately. Four main categories can be classified 
based on whether a person is permanently registered in the city and the Hukou status he/she 
holds. First, those who hold rural Hukou status and are temporarily registered in the city are 
temporary migrants from rural to urban. Second, those who hold rural Hukou status, but are 
permanently registered in the city are residents in a village inside a city, as happens when 
surrounding villages are absorbed into a growing city, are not an included category in my 
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analysis. Third, those who hold urban Hukou status and are temporarily registered in the city are 
temporary migrants from urban to urban; for example, this would include a person who has a 
Beijing Hukou, but who works in Shanghai temporarily. The fourth category is for those who 
hold urban Hukou status and are permanently registered in the city; people in this category can 
be classified into the three groups of urban non-migrants, permanent migrants from rural to 
urban, and permanent migrants from urban to urban based on their Hukou origins and whether 
they have migration experience or not. Urban non-migrants are individuals who were born in the 
city and hold local urban Hukou registration. Permanent migrants from urban to urban are those 
who have moved from other cities to the city of residence, changed their Hukou locations, and 
hold local urban Hukou registration now. Permanent migrants from rural to urban are people who 
have moved from a rural area to the city of residence, converted their Hukou type from a rural 
type to an urban type, and hold a local urban Hukou registration now.  
    Table 4.1 presents these four main categories based on different Hukou type and Hukou 
registration. Five groups, 1)temporary migrants rural to urban, 2)temporary migrants from urban 
to urban, 3)urban non-migrants, 4)permanent migrants from rural to urban and 5) permanent 
migrants from urban to urban are include in analysis. Residents in village inside a city (those 
who have rural Hukou type and are permanently registered in a city) are not included in this 
study.  
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   Table 4.1 Five groups in the analysis based on Hukou Status and Hukou Registration 
                    Local Hukou Registration 
       Temporary      Permanent  
 
Current 
Hukou 
Type 
 
Rural  
(Agricultural) 
1.Temporary Migrants     
Rural-Urban 
 
Residents in village inside a city 
  (not include in analysis) 
Urban 
(Non-
Agricultural) 
2. Temporary Migrants   
Urban-Urban 
3. Urban non-migrants 
4.Permanent migrants  
     Rural-Urban 
5.Permanent migrants  
      Urban-Urban 
   
     Using the CGSS 2003, migrant status is derived from the responses to the following four 
questions: First, “What is your Hukou status now?” with answers of “urban Hukou status” or 
“rural Hukou status.” Second, “Where is your Hukou location now?” with answers of “local 
Hukou registration” or “non-local Hukou registration.” Third, “Have you ever had the experience 
of converting your Hukou status from rural to urban?” with answers of “yes” or “no.” Fourth, 
“How many times have you changed your Hukou location?” with answers of actual numbers. 
 The urban non-migrants are those who have no experience of converting Hukou type from rural 
to urban and changing their Hukou location, and hold the urban Hukou type and local Hukou 
registration in 2003. Temporary migrants from rural to urban are those who have rural Hukou 
status in 2003.Temporary migrants from urban to urban are those who hold urban Hukou status 
and non-local Hukou registration in 2003. Permanent migrants from rural to urban are those who 
have the experience of converting their Hukou status from rural to urban and hold the urban 
Hukou status and local Hukou registration in 2003. Permanent migrants from urban to urban are 
those who hold the urban Hukou status and local Hukou registration in 2003, have experience of 
changing their Hukou location, but have no experience in converting Hukou status from rural to 
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urban. 
      Using the CGSS 2008, migrant status is derived from the responses to the following five 
questions: First, “What is your Hukou status now?” with the answer of “urban Hukou status” or 
“rural Hukou status.” Second, “Where is your Hukou location now?” with answers of “local 
Hukou registration” or “non-local Hukou registration.” Third, “Where did you live before you 
were 14 years old?” with answers of “urban area” or “rural area.” Fourth, “In which year did you 
get your urban Hukou status?” with answers of “I was born with an urban Hukou status” or 
actual years. Fifth, “In which year did you get your local Hukou registration?” with answers of “I 
was local here” or actual years. 
      Urban non-migrants are those who lived in urban areas before 14 years of age, are local 
people, hold urban Hukou status, and local Hukou registration in 2008. Temporary migrants from 
rural to urban are those who hold rural Hukou status and non-local Hukou registration in 2008. 
Temporary migrants from urban to urban are those who hold urban Hukou status and non-local 
Hukou registration in 2008. Permanent migrants from rural to urban are those who lived in rural 
areas before 14 years old and are not local people, but hold urban Hukou status and local Hukou 
registration in 2008. Permanent migrants from urban to urban are those who lived in urban areas 
before 14 years of age and are not local people, but hold urban Hukou status and local Hukou 
registration in 2008. 
Table 4.2 presents the numbers of the five groups in the CGSS 2003 and CGSS 2008. 
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         Table 4.2  No. of groups in CGSS 2003 and CGSS 2008 
                 Number 
    2003   2008 
Urban Non-Migrants     1630   1705 
Temporary Migrants from Rural to Urban       423     364 
Temporary Migrants from Urban to Urban       200     288 
Permanent Migrants from Rural to Urban     1615     540 
Permanent Migrants from Urban to Urban 
Total 
    1677 
    5545 
    183 
  3080 
   
 
4.3 Methods 
   Hukou based institutional inequality and discrimination in China refers to the phenomenon in 
which people are treated differently according to the different categories (rural or urban) and 
locations of their household registration. Under this system, some 700–800 million people are in 
effect treated as second-class citizens, deprived of the opportunity to settle legally in cities and of 
access to most of the basic welfare and state-provided services enjoyed by regular urban 
residents. To an individual, hukou status is an important ascribed attribute in determining one’s 
social and economic circumstances (Chan, 2010).  
       In studying labour market returns in urban China, researchers have consistently observed 
that rural migrants have been suffering significantly unequal employment opportunities and 
wages (Knight & Li, 2005; Meng & Kidd, 1997). But a more recent study argues the rural 
migrants’ lower wages compared  to urban locals were attributed to their deficits in pre-market 
endowments, such as age, work experience and education, rather than on-market discrimination, 
such as occupation segmentation and wage discrimination (Démurger, Gurgand, Li, & Yue, 
2009). By comparing urban locals and rural migrants who subsequently obtained urban hukou, 
Fan (2001; 2002) finds that the latter group performed better in labour market than the former. 
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       In this study, the Hukou based inequality or discrimination was first measured by the 
independent effects of migrant status on earnings and occupational attainments in multivariate 
analysis. Effects of human capital and ownership sectors variables were controlled.  Secondly, 
decomposition analysis decomposed the original gap in earnings and occupational attainments 
between migrant groups and urban non-migrants into components of explained gaps (gaps can be 
attributed to difference in characteristics) and unexplained gaps (gaps can be attributed to 
discrimination).  
   The first part of the empirical analyses (Chapter 5) involves examining whether migrant groups 
receive higher or lower earnings compared to urban non-migrants.  For this analysis, multiple 
regression is used since the dependent variable is a continuous variable. The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method is then used to decompose the original log earnings gap between migrant 
groups and urban non-migrants into components of explained gaps (gaps can be attributed to 
difference in characteristics) and unexplained gaps (gaps can be attributed to discrimination).  
   The dependent variable for multiple regression is hourly income in 2002 and 2007 (Ln).The 
income data in the China General Social Survey are based on one single question that asks about 
the total earnings in the past 12 months. Only positive and non-zero incomes are included. 
Weekly income is measured by dividing total gross earnings from 2002 and 2007 by 52. Hourly 
income is measured by dividing the weekly wage by working hours per week which is a variable 
available in the dataset. Hourly income rather than monthly income is used because some people 
work more hours than others to get a higher monthly income; thus, hourly income can measure 
earnings differences more precisely. The use of log earnings rather than raw earnings has been 
widely adopted because raw earnings distribution is not linear and it produces larger errors in 
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regression analysis for higher earnings levels (Portes & Zhou, 1996). The use of log earnings 
avoids this problem and allows regression results to be interpreted as percentage changes. 
   There are two types of independent variables in the multiple regression: migrant status, as well 
as human capital variables and ownership sectors.  
    The first type of independent variable, migrant status, includes four variables: 1) temporary 
migrants from rural to urban, 2) temporary migrants from urban to urban, 3) permanent migrants 
from rural to urban, and 4) permanent migrants from urban to urban. Each of these four 
independent variables is a dummy-coded variable, with urban non-migrants as a reference group.  
   In measuring human capital, Xie (1996) modifies Mincer’s (1974) human capital model for 
contemporary China into the form of:  
T = logY = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X22+ β4 X4 + β5 X5 + β6 X1X5 + є,…………………………….(4.1) 
where Y is earnings, X1 is years of schooling, X2 is years of work experience, X4 is a dummy 
variable denoting membership in the Communist Party of China, X5 is a dummy variable 
denoting gender. All βs are unknown parameters, and є is the residual unexplained by the model. 
Equation (1) deviates from Mincer’s model in two ways. First, Xie (1996) includes party 
membership in the model and interprets it as an aspect of human capital associated with political 
advantages. Second, the model is applied to both male and female workers and allows for 
differences between the sexes in the intercept as well as in the return to years of schooling. 
Following Xie’s (1996) model, the human capital variables in this study include years of 
schooling, years of work experience, and party membership. Differing from Xie, the model is 
applied separately for men and women. Difference in ownership sectors is also included in 
regression analysis. Lu (2006) and Lu (2008) argue that the ownership of enterprise (state-owned 
enterprises, township and village enterprises, joint ventures, foreign-invested firms) plays an 
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important role in determining a worker’s earnings.  
  Table 4.3 presents the main variables and their measurement in the analysis. 
                               Table 4.3 Main variables and their measurement 
Kinds of 
Variables 
Name of 
Variables 
  Indicators 
CGSS 2003 CGSS 2008 
Dependent 
Variable 
Ln (Hourly 
Income) 
Only positive and non-zero 
incomes are included. 
Weekly income=Yearly 
income/52. 
Hourly income= Weekly 
income/ working hours per 
week. 
Ln hourly income is a 
dependent variable in the 
regression analysis. 
Only positive and non-zero 
incomes are included. 
Weekly income=Yearly 
income/52. 
Hourly income= Weekly 
income/ working hours per 
week. 
Ln hourly income is a 
dependent variable in the 
regression analysis. 
Independent 
Variables 
Migrant 
Status 
Dummy coded for migrant 
status.  
Urban non-migrants=1, 
temporary migrants from 
rural to urban=2, 
temporary migrants from 
urban to urban=3, 
permanent migrants from 
rural to urban=4,  
permanent migrants from 
urban to urban=5 
Dummy coded for migrant 
status.  
Urban non-migrants=1, 
temporary migrants from 
rural to urban=2, 
temporary migrants from 
urban to urban=3, 
permanent migrants from 
rural to urban=4,  
permanent migrants from 
urban to urban=5 
Human Capital Variables 
Years of 
schooling  
Education level is measured 
in years of schooling 
completed: being illiterate is 
recoded as 0 years; 
completed primary school 
from first year to the sixth 
year is recoded as 6 years; 
completed junior high school 
is recoded as 9 years; 
completed high school 
diploma is recoded as 12 
years; completed vocational 
degree is recoded as 15 
years; completed university 
undergraduate program is 
recoded as 16 years; and 
completed graduate program 
Actual continuous variable 
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and above is recoded as 19 
years. 
Years of 
working 
Age-years of schooling-5 Age-years of schooling-5 
Party 
membership  
Party member=1,  
non-party member=0 
Party member=1,  
non-party member=0 
Gender  Male=1, female=0 Male=1, female=0 
Ownership 
sectors 
Dummy coded for ownership 
sectors of the enterprise.  
Government organization=1, 
State-owned enterprises=2,  
Collective enterprises=3, 
Privately-owned 
enterprises=4, 
Foreign-invested 
enterprises=5 
Dummy coded for 
ownership sectors of the 
enterprise.  
State-owned enterprises=1,  
Collective enterprises=2, 
Privately-owned 
enterprises=3  
Foreign-invested 
enterprises=4 
 
  In the first empirical part (Chapter 5), a descriptive analysis, multivariate analyses, and a 
decomposition analysis are conducted. The descriptive analysis consists of two major parts—
differences in human capital and ownership sectors by migrant status and earnings by migrant 
status.  
    In the multivariate analysis, a linear regression analysis was used to estimate earnings of men 
and women separately. The two types of potential explanatory variables were entered in separate 
blocks in a set of hierarchical regression models.  Ln hourly earnings for four migrant groups are 
compared to that of urban non-migrants when (1) other variables are not controlled (gross effect), 
and (2) other variables are controlled (net effect). Specifically, the multivariate analysis contains 
two models. Model 1 uses four migrant groups (temporary migrants from rural to urban, 
temporary migrants from urban to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent 
migrants from urban to urban) as independent variables. It shows the gross difference between 
migrant groups and urban non-migrants. Gross difference is the actual difference before other 
variables are controlled. Model 2 shows net differences when variations in human capital and 
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ownership sectors are taken into account. Human capital variables include years of schooling, 
work experience, and party membership. 
   To examine to what extent earnings differentials are due to discrimination, the Blinder and 
Oaxaca (OB) method of decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) is used following the 
regression analysis to decompose the earnings gap (1) between temporary migrants from rural to 
urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008, (2) between temporary migrants from rural to 
urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2003 and 2008, (3) permanent migrants 
from rural to urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008, and (4) permanent migrants from 
rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban in 2003 and 2008. The income gap 
between each of these two groups can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in 
individual characteristics and the other due to discrimination. The OB model is estimated in two 
steps. First, we estimate five separate wage equations—one for each group (group1, urban non-
migrants; group 2, temporary migrants rural-urban; group 3, temporary migrants urban-urban; 
group 4, permanent migrants rural-urban; group 5, permanent migrants urban-urban)—defining 
the OLS wage equation for each group as follows: 
  (j=group 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)………………………………………………(4.2) 
where refers to the hourly income (in Ln form) of individual i in corresponding group j, is 
a vector of standard control variables including years of schooling,  years of working, party 
membership dummies, and ownership sectors dummies.  is the intercept for group j. Next, the 
OLS results from was used, with  referring to sample means, and 
 are the OLS estimates for . 
   For a linear regression, the Binder-Oaxaca decomposition of the migrants/non-migrants gap in 
the average value of the dependent variable, Y=LnW, can be expressed as: 
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   LnWM-LnWN-M= [ …………………………...(4.3) 
where is a row vector of average values of the independent variables for group j and  is a 
vector of coefficient estimates for group j. The first term on the right-hand side, 
 is the wage gap due to differing individual characteristics (such as human 
capital) in the absence of discrimination. The second term,  measures the 
proportion of the relative wage gap due to discrimination. Discrimination is measured as the 
residual or the unexplained difference in the regression coefficients. 
        The second part of the empirical analysis (Chapter 6) involves examining occupational 
attainment of migrant groups and urban non-migrants. First, the descriptive analyses of 
occupational differences for individuals with different migrant status were conducted. In this 
study, the occupations outcomes are categorical dependent variables with two outcomes, 
therefore, logistic regressions are then conducted following the descriptive analyses. The main 
purpose logistic regression is to compare the likelihood of urban non-migrants and four migrant 
groups of being in ordinary, service and sales work controlling for the effects of human capital 
variables and ownership sectors. It is to test whether or not the observed distribution of 
occupational attainments between urban non-migrants and four migrants groups still holds if all 
other things are equal. Finally, OB decomposition using coefficients from logistic regression is 
conducted to estimate how much the occupational differentials can be attributed to 
discrimination.  
   The dependent variables are the most recent occupation in both 2002 and 2007. Occupation is 
classified into two categories: 1) managerial and professional work; 2) ordinary, service and 
sales work. The first category is “good job” in the primary segment, with adequate pay, fringe 
benefits and career development opportunities; while the second category is “bad job’ in the 
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secondary segment, with low wages, poor working conditions and little job security. In 
regression, managerial and professional work was recoded as 0, and ordinary and service or sales 
work was recoded as 1.  
   The logistic regression model is as follows:  
   P(Y)= …………………………………………………………………………………..(4.4) 
  Where Z= ……………………………………………………………(4.5) 
     P(Y) is the probability of working in ordinary, service and sales work. β0 is the intercept of Y. 
β1 represents a series of regression coefficients that show the amount that Y changes for each unit 
change in each X. Xi refers to a series of independent variables. 
       The independent variables in the logistic regression model, as with independent variables in 
multiple regression, involve, first, the migrant status variables, including temporary migrants 
from rural to urban, temporary migrants from urban to urban, permanent migrants from rural to 
urban, and permanent migrants from urban to urban; and, second, background variables, 
including years of schooling, years of work experience, party membership, gender, as well as 
ownership of the enterprise. The measurement of these variables is provided in Table 3.  
      In logistic regression, the two types of independent variables were entered in separate blocks 
in a set of hierarchical regression models. Occupational attainments of the four migrant groups 
are  compared to that of urban non-migrants when (1) other variables are not controlled, and (2) 
other variables are controlled. Specifically, the logistic regression analyses contain two models. 
Model 1 uses four migrant groups (temporary migrants from rural to urban, temporary migrants 
from urban to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent migrants from 
urban to urban) as independent variables. Model 2 shows net differences when variations in 
human capital and ownership sectors are taken into account.  
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   To examine to what extent occupations differentials are due to discrimination, the Blinder and 
Oaxaca method of decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) is used following the logistic 
regression to decompose the occupations difference amongst (1) temporary migrants from rural 
to urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008, (2) temporary migrants from rural to urban 
and permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2003 and 2008, (3) permanent migrants from rural 
to urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008, and (4) permanent migrants from rural to 
urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban in 2003 and 2008. 
      For a logistic regression, the Binder-Oaxaca decomposition of the migrants/non-migrants gap 
in the probability of working in ordinary, service and sales work, P(Y=1), can be expressed as: 
Total Gap=   ……………………………………………(4.6) 
Explained Gap=    and ……………………………….(4.7) 
Unexplained Gap=   ……………………………………....(4.8) 
     where is a row vector of average values of the independent variables for group j and  is 
a vector of coefficient estimates for group j. The explained gap is the gap due to differing 
individual characteristics (such as human capital) in the absence of discrimination. The 
unexplained gap measures how much of the difference in occupational attainments is due to 
discrimination.  
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CHAPTER 5 ECONOMIC RETURNS OF MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS 
  
    The purpose of this chapter is to examine economic returns of migrant groups and urban non-
migrants in 2003 and 2008 to see first whether non-migrants have higher earnings than migrants 
and second whether the effect of migrant status decreases in 2008 compared to in 2003.  
   Literature has produced conflicting evidence on migrants and non-migrants who have higher 
earnings (Chan, 1996; Li,1997; Fan, 2001; Liu, 2005; Lu, 2006; Li, 2007; Lu, 2008). The 
controversy partly has to do with using different ways to define migrants. Different papers 
compared earnings of urban non-migrants with those of different migrants; for example some 
studies (Chan, 1996; Liu, 2005; Lu, 2006; Li, 2007) compared earnings of urban non-migrants 
and temporary migrants while others (Li, 1997; Fan, 2001; Lu, 2008) compared earnings of 
urban non-migrants and permanent migrants, thus producing different conclusions. Based on the 
differences in Hukou status, Hukou location and Hukou origins, this chapter classifies migrants 
into four groups of temporary migrants from rural to urban, temporary migrants from urban to 
urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent migrants from urban to urban, 
and compared earnings of these four groups with those of urban non-migrants in 2003 and in 
2008. 
   Market transition theory suggests that inequality under one system can be reduced by 
introducing an alternative mechanism. Thus, the penetration by market factors will undermine 
the inequalities created by redistribution under socialist regimes (Szelenyi, 1983). Comparing the 
earnings difference between migrant groups and urban non-migrants in 2003 and in 2008, this 
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chapter examines whether the effect of migrant status decreases with the development of a 
market economy in China. 
   The first part of the analysis involves describing differences in characteristics and mean hourly 
earnings of different groups. The second part of the analysis involves developing a regression 
model to examine whether earnings of urban non-migrants are higher than those of migrant 
groups. Returns are measured in hourly income (Ln). The analysis first compares the gross 
differences or effects of migrant status, or in other words, differences before other explanatory 
variables are being considered. Net differences or effects are then discussed after variations in 
human capital and ownership sectors are taken into account.  The third part of the analysis 
involves decomposing the earnings difference (1) between temporary migrants from rural to 
urban and urban non-migrants, (2) between temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban, (3) between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
urban non-migrants, and (4) between permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent 
migrants from urban to urban in both 2003 and 2008. This is to examine how much of the 
earnings difference is due to discrimination and whether the discrimination decreases from 2003 
to 2008.  
 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
   There are some notable differences in the characteristics of different groups. Table 5.1 presents 
the means and percentages of selected variables by migrant status in 2003. 
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  Table 5.1 Percentages, means of selected variables by migrant status in 2003 
 Urban Non- 
Migrants 
 
Temporary 
Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
Temporary 
Migrants 
Urban-Urban  
Permanent 
Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
Permanent 
Migrants 
Urban-Urban  
Mean 
Mean Years of Schooling  10.7        8.2      11.2       9.9     11.4 
Mean Years of Working 28.4       26.9      26.5     31.6     31.0 
Mean Work Hours/Week  41.2       39.8      43.4     42.5     43.0 
Percentage (%) 
Party Member           14.1         5.9      15.9      23.5     22.5 
Gender 
  Male           51.8       40.7      51.5      48.4     45.3 
  Female           48.2       59.3      48.5      51.6 54.7 
Ownership Sector 
  Government Organization   3.5        2.8        1.2        8.0   5.6 
  State-owned Enterprises 64.1      17.4      60.1      60.0 72.6 
  Collective Enterprises 12.7        7.3        5.8      14.2 11.0 
  Privately-owned Enterprises 17.6      70.4      28.9      16.7   9.3 
  Foreign-invested Enterprises   2.2        2.0        4.0        1.0   1.3 
      
In terms of mean years of schooling, migrants from urban to urban have more years of schooling 
than other groups, with 11.4 years and 11.2 years respectively for permanent migrants from 
urban to urban and temporary migrants from urban to urban; followed by urban non-migrants 
with 10.7 years; migrants from rural to urban have fewer years of schooling than others, with 9.9 
years and 8.2 years respectively for permanent migrants from rural to urban and temporary 
migrants from rural to urban. The ordering of mean years of working is permanent migrants from 
rural to urban with 31.6 years, permanent migrants from urban to urban with 31.0 years, urban 
non-migrants with 28.4 years, temporary migrants from rural to urban with 26.9 years and 
temporary migrants from urban to urban with 26.5 years. Party membership is held by 23.5 
percent of permanent, while 22.5 percent of permanent migrants from urban to urban are party 
members, 15.9 percent of temporary migrants from urban to urban are party members, and 14.1 
percent of urban non-migrants and 5.9 percent of temporary migrants from rural to urban are 
71 
 
party members. The results for ownership of enterprise by migrant status indicate that those who 
have urban hukou status are more likely to work in state owned sectors either in government 
organizations or state-owned enterprises, for example, 78.2 percent of permanent migrants from 
urban to urban, 68.0 percent of permanent migrants from rural to urban，67.6 percent of urban 
non-migrants，61.3 percent of temporary migrants from urban to urban work in government 
organization or state-owned enterprises. Only 20.2 percent of temporary migrants from rural to 
urban work in state owned sectors and 70.4 percent of them work in private owned enterprises. 
This results indicate that people with urban Hukou status are more likely to work in state-owned 
sectors, while people with rural Hukou status would work in private-owned enterprises. 
    Undoubtedly, differences in background variables affect the economic returns of different 
groups unequally, and these variations have to be taken into account in the regression models. 
   Table 5.2  Percentages, means of selected variables by migrant status in 2008 
 Urban 
Non- 
Migrants 
Temporary 
Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
Temporary 
Migrants 
Urban-Urban  
Permanent 
Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
Permanent 
Migrants 
Urban-Urban  
Mean 
Mean Years of Schooling     11.0         9.4     12.0   10.0 11.2 
Mean Years of Working     22.9       10.2     17.2   25.0 28.7 
Mean Work Hours/Week      52.3       66.0     58.7   52.9  45.5 
Percentage (%) 
Party Membership     13.4         2.7     11.1   23.0 24.0 
Gender 
  Male     50.4       45.3     49.0    46.3 45.9 
  Female     49.6       54.7     51.0    53.7 54.1 
Ownership Sector 
  State-owned Enterprises 54.4         8.6     37.1    62.2 69.8 
  Collective Enterprises 13.4         6.7       6.9      9.7   9.9 
  Privately-owned Enterprises 29.0       77.5     46.8    26.0 17.4 
  Foreign-invested Enterprises   3.2         7.1       9.3      2.0   2.9 
 
Table 5.2  presents the means and percentages of selected variables by migrant status in 2008. In 
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terms of mean years of schooling, in common with results from CGSS2003, migrants from urban 
to urban still have more years of schooling than other groups, with 12.0 years and 11.2 years 
respectively for temporary migrants from urban to urban and permanent migrants from urban to 
urban; followed by urban non-migrants with 11.0 years; migrants from rural to urban have fewer 
years of schooling than others, with 10.0 years and 9.4 years respectively for permanent migrants 
from rural to urban and temporary migrants from rural to urban. The ordering of mean years of 
working from CGSS2008 is also the same with results from CGSS 2003, permanent migrants 
from urban to urban with 28.7 years, permanent migrants from rural to urban with 25.0 years, 
urban non-migrants with 22.9 years, temporary migrants from urban to urban with 17.2 years and 
temporary migrants from rural to urban with 10.2 years. In terms of party membership, 
permanent migrants are more likely to be party members than other groups, with 24.0 percent 
and 23.0 percent respectively for permanent migrants from urban to urban and permanent 
migrants from rural to urban; 13.4 percent of urban non-migrants are party members; temporary 
migrants are less likely to hold party membership, as 11.1 percent of temporary migrants from 
urban to urban and 2.7 percent of temporary migrants from rural to urban are party members.  
   As  with CGSS 2003, in 2008 people with urban Hukou status were more likely to work in state 
enterprises, for example, 69.8 percentage permanent migrants from urban to urban, 62.2 
percentage permanent migrants from rural to urban, 54.4 percentage urban non-migrants work 
and 37.1 percent of temporary migrants from urban to urban work in state-owned enterprises. 
Temporary migrants from rural to urban, with rural Hukou status, have the least chance to work 
in state enterprises (8.6 percent) and have the longest work hours per week (66.0) among five 
groups.  
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    To summarize, from the CGSS 2003 and CGSS 2008 data it appears that there were some 
differences in characteristics between permanent migrants, urban non-migrants and temporary 
migrants. Undoubtedly, differences in background variables affect the economic returns;  it is 
possible that earnings difference between five groups can be explained by the variations in 
human capital and ownership sectors. In order to explore this further we turn to multivariate 
analysis of earnings and these variations have to be taken into account in the regression. 
 
5.1.1 Earnings of different migrant groups over time 
    I first present some descriptive results about the mean hourly incomes of different migrant 
groups for male and female. Table 5.3 presents the mean hourly incomes of five groups in 2003 
and 2008.  
                Table 5.3  Mean hourly incomes by migrant status in 2003 and 2008    
        Mean Hourly Income (yuan) 
              2003         2008 
  Male   Female   Male Female 
Urban Non-Migrants 
Temporary Migrants from Rural to Urban 
Temporary Migrants from Urban to Urban 
Permanent Migrants from Rural to Urban 
Permanent Migrants from Urban to Urban 
Total 
   4.5 
   4.4 
   5.9 
   4.9 
   5.3 
   4.9 
     3.5 
     2.2 
     5.4 
     2.8 
     4.2 
     3.5 
  10.0 
    7.7 
  16.4 
  10.3 
  10.5 
  10.4 
  7.3 
  6.0 
10.5 
  5.4 
  8.6 
  7.2 
 
     From the smallest to the largest, in 2003, male temporary migrants from rural to urban had the 
smallest mean hourly income (4.4), male urban non-migrants had the second smallest mean 
hourly income (4.5), followed by male permanent migrants from rural to urban (4.9) and male 
permanent migrants from urban to urban (5.3), while male temporary migrants from urban to 
urban had the highest mean hourly income (5.9) among five groups. For females, female 
temporary migrants from rural to urban had the smallest mean hourly income (2.2), female 
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permanent migrants from rural to urban had second smallest mean hourly income (2.8), followed 
by female urban non-migrants (3.5) and female permanent migrants from urban to urban (4.2), 
while female temporary migrants from urban to urban had the highest mean hourly income (5.4) 
among five groups.  Females as a whole had smaller mean hourly income than male, and each 
female group had smaller mean hourly income than their male counterpart.  
    Earnings rankings of the five groups present the same patterns in 2003 and in 2008.  From 
smallest to the largest, in 2008, male temporary migrants from rural to urban had the smallest 
mean hourly income (7.7), male urban non-migrants had the second smallest mean hourly 
income (10.0), followed by male permanent migrants from rural to urban (10.3) and male 
permanent migrants from urban to urban (10.5), and male temporary migrants from urban to 
urban had the highest mean hourly income (16.4). In 2008, female permanent migrants from 
rural to urban had the smallest mean hourly income (5.4), female temporary migrants from rural 
to urban had the second smallest mean hourly income (6.0), followed by female urban non-
migrants (7.3) and female permanent migrants from urban to urban (8.6), while female 
temporary migrants from urban to urban had the highest mean hourly income (10.5). In 2008, 
each female sub-group also had smaller mean hourly income than their male counterpart.  
In summary, temporary migrants from rural to urban had the lowest mean hourly income in 
both 2003 and 2008 for both males and females, while temporary migrants from urban to urban 
had the highest mean hourly income in both 2003 and 2008 for both males and females. 
Permanent migrants from urban to urban had higher mean hourly income than urban non-
migrants in both 2003 and 2008 for both males and females. The difference in income patterns 
between males and female is that, for males, except for temporary migrants from rural to urban, 
other three migrant groups all had higher mean hourly income than male urban non-migrants in 
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two years. However, for females, mean hourly income of two migrant groups from rural area 
(whether permanent or temporary) was not only smaller than their male counterpart but also 
smaller than female urban non-migrants and female migrants from urban area in two years, this 
indicates that female migrants from rural area were doubly disadvantaged because their gender 
and rural origin status. 
 The income patterns indicate that permanent migrants from urban to urban are the most 
privileged and successful elite, followed by urban non-migrants, and finally by temporary rural 
migrants at the bottom of the hierarchy. Rural Hukou status plays a negative role in individuals’ 
earnings, while migration experience would have positive contribution to individuals’ earnings if 
holding urban Hukou status.   
       
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
      5.2.1 Multivariate analysis in 2003 
      In order to disentangle the effects of achieved attributes, such as education, from the effects 
of institutional attributes, I conduct a regression analysis that evaluates the relative contributions 
of three groups of independent variables, migrant status, human capital variables and ownership 
sectors. Earnings are estimated separately for men and women using two models. The first model 
calculates the gross earnings difference of migrant groups compared to urban non-migrants. The 
second model estimates the net earnings of the groups after taking into account variations in the 
human capital variables which include years of schooling, years of work experience and party 
membership and ownership sectors.  These results are reported in Table 5.4 for 2003 and Table 
5.5 for 2008. 
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The Model 1 in Table 5.4 shows the gross effect of migrant status compared to urban non-
migrants for males; “temporary migrants from rural to urban”, “temporary migrants from urban 
to urban”, “permanent migrants from rural to urban” and “permanent migrants from urban to 
urban” are four dummy variables, where the reference group is urban non-migrants.   Male 
temporary migrants from urban to urban had 0.422 in ln earnings more than male urban non-
migrants. Male permanent migrants from rural to urban had 0.189 in ln earnings more than male 
urban non-migrants. Male permanent migrants from urban to urban had 0.333 in ln earnings 
more than male urban non-migrants. In common with male urban non-migrants, these three 
groups all hold urban Hukou status, but they have migration experience.  The coefficient for 
temporary migrants from rural to urban was positive but not significant. These figures represent 
the log earnings disparity of different migrant groups with urban non-migrants. In other words, 
male temporary migrants from urban to urban, male permanent migrants from rural to urban, and 
male permanent migrants from urban to urban had a clear income advantage compared to male 
urban non-migrants before variations in other variables are being considered. Male temporary 
migrants from rural to urban, with rural Hukou status, had no significant earning differences with 
male urban non-migrants.  
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       Table 5.4  Estimated effects of two models to logged hourly income in 2003 
                    Male                Female 
Model 1    Model  2        Model 1       Model 2 
B β B β B β B      β 
Constant 
 
1.119*** 
(.036) 
 -.075 
(.124) 
 1.050*** 
(.042) 
 -.403** 
(.137) 
 
Migrant Status (reference: urban non-migrants) 
Temporary Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
-.105 
(.091) 
-.026 .005 
(.088) 
.001 -.334** 
(.107) 
-.077 -.007 
(.100) 
   -.002 
Temporary Migrants 
Urban-Urban 
.422*** 
(.106) 
.089 .305** 
(.098) 
.064 .426** 
(.131) 
.078 .357** 
(.116) 
    .066 
Permanent Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
.189*** 
(.050) 
.096 .114* 
(.047) 
.058 -.130* 
(.059) 
-.062 -.019 
(.052) 
   -.009 
Permanent Migrants 
Urban-Urban 
.333*** 
(.051) 
.165 .184*** 
(.048) 
.091 .174** 
(.055) 
 .090 .072 
(.049) 
    .037 
Human Capital 
Years of Schooling .100*** 
(.007) 
.382  .116*** 
(.007) 
    .456 
Years of Work Experience .005** 
(.002) 
.075  .006** 
(.002) 
    .093 
Party Membership (reference: non-party   
                                     member) 
.156*** 
(.045) 
.078  .200** 
(.058) 
    .076 
Ownership Sectors (reference: state-owned organizations) 
State-owned Enterprises     -.050 
    (.058) 
-.026  .057 
(.064) 
 .030 
Collective-owned Enterprises    -.303*** 
    (.085) 
-.089  -.305*** 
(.081) 
-.107 
Privately-owned Enterprises     .038 
    (.074) 
.015  -.118 
(.079) 
-.044 
Foreign invested Enterprises     .050 
    (.180) 
.006  .477** 
(.169) 
 .062 
R Square .027        .179             .030              .249 
Adjusted R Square .026       .175             .028              .245 
 N 2143        2143             1798             1798 
Significance level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; ***0.001 
       Since part of the difference in returns for male migrant groups and male urban non-migrants 
may be related to variations in their features, it is essential to control for other variations to 
compare the net difference in returns. Model 2 for males in Table 5.4 shows the net effects of 
migrant status compared to urban non-migrants for males after controlling for the variations in 
human capital and work-related features. When the human capital variables are considered 
conjointly, the estimated coefficients associated with education, work experience, and party 
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membership are all statistically significant and have signs consistent with the prediction from 
human capital theory. The coefficient of years of schooling (0.100) indicates that each additional 
year of schooling increased log earnings by 10 percent when variations in other variables in the 
equation were taken into account. The slope of years of work experience (0.005) suggests that 
each additional year of work experience raised net log earnings by 0.5 percent. The coefficient of 
party membership (0.156) shows that those who were party members earned 0.156 in net log 
earnings more than those who were not party members. Male workers in collective enterprises 
have 0.303 lower in net log earnings compared to those who work in government organizations; 
earnings of male workers in state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and enterprises with 
foreign investment are not significantly different from those of male workers in government 
organizations.  
      The inclusion of these human capital variables and ownership sectors considerably narrows 
the original earnings difference between migrant groups and urban non-migrants and weakens 
the migrant status effects. The log earnings difference between temporary migrants from urban to 
urban and urban non-migrants reduced from 0.422 to 0.305, the log earnings difference between 
permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants reduced from 0.189 to 0.114 and 
the log earnings difference between permanent migrants from urban to urban and urban non-
migrants was reduced from 0.333 to 0.184. These results indicate that, first, male permanent 
migrants and temporary migrants from urban to urban had a net advantage in log earnings 
compared to male urban non-migrants and, second, some of the original earnings advantage of 
male permanent migrants and male temporary migrants from urban to urban can be attributed to 
variations in human capital variables and ownership sectors. Coefficients of temporary migrants 
from rural to urban in both Model 1 and Model 2 were not significant, which means there is little 
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earnings difference between male temporary migrants from rural to urban and male urban non-
migrants.  The result  indicates that those male migrants who have urban Hukou registration 
(permanent male migrants from urban to urban, permanent male migrants from rural to urban 
and temporary male migrants from urban to urban) continue to earn more than male urban non-
migrants, earnings of temporary migrants from rural to urban is not significantly different from 
that of urban non-migrants.  
    Model 1 for males also shows that using migrant status as the only explanatory variable, 2.6 
percent (Adjusted R2=0.026) of the variation in the log earnings can be explained, but when the 
independent variables of human capital and ownership sectors entered simultaneously, the 
explained variance  increased to 17.5 percent (Adjusted R2=0.175). 
    The Model 1 for females in Table 5.4 shows the gross effect of migrant status compared to 
urban non-migrants. Before variations in other variables were being considered, female 
temporary migrants from rural to urban earned 0.334 less in log earnings than female urban non-
migrants; female temporary migrants from urban to urban had 0.426 in log earnings more than 
female urban non-migrants; female permanent migrants from rural to urban earned 0.130 less in 
log earnings than female urban non-migrants; female permanent migrants from urban to urban 
had 0.174 in log earnings more than female urban non-migrants. These figures indicate that 
females who were from rural areas (temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent 
migrants from rural to urban) had lower gross earnings than female urban non-migrants, but 
those who were from urban areas (temporary migrants from urban to urban and permanent 
migrants from urban to urban) had higher gross earnings than female urban non-migrants before 
variations in other variables are being considered.      
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    The Model 2 for females in Table 5.4 indicates the net effects of migrant status compared to 
urban non-migrants after variations in human capital and ownership sectors were taken into 
account. With regard to the coefficients of human capital variables and ownership sectors, the 
results reveal the following findings. First, each additional year of schooling increased the 
earnings of females by 11.6 percent after controlling for other variables. Second, one additional 
year of work experience raised net log earnings of females marginally by 0.6 percent. Third, 
those who were party members earned 0.2 in net log earnings more than those who were not 
party members. Fourth, female workers in collective enterprises had 0.305 lower in net log 
earnings compared to workers in government organizations; earnings of female workers in 
foreign invested enterprises earned 0.477 higher in net log earnings than those in government 
organizations; and earnings of female workers in state-owned enterprises and private-owned 
enterprises were not significantly different from those of female workers in government 
organizations.      
   After controlling for variations in human capital and ownership sectors, the original earnings 
difference between female migrant groups and female urban non-migrants was considerably 
narrowed and migrant status effects were also weakened. The log earnings difference between 
female temporary migrants from urban to urban and female urban non-migrants reduced from 
0.426 to 0.357, which means although the earnings advantage decreased, female temporary 
migrants from urban to urban still earned 0.357 more in net log earnings than female urban non-
migrants. The coefficients of temporary migrants from rural to urban, permanent migrants from 
rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban were not significant after variations 
in human capital and ownership sectors were considered. In other words, there was little 
difference in net returns between female temporary migrants from rural to urban, female 
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permanent migrants from rural to urban, and female permanent migrants from urban to urban, 
compared to female urban non-migrants and the original log earnings difference was mainly due 
to variations in human capital variables and ownership sectors.  
     Model 1 for females in Table 5.4 also shows that, when using migrant status as the only 
explanatory variable, 2.8 percent (Adjusted R2=0.028) of the variation in the log earnings can be 
explained, but when the independent variables of human capital and ownership sectors entered 
simultaneously, the explained variance is increased to 24.5 percent (Adjusted R2=0.245). 
To summarize, in 2003 male migrants with urban Hukou status (temporary migrants from urban 
to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban, permanent migrants from urban to urban) had 
higher gross and net earnings than did urban non-migrants. Earnings of male migrants with rural 
Hukou status were not significantly different from those of urban non-migrants. Some of the 
original earnings advantage of male migrants with urban Hukou status can be attributed to 
variations in human capital variables and ownership sectors. 
    For females, those who were from rural areas (temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban) had lower gross earnings than female urban non-
migrants, but those who were from urban areas (temporary migrants from urban to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban) had higher gross earnings than female urban non-
migrants. After variations in other variables are considered, except for the finding that temporary 
migrants from urban to urban had higher net earnings than urban non-migrants, there was little 
earnings difference between urban non-migrants and other migrant groups. In other words,  the 
original log earnings difference for females was mainly due to variations in human capital 
variables and ownership sectors.  
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  5.2.2 Multivariate analysis in 2008 
     In order to examine whether the effects of institutional attributes still play an important role in 
determining income in 2008, regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the relative 
contributions of three relevant groups of independent variables, migrant status, human capital 
variables, and working conditions variables to earnings. As with the previous analysis, hourly 
earnings are estimated separately for men and women using two models. The first model 
calculates the gross differences or effect of different migrant status on earnings. The second 
model estimates the net differences of comparative groups after taking into account variations in 
the human capital variables which include years of schooling, years of work experience and 
party membership and also taking into account variations in ownership sectors. These results are 
reported in Table 5.5. Column 1 to column 4 are for males, and column 5 to column 8 are for 
females.  
     The Model 1 for males in Table 5.5 shows the gross effect of migrant status compared to 
urban non-migrants. Male permanent migrants from urban to urban had 0.301 in log earnings 
more than male urban non-migrants. The coefficients for temporary migrants from rural to urban, 
permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent migrants from urban to urban are not 
significant, indicating that earnings of these groups are not significantly different from those of 
urban non-migrants. In other words, except for male temporary migrants from urban to urban, 
there was little difference between the earnings of other male migrant groups and those of male 
urban non-migrants in 2008 before variations in other variables are considered.  
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         Table 5.5  Estimated effects of two models to hourly earnings  in 2008 
                       Male                              Female 
Model 1          Model  2         Model 1       Model 2 
B β B β B β B  β 
Constant 
 
1.897**
* 
(.031) 
 .803*** 
(.135) 
 1.624**
* 
(.030) 
 .471*** 
(.133) 
 
Migrant Status (reference: urban non-migrants) 
Temporary Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
-.141 
(.089) 
-.043  .000 
 (.097) 
  .000 -.003 
(.095) 
-.001 .150 
(.093) 
 .045 
Temporary Migrants 
Urban-Urban 
.301** 
(.094) 
.087  .234** 
 (.089) 
  .069 .456*** 
(.091) 
.142 .310*** 
(.082) 
 .100 
Permanent Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
.070 
(.071) 
.027  .073 
 (.067) 
  .029 -.133 
(.074) 
-.052 -.052 
(.068) 
-.021 
Permanent Migrants 
Urban-Urban 
.139 
(.111) 
.034  .046 
 (.104) 
.012 .279** 
(.105) 
.076 .200* 
(.093) 
.057 
Human Capital 
Years of Schooling .095*** 
 (.008) 
 .357  .110*** 
(.008) 
.428 
Years of Work Experience  .001 
 (.002) 
 .009  .002 
(.002) 
.034 
Party Membership (reference: non-party   
                                   member)  
 .156** 
  (.059) 
 .075  .185* 
(.074) 
.069 
Ownership Sectors (reference: state-owned enterprises) 
Collective-owned Enterprises  -.129 
 (.086) 
 -.040  -.218** 
 (.069) 
-.086 
Privately-owned Enterprises  -.013 
 (.059) 
 -.006   -.112 
 (.060) 
-.061 
Foreign invested Enterprises  .371** 
 (.121) 
  .082    .059 
 (.124) 
.013 
R Square .011 .167  .029   .237 
Adjusted R Square .008            .160            .026             .230 
 N 1390 1298            1239             1157 
Significance level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; ***0.001 
     The Model 2 for males in Table 5.5 indicates the net effects of migrant status compared to 
urban non-migrants after variations in human capital and ownership sectors were taken into 
account. The variable of years of schooling affected the net log earnings positively. The 
coefficient indicates that one additional year of schooling increased the net returns of males by 
9.5 percent. The slope of years of work experience is not significant. In other words, years of 
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work experience had no net effect on the net log earnings for males in 2008. The effect of party 
membership is also significant. It shows that those who are party members earned 0.156 in log 
earnings more than those who are not party members when effects of other variables were taken 
into account. Male workers in foreign invested enterprises had 0.371 higher in net log earnings 
compared to workers in state owned enterprises; earnings of male workers in collective 
enterprises and private-owned enterprises were not significantly different from those of workers 
in state owned enterprises.  
    When human capital variables and ownership sectors were considered in conjunction with one 
another, the log earnings difference between temporary migrants from urban to urban and urban 
non-migrants was reduced from 0.301 to 0.234, while the coefficients of temporary migrants 
from rural to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent migrants from urban 
to urban still were not significant, indicating that net earnings of these groups were not 
significantly different from those of urban non-migrants. In Model 1 and Model 2 for males, only 
the coefficient for temporary migrants from urban to urban was significant, while coefficients for 
other migrants groups were not significant, which suggests that migrant status is not a significant 
determinant for earnings for males in 2008. 
    Model 1 for males also shows that using migrant status as the only explanatory variable, 0.008 
percent (Adjusted R2=0.008) of the variation in the log earnings can be explained, but when the 
independent variables of human capital and ownership sectors are entered simultaneously, the 
explained variance  increases to 16.0 percent (Adjusted R2=0.160). For males, the regression 
model appears to fit better in 2003 than in 2008. 
    The Model 1 for females in Table 5.5 show the gross effect of migrant status compared to 
urban non-migrants for female. Female permanent migrants from urban to urban had 0.456 in log 
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earnings more than male urban non-migrants. Female permanent migrants from urban to urban 
had a gross advantage of 0.279 in log earnings compared to female urban non-migrants. The 
coefficients of female temporary migrants from rural to urban and female permanent migrants 
from rural to urban are not significant, indicating that earnings of these groups are not 
significantly different from those of female urban non-migrants. These results indicate that 
female migrants from urban areas (temporary and permanent migrants from urban to urban) had 
higher gross earnings than female urban non-migrants in 2008 and female migrants from rural 
areas (temporary and permanent migrants from rural to urban) had little earnings difference with 
female urban non-migrants in 2008 before variations in other variables are considered.  
The Model 2 for females in Table 5.5 shows the net effects of migrant status compared to urban 
non-migrants after variations in human capital and ownership sectors are taken into account. The 
coefficients for years of schooling, years of work experience, party membership and ownership 
sectors show that, first, one additional year of schooling increased net earnings for females by 
11.0 percent;  second, the slope of years of work experience is not significant meaning that years 
of work experience had no net effect on the net log earnings for females in 2008; third, those 
who are party members earned 0.185 in net log earnings more than those who are not party 
members;  and,  fourth, female workers in private owned and foreign invested enterprises had 
little earnings differences with workers in state owned enterprises, while female workers in 
collective enterprises earned 0.218 in net log earnings less than workers in state owned 
enterprises.  
     After controlling for variations in human capital and ownership sectors, the original earnings 
difference between female migrant groups and female urban non-migrants was considerably 
narrowed and migrant status effects were also weakened. The coefficient for migrant status show 
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that the original advantage for female temporary migrants from urban to urban was reduced to 
0.310 in log earnings; the original advantage for female permanent migrants from urban to urban 
was reduced to 0.200 in log earnings; the coefficients of female temporary migrants from rural to 
urban, female permanent migrants from rural to urban still were not significant after variations in 
human capital and ownership sectors were considered. These results indicate that female 
migrants from urban areas (temporary and permanent migrants from urban to urban) had a net 
earnings advantage relative to urban non-migrants and there was little difference in net returns 
between female migrants from rural areas (temporary and permanent migrants from rural to 
urban) and female urban non-migrants when other variables were controlled.  
Model 1 for males also shows that using migrant status as the only explanatory variable, 2.6 
percent (Adjusted R2=0.026) of the variation in the log earnings can be explained, but when the 
independent variables of human capital and ownership sectors are entered simultaneously, the 
explained variance  increases to 23.0 percent (Adjusted R2=0.230). 
      To summarize, in 2008, other than male temporary migrants from urban to urban areas who 
had higher gross and net earnings than urban non-migrants, there was little difference in gross 
and net earnings between male urban non-migrants and other migrant groups. For males, migrant 
status was not an important factor in determining earnings in 2008.  
      For females, migrants who were from urban areas (temporary migrants from urban to urban 
and permanent migrants from urban to urban) had higher gross and net earnings than female 
urban non-migrants. The earnings of migrants who were from rural areas (temporary migrants 
from rural to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban) were not significantly different 
from those of urban non-migrants. Some of the original earnings advantage of female migrants 
from urban areas can be attributed to variations in human capital variables and ownership sectors.  
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5.3 Decomposition analysis 
   Although earnings differences between different migrant groups are reported in regression 
results (Table 5.4 and Table 5.5), it is not clear to what extent such earnings differentials are due 
to discrimination. Using the Blinder and Oaxaca method of decomposition (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973), it is possible to decompose the original earnings difference between different 
groups into several components. The tables showing the calculations of the decomposition are in 
Appendix A to H, and the summary of decomposition is given in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7.   
Table 5.6 Decomposing the earnings disparity of Temporary migrants rural-urban with Urban 
non-migrants and Permanent migrants rural-urban in 2003 and 2008 
 
 
 
Temporary Migrants Rural-
UrbanVS. Urban Non-Migrants 
Temporary Migrants Rural-UrbanVS. 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 
 2003  2008  2003  2008 
Total Difference   -0.29 -0.16  -0.28 -0.06 
Explained difference   0.09  0.02   0.10  0.13 
Unexplained difference -0.38 -0.18  -0.38 -0.19 
     Column 1 and column 2 in Table 9 present the decomposition of earnings difference between 
temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008. The 
calculations are provided in Appendix A and B. In column 1, the decomposition shows that of 
the original Ln hourly earnings difference of -0.29 in 2003, 0.09 can be attributed to differences 
in levels of characteristics, such as differences in schooling, years of working, party membership, 
gender and ownership sectors. The unexplained difference is -0.38. In other words, if levels of 
the characteristics between these two groups are the same, temporary migrants from rural to 
urban expect to earn 0.09 more than urban non-migrants, but they actually earn 0.29 less than 
urban non-migrants, while the unequal returns of other unmeasured factors produce an effect of  
-0.38. In 2008, the original earning difference is -0.16 while the explained difference and 
unexplained difference are 0.02 and -0.18 respectively. Comparing the results of 2003 and 2008, 
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the original earnings difference between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
migrants decreased from -0.27 to -0.16, and the unexplained difference which is the effect of 
unmeasured factors decreased from -0.36 to -0.18. That is to say, the earnings difference between 
temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants decreased from 2003 to 2008 
and the effect of unmeasured factors also decreased. 
   Column 3 and column 4 in Table 9 present the decomposition of earnings difference between 
temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2003 and 
2008. The calculations are provided in Appendix C and D. In 2003, the earnings difference is -
0.28; it is found that 0.10 of the original differences can be attributed to different levels of 
characteristics between temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from 
rural to urban. Furthermore, unexplained differences produce an effect of -0.38 for temporary 
migrants from rural to urban. That means, if human capital and working sectors of temporary 
migrants from rural to urban are the same as those of permanent migrants from rural to urban, 
temporary migrants from rural to urban are expected to earn 0.10 more than temporary migrants 
from rural to urban, but they actually earn 0.28 less than urban non-migrants; the unequal returns 
of other unmeasured factors produce an effect of -0.38. The decomposition of earnings 
difference between these two groups in 2008 shows that the original Ln earnings difference is -
0.06, the explained difference which is attributed to the different levels of characteristics 
between two groups  is 0.13, and the unexplained difference is -0.19. That is to say, in 2008, if 
levels of characteristics of these two groups are the same, temporary migrants from rural to urban 
would expect to have 0.13 more earnings than permanent migrants from rural to urban, but in 
fact their earnings are -0.06 less, the unequal returns of other unmeasured factors produce an 
effect of -0.19. Comparing the results for 2003 and 2008, the earnings difference between 
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temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban decreased 
from -0.27 to -0.06, the unexplained difference which is the effect of unmeasured factors 
decreased from -0.37 to -0.19. In other words, the earnings difference between temporary 
migrants from rural to urban and urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban decreased 
from 2003 to 2008 and the discrimination against temporary migrants from rural to urban also 
decreased. In summary, from 2003 to 2008, the earnings gap between temporary migrants from 
rural to urban and other groups have been reduced, while the effect of unmeasured factors on the 
earnings of temporary migrants from rural to urban also decreased significantly.  
Table 5.7 Decomposing the earnings disparity of Temporary migrants rural-urban with Urban 
non-migrants and Permanent migrants rural-urban in 2003 and 2008 
 
 
 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 
VS. Urban Non-Migrants 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban VS. 
Permanent Migrants Urban-Urban  
 2003  2008     2003    2008 
Total Difference   0.00 -0.10    -0.23   -0.22 
Explained difference   0.04 -0.03   -0.09(38.6%)   -0.12(53.4%) 
Unexplained difference -0.04 -0.07   -0.14(61.4%)   -0.10(46.6%) 
   
    Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5.7 present decomposition of earnings difference between 
permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants, and columns 3 and 4 present 
decomposition of earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban. The calculations are provided in Appendices E to H. 
Column 1 shows that in 2003 the original ln earnings difference between temporary migrants 
from rural to urban and urban non-migrants is 0.00;  0.04 can be attributed to differences in 
levels of characteristics, such as differences in schooling, years of working, party membership, 
gender, and ownership sectors. The unexplained difference is -0.04. In other words, if levels of 
the characteristics between these two groups are the same, permanent migrants from rural to 
urban expect to earn 0.04 more than permanent migrants from urban to urban, but they actually 
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earn the same as permanent migrants from urban to urban, as the unequal returns of other 
unmeasured factors produce an effect of -0.04. In 2008, the original earning difference is -0.10; 
the explained difference and unexplained difference is -0.03 and -0.07 respectively. That is to 
say, in 2008, 30 percent of the original difference between permanent migrants from rural to 
urban and urban non-migrants can be attributed to differences in levels of characteristics between 
these two groups, while 70 percent of the original differences are due to the effect of unmeasured 
factors. 
    Column 3 and column 4 in Table 5.7 present the decomposition of earnings difference 
between permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban in 
2003 and 2008. The calculations are provided in Appendix G and H. In 2003, the earnings 
difference is -0.23;  it is found that -0.09 of the original differences can be attributed to different 
human capital and working sectors between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban. Furthermore, unexplained differences produce an 
effect of -0.14 which accounts for 61.4% of the total earnings gap. That means, of the -0.23 
earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants 
from urban to urban in 2003, 38.6% of the difference can be attributed to the differences in 
human capital and working sectors, and 61.4% of the difference is attributed to the effect of 
unmeasured factors. The decomposition of earnings difference between these two groups in 2008  
show that the original ln earnings difference is -0.22, the explained difference which is attributed 
to the different levels of characteristics between  two groups is -0.12, and the unexplained 
difference is -0.10. That is to say, of the -0.22 earnings difference between permanent migrants 
from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban in 2008, 53.4% of the 
difference can be attributed to the differences in human capital and working sectors, and 46.6% 
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of the difference is attributed to the effect of unmeasured factors. Comparing the results of 2003 
and 2008, the earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban slightly decreased from -0.23 to -0.22, but the effect of 
unmeasured factors decreased from 61.4% of the total difference to 46.6% of the total difference. 
In other words, the earnings difference between temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban decreased from 2003 to 2008 and the effect of 
unmeasured factors also decreased.  
 
 5.4 Summary 
   In summary, in 2003, male migrants with urban Hukou status (temporary migrants from urban 
to urban, permanent migrants from rural to urban, and permanent migrants from urban to urban) 
had higher earnings than male urban non-migrants either before or after variations in other 
factors were controlled. Earnings of male migrants with rural Hukou status were not significantly 
different from those of male urban non-migrants. In 2008, migrant status was not an important 
factor in determining income for males; earnings of migrant groups were not significantly 
different from those of urban non-migrants, except for temporary migrants from urban to urban 
who had significant higher earnings than urban non-migrants.  
For females, those who were from rural areas (temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban) had lower gross earnings than female urban non-
migrants, but those who were from urban areas (temporary migrants from urban to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban) had higher gross earnings than female urban non-
migrants in 2003. After variations in other variables are considered, except for temporary 
migrants from urban to urban who had higher net earnings than urban non-migrants, there was 
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little earnings difference between urban non-migrants and other migrant groups. In 2008, 
migrants who were from urban areas (temporary migrants from urban to urban and permanent 
migrants from urban to urban) still maintained higher gross and net earnings than female urban 
non-migrants. The earnings of migrants who were from rural areas (temporary migrants from 
rural to urban, and permanent migrants from rural to urban) were not significantly different from 
that of urban non-migrants.  
    Thus, it can be said in general that male migrants had higher earnings than urban non-migrants 
in 2003, while in 2008, there was little earnings difference between migrant groups and urban 
non-migrants; the effect of migrant status was not an important factor in determining male’s 
earnings in 2008. For females, migrants from urban areas had a significant earnings advantage in 
both 2003 and 2008; female migrants from rural areas had lower gross earnings than urban non-
migrants in 2003 but there was little earnings difference between female migrants from rural 
areas and urban non-migrants in 2008. From 2003 to 2008, the effect of migrant status on 
earnings decreased. 
      Results from decomposition analyses indicate that not only earnings difference of migrants 
from rural area (temporary and permanent migrants from rural to urban) with other groups 
decreased, but the unexplained difference which is effect of unmeasured factors also decreased 
from 2003 to 2008.  
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        CHAPTER 6 OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF MIGRANTS AND  
                                              NON-MIGRANTS 
   The previous chapter examined economic returns of migrant groups and urban non-migrants in 
2003 and 2008. The purpose of this chapter is to examine occupational attainment of migrant 
groups and urban non-migrants using data from CGSS 2003 and CGSS 2008 and to test whether 
migrant status affects individual’s occupational attainments and whether the effect of migrant 
status decreases in 2008 compared to in 2003. This is important because differing employment 
opportunities in certain occupations due to different migrant status, rather than productivity,  
result in occupational discrimination (Brown et al., 1980). Such discrimination is an artificial 
barrier and embodies the inequality under Hukou system.  
   The dependent variables are the most recent occupation in 2002 and in 2007. Occupation is 
classified into two categories: 1) managerial & professional work; 2) ordinary service & sales 
work. In regression, managerial & professional work was recoded as 0 and ordinary service & 
sales work was recoded as 1. The explanatory variables are the same as those in the last chapter, 
include years of schooling, years of work experience, party membership, gender and ownership 
sectors.  
   As in the last chapter, the first part of the analysis involves describing differences in 
occupational attainments of different groups. The second part of the analysis involves developing 
a logistic regression model to compare the likelihood of migrant groups and urban non-migrants 
of being in ordinary, service & sales work other than managerial & professional work. The 
analysis first estimates effects of migrant status, or in other words, differences before other 
explanatory variables are being considered. Next, occupational differences between migrant 
94 
 
groups and urban non-migrants are examined after controlling variations in human capital 
variables and ownership sectors. The third part of the analysis involves decomposing the 
occupational differentials between (1) temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
migrants (2) temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban 
(3) permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants and (4) permanent migrants 
from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban in both 2003 and 2008. This is 
to examine how much of the occupational differentials of these four pair of groups is attributed 
to discrimination and whether the discrimination decreases from 2003 to 2008.  
 
6.1 Descriptive analysis 
 Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 present occupational distribution of male and female with different 
migrant status in 2003 and 2008 respectively. Data from CGSS 2003 and CGSS 2008 both show 
that occupations were significantly related to migrant status (X2=83.724, pr=0.00 for male, 
X2=50.337,pr=0.00 for female in 2003; X2=48.248, pr=0.00 for male X2=63.449 pr=0.00 for 
female in 2008). 
   Comparing occupational distribution pattern for male and female, the pattern of five male 
groups is different from that of five female groups in both 2003 and 2008. However, 
occupational distribution pattern of five male groups in 2003 is same with that of five male 
groups in 2008, meanwhile, occupational distribution of five female groups presents same 
pattern in 2003 and in 2008.  
   In both 2003 and 2008, for both male and female, temporary migrants from rural to urban were 
most likely to be employed in ordinary, service & sales work among five groups. To be specific, 
79.7 percentage male temporary migrants from rural to urban and 85.5 percentage female 
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temporary migrants from rural to urban were employed in ordinary, service & sales works in 
2003, 83.0 percentage male temporary migrants from rural to urban and 83.1 percentage female 
temporary migrants from rural to urban were employed in ordinary & service work in 2008. This 
finding is consistent with the literature which demonstrates that rural migrants are concentrated 
in ordinary occupations such as production-line, service and construction work (Meng and Zhang, 
2001; Chen, 2010).  
    On the other hand, in both 2003 and 2008, for both male and female, permanent migrants from 
urban to urban were least likely to work in ordinary & service jobs among five groups. For 
example, 50.2 percentage male permanent migrants from urban to urban and 53.0 percentage 
female permanent migrants from urban to urban were employed in ordinary, service & sales 
work in 2003. 43.2 percent of male permanent migrants from urban to urban and 37.0 percent of 
female permanent migrants from urban to urban were employed in ordinary, service & sales 
work in 2008.   
    The main differences in occupational attainments between male and female is the different 
ranking of male and female permanent migrants from rural to urban. Male permanent migrants 
from rural to urban were second least likely to be employed in ordinary, service & sales work in 
both 2003 and 2008 among five groups while female permanent migrants from rural to urban 
were second most likely to be employed in ordinary, service & sales work in both 2003 and 2008 
among five groups. To be specific, in two years, the percent of being employed in ordinary, 
service & sales work for male permanent migrants from rural to urban (51.4 percent in 2003 and 
55.3 percent in 2008) was smaller than that for male urban non-migrants (68.2 percent in 2003 
and 65.0 percent in 2008) and male temporary migrants from urban to urban (61.8 percent in 
2003 and 56.9 percent in 2008). On the contrary, the percent of being employed in ordinary, 
96 
 
service & sales work for female permanent migrants from rural to urban (63.1 percent in 2003 
and 58.9 percent in 2008) was larger than that for female urban non-migrants (63.0 percent in 
2003 and 58.9 percent in 2008) and female temporary migrants from urban to urban (59.4 
percent in 2003 and 51.1 percent in 2008).  That is to say, occupational attainments of female 
migrants from rural area (whether temporary or permanent) are worse off urban non-migrants 
and migrants from urban area (whether temporary or permanent). However, occupational 
attainments of male permanent migrants from rural to urban are better than male urban non-
migrants and male temporary migrants from urban to urban.  
   Table 6.1 Occupational differences by migrant status in 2003 for Male and Female 
 
 
Professional & 
Managerial 
Ordinary, Service 
& Sale 
N 
Male Female Male  Female  
Urban non-migrants 31.8 37.0 68.2 63.0 1199 
Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban 20.3 14.5 79.7 85.5 250 
Temporary Migrants Urban-Urban 38.2 40.6 61.8 59.4 153 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 48.6 36.9 51.4 63.1 1246 
Permanent Migrants Urban-Urban 49.8 47.0 50.2 53.0 1387 
Total 
 N 
 
41.9 
943 
39.4 
781 
58.1 
1309 
60.6 
1202 4235 
        40.7          59.3 
 
     Table 6.2 Occupational differences by migrant status in 2008 for Male and Female 
 
 
Professional & 
Managerial 
Ordinary, Service 
& Sale 
N 
Male Female Male  Female  
Urban non-migrants 35.0   41.1 65.0   58.9 1541 
Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban 17.0   16.9 83.0   83.1   319 
Temporary Migrants Urban-Urban 43.1   48.9 56.9   51.1   265 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 44.7   41.1 55.3   58.9   471 
Permanent Migrants Urban-Urban 56.8   63.0 43.2   37.0   173 
Total 36.8   40.3 63.2   59.7  
 N  509    558  875    827 2769 
        38.5          61.5  
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     Meanwhile, there were some differences in characteristics between five groups (as show in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 in previous chapter). Undoubtedly, differences in background variables 
affect the occupational attainment, it is possible that occupational differences between five 
groups can be explained by the variations in human capital and ownership sectors. In order to 
disentangle the effects of achieved attributes, such as education, work experience from the 
effects of institutional attributes, I conduct a logistic regression analysis that evaluates the 
relative contributions two groups of independent variables, migrant status, human capital 
variables. Two models were included in logistic regression analysis. The first model only 
includes migrant status variables, the second model estimates the occupational attainment of the 
groups after taking into account variations in the human capital variables which include years of 
schooling, years of work experience and party membership, gender and ownership sectors.  
These results are reported in Table 6.3 for 2003 and Table 6.4 for 2008. 
 
6.2 Logistic Regression analysis 
    Table 6.3 presents the results of the logistic regression using data from CGSS 2003. The 
results indicated that migrant status had significant effect on individual’s occupational 
attainments in 2003. In model 1, coefficients of temporary migrants from rural to urban and two 
permanent migrants groups were significant. Compared to urban non-migrants, temporary 
migrants from rural to urban were 2.4 times more likely to be employed in ordinary & service, 
sales works, permanent migrants from rural to urban were 32 percent less to work in ordinary & 
service, sales works, permanent migrants from urban to urban were 44 percent less likely to work 
in ordinary, service & sales occupations. In summary, before taking into account the variations 
of human capital and ownership sectors, permanent migrants had higher chance to be employed 
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in managerial & professional works relative to ordinary & service, sales works than urban non-
migrants; while temporary migrants from rural to urban were more likely to be employed in 
ordinary & service, sales works than urban non-migrants. In model 2, migrant status still had a 
significant effect on occupational attainments after taking into variables of human capital and 
ownership sectors. Coefficients of two permanent migrant groups were still significant and 
negative, that means compared to urban non-migrants, permanent migrants from rural to urban 
were 33 percent less likely to work in ordinary & service, sales works, permanent migrants from 
urban to urban were 19 percent less likely to work in ordinary & service, sales occupations. In 
contrast to model 1, temporary migrants from rural to urban are revealed in model 2 to have 
become less likely to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works, although the coefficient 
was not statistically significant. In other words, migrants had higher chances to be employed in 
managerial & professional works relative to ordinary & service, sales works than urban non-
migrants when differences in other variables were controlled in 2003.  
    As to the human capital variables, effects of all human capital variables on an individual’s 
occupational attainments were significant. To be specific, each additional year of schooling 
decreased the odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works by 36 percent when 
other factors were controlled; and each additional year of working decreased the odds of being 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works by 3 percent when other factors were controlled; 
those who were a party member were 77 percent less likely to work in ordinary & service, sales 
positions than those who were not party members; males were 1.4 times more likely to be 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works than females when other factors were taken into 
account. Ownership sectors had a statistically significant effect on individuals’ occupational 
attainments.  Compared to those who worked in state owned organization, those who worked in 
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state owned enterprises were 1.6 times more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales positions; 
those who worked in collective owned enterprises were 1.6 times more likely to work in ordinary 
& service, sales positions; and those who worked in privately owned enterprises were 3.4 times 
more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales positions when differences in other variables 
were controlled. Finally, the statistic measuring the “goodness of fit” (-2LL) indicates a good 
match between predicted and actual values in the dependent variable, and that the independent 
variables made a difference in predicting the odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales 
works (significant model χ2). 
Table 6.3 Logistic regression showing logits of occupational attainments in 2003,  
Dependent variable: probability of being employed in ordinary, service and sales works 
 
                Model 1                  Model 2 
Coefficients   Odds Coefficients  Odds Marginal   
Effects 
Constant  .653***        6.203***    
Migrant Status (reference: urban non-migrants) 
Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban  .877***     2.403    -.253   .776 -0.06106 
Temporary Migrants Urban-
Urban 
-.210       .811     -.274   .760 -0.06613 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban -.381***       .683    -.398***   .672 -0.09606 
Permanent Migrants Urban-
Urban 
-.583***       .558     -.215*   .807 -0.05189 
Human Capital 
Years of Schooling       -.446***   .640 -0.10764 
Years of Work experience       -.031***   .970 -0.00748 
Party Membership (reference: non-party member)    -1.457***   .233 -0.35165 
Gender (reference: female)         .317***  1.372 0.07651 
Ownership Sectors (reference: state-owned organizations) 
State-Owned Enterprises         .452***  1.572 0.10909 
Collective-owned Enterprises           .465**  1.591 0.11223 
Private-owned enterprises        1.228***  3.414 0.29638 
Foreign invested enterprises            .475  1.608 0.11464 
         N                  4326                          4240 
-2 log Likelihood               5722. 448                      3974.160 
Model Chi Square                122.098***                      1756.424*** 
R2                .028  .038                     .339    .458 
100 
 
  ***p≤0.05  
 
   Table 6.4 presents the results of the logistic regression using data from CGSS 2008. Migrant 
status played a significant role in determining individual’s occupational attainments in 2008. In 
model 1, coefficients of three migrant groups were significant, compared to urban non-migrants, 
temporary migrants from rural to urban were 2.4 times more likely to be employed in ordinary & 
service, sales works, temporary migrants from urban to urban were 29 percent less likely to work 
in ordinary & service, sales works,  permanent migrants from rural to urban were 32 percent less 
likely to work in ordinary & service, sales works, and permanent migrants from urban to urban 
were 44 percent less likely to work in ordinary & service, sales works. In summary, before 
taking into account the variations of human capital and ownership sectors, permanent migrants 
and temporary migrants from urban to urban had higher chances than urban non-migrants to be 
employed in managerial & professional work relative to ordinary & service, sales work; while 
temporary migrants from rural to urban were more likely to be employed in ordinary & service, 
sales works than urban non-migrants in 2008. In model 2, after taking into account variations in 
human capital variables and ownership sectors, migrant status still had a significant effect on 
occupational attainment. Coefficients of temporary migrants from rural to urban and two 
permanent migrants groups were significant. Compared to urban non-migrants, permanent 
migrants from rural to urban were 28 percent less likely to work in ordinary & service, sales 
works, permanent migrants from urban to urban were 52 percent less likely to work in ordinary 
& service, sales works; in contrast to results from CGSS 2003, temporary migrants from rural to 
urban were 1.4 times more likely to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works compared to 
urban non-migrants in 2008. In other words, permanent migrants had higher chances to be 
employed in managerial & professional work relative to ordinary & service, sales works than 
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urban non-migrants, however temporary migrants from rural to urban had higher chances to be 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works rather than managerial & professional work than 
urban non-migrants when differences in other variables were controlled in 2008.  
   Effects of all human capital variables on individual’s occupational attainments were significant 
using CGSS 2008. The odds for the variable “years of schooling” shows that each additional 
year of schooling decreased the odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works by 32 
percent when other factors were controlled; and each additional year of working decreased the 
odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works by 2 percent when other factors were 
controlled; those who were a party member were 68 percent less likely to work in ordinary & 
service, sales positions than those who were not party members; males were 1.8 times more 
likely to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works than female when other factors were 
taken into account. In 2008, ownership sectors didn’t have a significant effect on individual’s 
occupational attainment.  Compared to those who worked in state owned organization, those who 
worked in privately owned enterprises were 1.4 times more likely to work in ordinary & service, 
sales positions when differences in other variables were controlled. The occupational attainment 
of those who worked in collective enterprises and foreign invested enterprises wasn’t 
significantly different from those who worked in state owned enterprises. Finally, the statistic 
measuring the “goodness of fit” (-2LL) indicates a good match between predicted and actual 
values in the dependent variable, and that the independent variables made a difference in 
predicting the odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales work (significant model χ2). 
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Table 6.4 Logistic regression showing logits of occupational attainments in 2008, 
 Dependent variable: probability of being employed in ordinary, service and sales works 
 
              Model 1               Model 2 
Coefficients odds Coefficients  Odds Marginal 
Effects 
Constant .508***   5.167***      
Migrant Status (reference: urban non-migrants) 
Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban 1.108*** 3.029    .352* 1.423      .0833 
Temporary Migrants Urban-Urban -.344* .709   -.189   .828     -.0448 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban -.121 .886   -.329**    .720     -.0779 
Permanent Migrants Urban-Urban -.890*** .411   -.728***    .483     -.1724 
Human Capital  
Years of Schooling      -.383***    .682      -.0907 
Years of Work experience      -.024***    .976      -.0057 
Party Membership (reference: non-party member) -1.135***    .321      -.2687 
Gender (reference: female)       .577***  1.780       .1366 
Ownership Sectors (reference: state-owned enterprises) 
Collective-owned Enterprises       .061   1.063       .0144 
Private-owned enterprises       .302**   1.353       .0715 
Foreign invested enterprises       .078   1.081       .0185 
N               2855                             2769 
-2 Log Likelihood           3670.735                        2871.140 
Model Chi Square          114.244***                          820.584*** 
   R2           .039  .053                        .256     .348 
***p≤0.05 
     Comparing the effect of migrant status on individual’s occupational attainments in 2003 and 
2008, there was no sign that the effect decreased from 2003 to 2008. Coefficients of migrant 
status variables were significant after standardization of difference in characteristics in both 2003 
and 2008, which revealed that there is occupational inequality between people with different 
migrant status. In both years, permanent migrants, whether from rural to urban or from urban to 
urban, were more likely than urban non-migrants to be in professional & managerial work 
relative to ordinary, service & sales works. The only difference between 2003 and 2008 was in 
the occupational attainments of temporary migrants from rural to urban. Temporary migrants 
from rural to urban were less likely to be in ordinary & service, sales jobs than urban non-
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migrants after controlling variations in characteristics in 2003, however they were more likely to 
be in ordinary & service, sales works than urban non-migrants after taking into account 
variations in characteristics in 2008.  This result indicates that the inequality of occupational 
attainments between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants increased 
from 2003 to 2008.  
6.3  Decomposition Analysis 
    Logistic regression analyses indicated that there were significant occupational differences 
between people with different migrant status in both 2003 and 2008, however, it is not clear to 
what extent such occupational differences are due to discrimination. Using the Blinder and 
Oaxaca method of decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), it is possible to decompose the 
occupational differentials between different groups into components of explained gap (attributed 
to differences in levels of characteristics between these two groups) and unexplained gap 
(attributed to effect of unmeasured factors). The tables showing the calculations of the 
decomposition are in Appendix I to P, and the summary of decomposition is given in Table 6.5 
and Table 6.6.   
Table 6.5 Decomposing the occupational differentials of Temporary migrants rural-urban with 
Urban non-migrants and Permanent migrants rural-urban in 2003 and 2008 
 
 
 
Temporary Migrants Rural-UrbanVS. 
Urban Non-Migrants 
Temporary Migrants Rural-UrbanVS. 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 
  2003     2008     2003           2008 
Total Difference      0.16     0.22     0.27           0.29 
Explained difference     0.12 (72%)     0.13 (58%)   0.17(63%)           0.10 (35%) 
Unexplained difference    0.04 (28%)     0.09 (42%)   0.10(37%)           0.19 (65%) 
 
   Column 1 and column 2 in Table 6.5 present the decomposition of difference in odds of being 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works between temporary migrants from rural to urban 
and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008. The calculations are provided in Appendices I and J. 
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In column 1, the decomposition shows that of the original difference in odds of being employed 
in ordinary & service, sales occupations was 0.16 in 2003, 0.12 can be attributed to differences in 
levels of characteristics, such as differences in schooling, years of working, party membership, 
gender and ownership sectors. The unexplained difference is 0.04. In other words, if levels of the 
characteristics between these two groups were the same, temporary migrants from rural to urban 
were expected to be 0.12 more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales positions than urban 
non-migrants, but they were actually 0.16 more likely than urban non-migrants to be employed 
in ordinary & service, sales works, the unequal returns of other unmeasured factors produce an 
effect of 0.04. That is to say in 2003, 72 percent of original differentials in occupational 
attainments between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants can be 
attributed to differences in levels of characteristics between these two groups, while 28 percent 
of the original differences are due to the effect of unmeasured factors. In 2008, the original 
difference is 0.22, the explained difference and unexplained difference are 0.13 and 0.09 
respectively. That is to say in 2008,  if levels of the characteristics between these two groups are 
same, temporary migrants from rural to urban are expected 0.13 more likely to work in ordinary 
& service, sales positions than urban non-migrants, other unmeasured factors make them 0.09 
more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales positions than urban non-migrants.  58 percent 
of original difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants 
can be attributed to differences in levels of characteristics between these two groups, while 42 
percent of the original differences are due to the effect of unmeasured factors. Comparing the 
results of 2003 and 2008, the original difference in odds of being employed in ordinary & service, 
sales works between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants increased 
from 0.16 to 0.22, the unexplained difference which is the effect of unmeasured factors increased 
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from 0.04 to 0.09. That is to say, differentials of occupational attainments between temporary 
migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants increased, and effect of unmeasured factor 
also increased from 2003 to 2008.  
    Column 3 and column 4 in Table 6.5 present the decomposition of differences in odds of being 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works between temporary migrants from rural to urban 
and permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2003 and 2008. The calculations are provided in 
Appendices K and L. In 2003, the total difference is 0.27, it is found that 0.17 of the original 
differences can be attributed to different levels of characteristics between temporary migrants 
from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban. Furthermore, unexplained 
differences produce an effect of 0.10 of temporary migrants from rural to urban. That means, if 
human capital and working sectors of temporary migrants from rural to urban are same as those 
of permanent migrants from rural to urban, temporary migrants from rural to urban are expected 
to be 0.17 more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales works than permanent migrants from 
rural to urban, but they are actually 0.27 more likely than urban permanent migrants from rural to 
urban, the unequal effect of other unmeasured factors make temporary migrants from rural to 
urban 0.10 more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales positions. That is to say in 2003, 63 
percent of original difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
migrants can be attributed to differences in levels of characteristics between these two groups, 
while 37 percent of the original differences are due to the effect of unmeasured factors.  In 2008, 
the decomposition of difference in odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works 
between these two groups shows that the total difference is 0.29, the explained difference which 
is attributed to the different levels of characteristics between two groups is 0.10, and the 
unexplained difference is 0.19. That is to say, in 2008, if levels of characteristics of these two 
106 
 
groups are same, temporary migrants from rural to urban are expected only 0.10 more likely to 
be employed in ordinary & service, sales works than permanent migrants from rural to urban, but 
in fact they are 0.29 more likely to work in ordinary & service, sales works than permanent 
migrants from rural to urban, the unequal effects of other unmeasured factors produce an effect 
of 0.19.  65 percent of original difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
urban non-migrants can be attributed to differences in levels of characteristics between these two 
groups, while 35 percent of the original differences are due to the effect of unmeasured factors.  
Comparing the results of 2003 and 2008, the difference in odds of being employed in ordinary & 
service, sales works between temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants 
from rural to urban increased from 0.27 to 0.29, the unexplained difference which is the effect of 
unmeasured factors increased from 0.10 to 0.19. In other words, compared to permanent 
migrants from rural to urban, the chance of temporary migrants from rural to urban to be 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works increased from 2003 to 2008 and the discrimination 
against temporary migrants from rural to urban also increased. In summary, from 2003 to 2008, 
temporary migrants from rural to urban had an increased likelihood of being employed in 
ordinary & service, sales works compared to urban non-migrants and permanent migrants from 
rural to urban, meanwhile the effect of unmeasured factors on the occupational attainments of 
temporary migrants from rural to urban also increased significantly.  
Table 6.6 Decomposing the occupational differentials of Permanent migrants rural-urban with 
Urban non-migrants and with Permanent migrants rural-urban in 2003 and 2008 
 
 
 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 
VS. Urban Non-Migrants 
Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban VS. 
Permanent Migrants Urban-Urban  
 2003          2008           2003            2008 
Total Difference  -0.11        -0.0606           0.08            0.22 
Explained difference  -0.03 (26%)       -0.0004 (0.6%)           0.14            0.13 (60%) 
Unexplained difference -0.08 (74%)      -0.0602 (99.4%)          -0.06            0.09 (40%) 
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  Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6.6 present decomposition of difference in odds of being employed in 
ordinary & service, sales works between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
migrants, columns 3 and 4 present decomposition of difference in odds of being employed in 
ordinary & service, sales works between permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent 
migrants from urban to urban.  The calculations are provided in Appendix M to P. Column 1 
shows that in 2003 the original gap between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban 
non-migrants is -0.11, -0.03 can be attributed to differences in levels of characteristics, such as 
differences in schooling, years of working, party membership, gender and ownership sectors. 
The unexplained difference is -0.08. In other words, if levels of the characteristics between these 
two groups are same, permanent migrants from rural to urban are expected 0.03 less likely than 
urban non-migrants to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works, but the actual result 
reveals 0.11 less likelihood of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works, the effect of 
other unmeasured factors make permanent migrants from rural to urban 0.08 less likely to be 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works than urban non-migrants. In 2003, 26 percent of the 
original occupational difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
migrants can be attributed to differences in levels of characteristics between these two groups, 
while 74 percent of the original differences are due to the effect of unmeasured factors. In 2008, 
the original difference in odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works is -0.0606, 
the explained difference and unexplained difference is -0.0004 and -0.0602 respectively. That is 
to say, permanent migrants from rural to urban are 0.0606 less likely than urban non-migrants to 
be employed in ordinary & service, sales works; if levels of the characteristics between these two 
groups are the same, permanent migrants from rural to urban would be only 0.004 less likely to 
work in ordinary & service, sales positions, and  the effect of other unmeasured factors make 
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permanent migrants from rural to urban 0.0602 less likely to be employed in ordinary & service, 
sales works than urban non-migrants. In 2008, 0.6 percent of occupational differentials between 
permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants can be attributed to differences 
in levels of characteristics between these two groups, while 99.4 percent of the original 
differences are due to the effect of unmeasured factors. In summary, compared to urban non-
migrants, the chance of permanent migrants from rural to urban to be employed in ordinary & 
service, sales works decreased from 2003 to 2008, however the effect of unmeasured factors 
increased from 2003 to 2008.   
   Column 3 and column 4 in Table 6 present the decomposition of difference in odds of being 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works between permanent migrants from rural to urban 
and permanent migrants from urban to urban in 2003 and 2008. The calculations are provided in 
Appendix O and P. In 2003, the total difference is 0.08, it is found that 0.14 of the original 
differences can be attributed to different human capital and working sectors between permanent 
migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban, furthermore, 
unexplained differences produce an effect of -0.06. The decomposition of occupational 
difference between these two groups in 2008 show that the original difference is 0.22, the 
explained difference which is attributed to the different levels of characteristics between  two 
groups  is 0.13, and the unexplained difference is 0.09. That is to say, if levels of the 
characteristics between these two groups are the same, permanent migrants from rural to urban 
are expected to be only 0.13 more likely than permanent migrants from urban to urban to be 
employed in ordinary & service, sales works, but the actual difference is that they are 0.22 more 
likely to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works; the effect of other unmeasured factors 
make permanent migrants from rural to urban 0.09 more likely to be employed in ordinary & 
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service, sales works than permanent migrants from urban to urban. In 2008, 60 percent of the 
difference in odds of being employed in ordinary & service, sales works between permanent 
migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban can be attributed to the 
differences in human capital and working sectors, and 40 percent of the difference is attributed to 
the effect of unmeasured factors. Comparing the results of 2003 and 2008, compared to 
permanent migrants from urban to urban, the chance of permanent migrants from rural to urban 
to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works increased from 2003 to 2008.  
 
6.4 Summary 
     In summary, in 2003, migrant status had a significant effect on individuals’ occupational 
attainment after controlling for education, work experience, party membership, gender, and 
ownership sectors. Permanent migrants (whether from rural to urban or urban to urban) were less 
likely to employed in ordinary & service, sales works than urban non-migrants either before or 
after variations in human capital variables and ownership sectors were controlled for. Temporary 
migrants from rural to urban were less likely to be in ordinary & service, sales works after 
controlling variations in human capital and ownership sectors variables, although the coefficient 
was not significant. In 2008, migrant status still had a significant effect on people’s occupational 
attainments after controlling for human capital variables and ownership sectors. Two permanent 
migrant groups were still less likely than urban non-migrants to be employed in ordinary & 
service, sales works, while temporary migrants from rural to urban were more likely than urban 
non-migrants to be employed in ordinary & service, sales works either before or after variations 
in human capital variables and ownership sectors were controlled. 
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     Results from logistic regression analyses indicated that there was no sign that effect of 
migrant status on individuals’ occupational attainments decreased from 2003 to 2008. At the 
same time, results from decomposition analyses also support this finding. The occupational 
differentials between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants; between 
temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban; and 
between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants, increased from 2003 to 
2008, meanwhile, the proportion of effect of unmeasured factors in total occupational 
differentials also increased from 2003 to 2008. The results from decomposition analyses 
indicated that not only did migrant status have a significant effect on individuals’ occupational 
attainments in both 2003 and 2008, but the occupational discrimination against migrants from 
rural areas increased as well.  
    Findings from this chapter indicate that migrant status continues to significantly influence 
individuals’ occupations, after controlling for other factors in both 2003 and 2008. Temporary 
migrants from rural to urban are more likely to be in ordinary, service and sales works than urban 
non-migrants. At the same time, unexplained occupational gap between migrants from rural area 
and other groups increased from 2003 to 2008. These findings show evidence of occupational 
discrimination based on migrant status. 
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        CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION: ARE URBAN NON-MIGRANTS THE RIGHT   
                                            REFERENCE GROUP? 
 
   To address the effects of the Hukou system and  labour market discrimination against migrants, 
most of the existing literature uses local residents as a reference group and compares labour 
market returns of rural and urban migrants (Chen, 2010) or temporary and permanent migrants 
(Fan, 2001) to that of  local residents.  (Knight and Song, 1999b; Meng and Zhang, 2001, Wang 
et al., 2002; Appleton et al., 2005). In the previous part, I also use local residents which are 
urban non-migrants in this dissertation as a reference group and compare earnings and 
occupational attainments of urban non-migrants to that of four migrant groups. In the following 
part, comparing earnings and occupational attainments separately of four pairs of (1) temporary 
migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban (2) Urban non-migrants 
and Temporary migrants rural-urban (3) Urban non-migrants and Permanent migrants urban-
urban (4) Permanent migrants rural-urban and Permanent migrants urban-urban,  this thesis is to 
further investigate the effect of Hukou type, migration selection and Hukou origin. 
 
     7.1  Effect of Hukou type: Temporary migrants rural-urban VS. Permanent Migrants 
rural-urban   
    By comparing the earnings and occupational attainments between temporary and permanent 
migrants from rural to urban, the pure Hukou type effect can be separated as both groups are 
migrants from rural origin but differ only by Hukou type they hold. Permanent migrants from 
rural to urban hold urban Hukou type while temporary migrants from rural to urban hold rural 
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Hukou type. The results of the multiple and logistic regression for temporary migrants from rural 
to urban and permanent migrants from rural to urban are presented in Table 7.1 
    Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7.1 show the results of multiple regression of net effects of Hukou 
type on log earnings in 2003 and 2008 separately. The coefficients of permanent migrants rural-
urban (temporary migrants rural-urban=0) are not statistically significant after controlling for 
variation in human capital and ownership sectors in both 2003 and 2008. The results indicate that 
permanent migrants from rural to urban had little net earnings difference with temporary 
migrants from rural to urban, original log earnings differences can be attributed to different 
characteristics of two groups and different Hukou type had little effect on log earnings in both 
2003 and 2008.   
   Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7.1 show the results of logistic regression of net effects of Hukou 
type on occupational attainments in 2003 and 2008 separately. Coefficients of permanent 
migrants rural-urban are not statistically significant when variations in human capital and 
ownership sectors are controlled, which means there was little difference in occupational 
attainments between permanent migrants from rural to urban and temporary migrants from rural 
to urban in 2003 and 2008 with other factors being equal. That is to say, different Hukou type 
had little net effect on occupational attainments in 2003 and 2008.  
    Results from multiple and logistic regression indicate that there was little difference in  log 
earnings and occupational attainments between temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2003 and 2008 with other factors being equal, in other 
words, different Hukou type had little net effect on individual’s labour market returns in both 
2003 and 2008.  
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Table 7.1 Labour Market Returns of Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban V.S. Permanent Migrants 
Rural-Urban 
Significance level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; ***0.001 
 
  7.2 Disadvantage of Hukou type and advantage of migration: Urban non-migrants VS.    
               Temporary migrants rural-urban 
  Table 7.2 shows results of multiple and logistic regression of earnings and occupational 
attainments of temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants in both 2003 and 
2008. Columns 1 and 2 present results of multiple regression of log earnings. The coefficients of 
temporary migrants rural-urban (urban non-migrants=0) are not statistically significant after 
controlling for variation in human capital and ownership sectors in both 2003 and 2008. That is 
to say there was little difference in net log earnings between temporary migrants from rural to 
urban and urban non-migrants, original log earnings differences can be attributed to different 
characteristics of two groups. 
   Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7.2 show results of logistic regression of occupational attainments. 
In 2003, occupational attainments of temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
                                                                              Earnings    Occupational Attainments 
2003 2008    2003     2008 
Permanent migrants rural-urban (Ref: 
Temporary migrants rural-urban ) 
.072 -.123    -.071     -.471 
Years of Schooling .093*** .095***    -.437***   -.349*** 
Years of Working .002 .000    -.028***    -.026* 
Party Membership .180** .122    -1.501***    -.967** 
Gender .227*** .246***       .189     .541* 
Ownership sectors (Reference: State-owned organization) 
State-owned Enterprises .175**        .381  
Collective-owned Enterprises -.121 -.195       .355     .719 
Privately-owned Enterprises  .096 -.276**     1.417***     .689* 
Foreign-invested Enterprises .563* .328       .039    -.055 
Constant -.213   .819***     5.831***   4.664*** 
   R Square .223  .218 .254 .243    .372   .505   .283 .387 
N 1373   575        1496       636 
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migrants were not significantly different from each other after controlling variation in human 
capital and ownership sectors. In 2008, temporary migrants from rural were 1.5 times2 more 
likely to be ordinary, service and sales works than urban non-migrants with other factors being 
equal. This reflects occupational discrimination against temporary migrants from rural to urban 
in 2008. 
     Urban non-migrants are individuals who were born in the city and hold local urban Hukou 
status, while temporary migrants from rural to urban, without urban Hukou type and local Hukou 
registration, are at a disadvantage in terms of Hukou status. However,  through comparing 
earnings and occupational attainments between these two groups, little net earnings difference 
were found in 2003 and 2008 and there was little difference in occupational attainments in 2003 
with other factors being equal. Original difference in labour market returns between these two 
groups can mostly be explained by their difference in human capital and ownership sectors. 
Compared to urban non-migrants, temporary migrants from rural to urban were not at a 
significant disadvantage in terms of labour market returns in both 2003 and 2008. It is possible 
that temporary migrants from rural to urban obtain a premium for migration (due to positive 
migration selection), but also be discriminated against due to their temporary and rural Hukou 
status. These two opposing effects may produce the results that little difference in labour market 
returns between these two groups when human capital variables and ownership sectors are 
controlled.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Exp(.415)=1.5 
115 
 
Table 7.2 Labour market returns of urban non-migrants and temporary migrants rural-urban 
Significance level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; ***0.001 
 
7.3 Effect of Migration Selection: Urban non-migrants VS. Permanent migrants urban-
urban 
     Migration is not a random process. Migrants positively self-select into urban labour markets 
based on individual human capital characteristics – many of which are unobserved. As such, 
migrants’ labour market returns likely include a premium related to these unobserved 
characteristics (Gagnon et.al., 2011). To evaluate the true extent of this “migrant premium”, 
earnings and occupational attainments between urban non-migrants and permanent migrants 
from urban to urban are compared. Both groups have urban Hukou type and are from urban 
origin but differ on migration experience. Hence if permanent migrants from urban to urban have 
advantage in earnings and occupational attainments than urban non-migrants and human capital 
levels do not fully explain this difference, evidence of a migrant premium can be deduced. 
                                                                             Earnings   Occupational Attainments 
2003 2008    2003   2008 
Temporary migrants rural-urban (Ref: 
Urban non-migrants) 
-.016 -.027    -.137    .415* 
Years of Schooling  .117***  .106***    -.374***  -.342*** 
Years of Working  .010***  .001    -.023**  -.011 
Party Membership  .098  .111   -1.837***  -1.345*** 
Gender  .089  .184***      .421**     .605*** 
Ownership sectors (Reference: State-owned organization) 
State-owned Enterprises -.019      .466*  
Collective-owned Enterprises -.378** -.251***     .562    .125 
Privately-owned Enterprises   .062 -.032   1.278***    .384* 
Foreign-invested Enterprises  .235  .131   1.272**    .241 
Constant -.492**  .572***   5.104***  4.232*** 
                  R Square .151  .145 .190 .186   .289  .406   .231 .314 
                       N    1334  1421       1449     1634 
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   The results of the multiple and logistic regression for permanent migrants from urban to urban 
and urban non-migrants are presented in Table 7.1. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of multiple 
regression of net log earnings differentials between permanent migrants from urban to urban and 
urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008 separately. In 2003, after controlling for variations in 
human capital and ownership sectors, permanent migrants from urban to urban still earned 0.114 
more in log earnings than urban non-migrants, while in 2008, net earnings of permanent migrants 
from urban to urban was not significantly different from that of urban non-migrants when 
variations in human capital and ownership sectors are controlled.  
   Columns 3 and 4 show the results of logistic regression of occupational attainment of 
permanent migrants from urban to urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 and 2008 separately. In 
2003, the odds of being in ordinary, service and sales works for permanent migrants from urban 
to urban were significantly 19 percent3 less than urban non-migrants with other factors being 
equal. In 2008, permanent migrants from urban to urban were significantly 55 percent4 less likely 
to be in ordinary, service and sales works than urban non-migrants after controlling variations in 
other factors.  
   In summary, compared to urban non-migrants, permanent migrants from urban to urban had 
net earnings advantage in 2003 and they also have advantage in occupational attainments in both 
2003 and 2008 after controlling variations in other factors. Difference in earnings and 
occupational attainments between these two groups can’t be fully explained by the variations in 
human capital and ownership sectors. Hence, the results support my hypothesis and provide 
evidence of the existence and significance of effects of migration selection. 
 
                                                          
3 Exp(-.210)=0.81 
4 Exp(-.791)=0.45 
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 Table 7.3 Labour market returns of urban non-migrants and permanent migrants urban-urban 
Significance level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; ***0.001 
 
 7.4 Effect of Hukou origin: Permanent migrants rural-urban VS. Permanent migrants 
urban-urban 
   The most neglected effect is the effect of Hukou origin. By comparing earnings and 
occupational attainments of permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants 
from urban to urban, the effect of Hukou origin can be separated from other effect and further 
elaborate the inequality under Hukou system. Both groups have local urban Hukou type and 
migration experience with the only difference their origins. 
   Table 7.4 presents the multiple and logistic regression results of earnings and occupational 
attainments of permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to 
urban in 2003 and 2008. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of multiple regression of log earnings. 
In 2003, after controlling for variations in human capital and ownership sectors, permanent 
migrants from urban to urban had a net advantage of 0.081 in ln earnings over permanent 
migrants from rural to urban. In 2008,  the coefficient of permanent migrant urban-urban 
                                                                             Earnings   Occupational Attainments 
2003  2008    2003      2008 
Permanent migrants urban-urban (Ref: 
Urban non-migrants) 
.114** .064   -.210*   -.791*** 
Years of Schooling .117*** .103***   -.455***   -.339*** 
Years of Working .008*** .001   -.032***   -.014* 
Party Membership .144** .141*   -1.423***  -1.302*** 
Gender .102** .172***      .371***    .653*** 
Ownership sectors (Reference: State-owned organization) 
State-owned Enterprises -.130*       .585**  
Collective-owned Enterprises -.461*** -.265***      .582*    .040 
Privately-owned Enterprises  -.177* -.020    1.324***    .281 
Foreign-invested Enterprises  .187  .117      .721    .569 
Constant -.343** .624***    6.213***  4.248*** 
                 R Square .218  .215 .198 .193   .328 .441  .235  .316 
                        N     2426   1358       2586      1574 
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(permanent migrants rural-urban=0) was not statistically significant, that is to say there was little 
difference in net Ln earnings between permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent 
migrants from rural to urban.  
   Columns 3 and 4 show the results of logistic regression of occupational attainments. In 2003, 
the odds of being in ordinary, service and sales works for permanent migrants from urban to 
urban were significantly 1.25 times5 more than permanent migrants from rural to urban with 
other factors being equal. In 2008, occupational attainments of permanent migrants from urban 
to urban were not significantly different from that of permanent migrants from rural to urban 
when variations in other factors were controlled.  
   In summary, differences in earnings and occupational attainments between these two groups 
were still statistically significant in 2003 after controlling for other factors, while in 2008 
differences in earnings and occupational attainments between these two groups can be fully 
explained by the difference in human capital and ownership sectors. That is to say, Hukou origin 
was an important factor in determining individuals’ labour market returns in 2003, however in 
2008 the effect of Hukou origin was no longer significant.  
         To summarize, different Hukou type had little net effect on individuals’ labour market 
returns in both 2003 and 2008. Effects of Hukou origin on individuals’ labour market returns was 
significant in 2003 but not significant in 2008. Migration selection had significant and positive 
effects on people’s labour market returns in both 2003 and 2008. The little difference in labour 
market returns between urban non-migrants and temporary migrants from rural to urban may be 
the outcome of two opposing mechanisms: a premium for migration selection and discrimination 
against temporary and rural Hukou status. 
                                                          
5 Exp(.223)=1.25 
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Table 7.4 Labour market returns of permanent migrants from urban-urban and permanent 
migrants rural-urban 
                                                                             Earnings   Occupational Attainments 
2003 2008 2003 2008 
Permanent migrants urban-urban (Ref: 
Permanent migrants rural-urban ) 
.081* .115 .223* -.365 
Years of Schooling .105*** .086*** -.487*** -.351*** 
Years of Working .004* -.002 -.035*** -.034** 
Party Membership .183*** .177* -1.300*** -.936*** 
Gender .171*** .217** .244* .716** 
Ownership sectors (Reference: State-owned organization) 
State-owned Enterprises .016  .500**  
Collective-owned Enterprises -.273*** -.197 .420* .351 
Privately-owned Enterprises  -.124 -.325*** 1.406*** .327 
Foreign-invested Enterprises .431** .681** -.326 .582 
Constant -.200 .853*** 6.365*** 4.385*** 
   R Square .253  .250 .305 .294 .358 .478 .272 .363 
N 2465 512 2633 576 
Significance level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; ***0.001 
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                                           CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
     The massive migration of population, mainly from rural to urban areas and from regions of 
northwest inland to southeast coast, has been typical feature of the tremendous social and 
economic transformation in China and important research topic for scholars both in China and 
western world since the initiation of economic reform in 1978. Numerous studies have been 
conducted to investigate the consequences of migration, or to be specific the labour market 
returns of migrants in destination and difference of labour market returns between migrants and 
urban non-migrants. The literature on migration and urban labour market in China suggests that 
the Chinese urban labour market was strictly segmented or divided between migrants and local 
residents in the 1980s and early 1990s because of institutional barriers (Chen,2011). For a long 
time, labour market returns of migrants without local urban Hukou status were believed far 
behind local residents and Hukou system is the major source of hardship. However, along with 
deepening of research, more and more researchers found migrants is a heterogeneous group, 
permanent migrants are the most privileged and successful elite, followed by non-migrant native, 
and finally by temporary migrants (Fan, 2002). At the same time, with the economic reform 
accelerated in the mid-1990s, reforms of state sector enterprises and redundancies of urban 
workers, many studies point out that migrants and urban residents become more competitive and 
that the role of the Hukou system is declining (Knight and Yueh, 2009).   
    To investigate the relationship of Hukou system, migration and inequality of labour market 
returns, this thesis studies whether individuals with different migrant status will end up with 
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different labor market returns. To be specific, earnings and occupational attainments of urban 
non-migrants, temporary migrants from rural to urban, temporary migrants from urban to urban, 
permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban are 
examined. To investigate whether effect of Hukou system is declining with the development of 
market economy, earnings and occupational attainments of five groups in 2003 are compared to 
that in 2008. 
     In studying earnings of urban non-migrants and four migrants groups, multiple regression 
analyses were conducted to examine the gross and net earnings difference between urban non-
migrants and other four migrants groups in 2003 and 2008. Multiple regression analyses were 
followed by Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to decompose the original log earnings gap into 
components of explained gaps (gaps can be attributed to difference in characteristics) and 
unexplained gaps (gaps can be attributed to discrimination).  In studying occupational 
attainments of urban non-migrants and migrants groups, logistic regression models were 
conducted to compare the likelihood of urban non-migrants and four migrants groups of being in 
ordinary, service and sales works other than managerial & professional work before and after 
controlling for the effects of human capital variables and ownership sectors in 2003 and 2008. 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analyses were then conducted to examine how much of the 
occupational differentials are attributed to discrimination. Decomposition analyses in both 
empirical chapters include four pair of groups:  (1) temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
urban non-migrants (2) temporary migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from 
rural to urban (3) permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants and (4) 
permanent migrants from rural to urban and permanent migrants from urban to urban.  
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 There are four main findings. First, effects of migrant status on individuals’ earnings and 
occupational attainments are very mixed. On the one hand, migrant status had a significant effect 
on individuals’ occupational attainments after controlling for human capital variables and 
ownership sectors in both 2003 and 2008.  On the other hand, the effects of migrant status on 
individuals’ earnings changed from 2003 to 2008.  For males, the effect of migrant status on 
earnings was significant in 2003 after controlling for other factors, but not significant in 2008 
with other factors being equal. For females, on the contrary, migrant status had little effect on 
earnings in 2003 after controlling for differences in characteristics, while in 2008, being a 
migrant with urban Hukou contributed to significantly higher earnings than for urban non-
migrants. In general, the importance of migrant status on individuals’ earnings decreased from 
2003 to 2008. Second, earnings discrimination against migrants from rural areas (temporary and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban) decreased from 2003 to 2008, on the contrary, 
occupational discrimination against migrants from rural areas increased from 2003 to 2008. 
Decomposition results indicated that the unexplained earnings gap (which is effect of 
unmeasured factors) between migrants from rural areas (temporary and permanent migrants from 
rural to urban) and other groups decreased from 2003 to 2008. On the contrary, the unexplained 
gap in occupational attainments between migrants from rural areas and other groups increased 
from 2003 to 2008. Third, different Hukou type had little effects on individuals’ earnings and 
occupational attainments in both 2003 and 2008; effects of Hukou origin on individuals’ earnings 
and occupational attainments was significant in 2003 but not significant in 2008; migration 
selection had significant and positive effects on individual’s earnings and occupational 
attainments in both 2003 and 2008. Fourth, migrants with urban Hukou status have advantage in 
labour market returns. Urban migrants (temporary and permanent migrants from urban to urban) 
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had a net earnings advantage over urban non-migrants in two years of 2003 and 2008; permanent 
migrants (permanent migrants from rural to urban and from urban to urban) had an advantage 
with regard to occupational attainments over urban non-migrants, in that they were less likely to 
be employed in ordinary, service & sales works than urban non-migrants either before or after 
variations in human capital variables and ownership sectors were controlled in both 2003 and 
2008.  
 The first two findings, the mixed findings of decreased effect of migrant status on individuals’ 
earnings from 2003 to 2008 and the increased effect of migrant status on individuals’ 
occupational attainment from 2003 to 2008, indicate that both segmentation and competition 
exist in urban labour market in China. The effect of migrant status on earnings is declining while 
effect of migrant status on occupational attainments is still intact and significant. Temporary 
migrants from rural to urban now can move to the city, make a living and have a good income in 
urban areas, but the capacity to get a “good job” in the primary segment of the labour market 
with fringe benefits and job security is still restricted by their temporary and rural Hukou status. 
The continuing labour market segmentation, accompanied by signs of competition, can be 
explained by the nature of China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, where 
growing market forces co-exist with institutional legacies (Chen, 2011). With economic reforms, 
the labour market tends to reward individuals’ abilities and hard work, thus the effect of migrant 
status on earnings decreases and becomes not significant. However, institutional legacies con-
tinue to protect local residents in getting good and stable jobs, in this sense, labour market 
segmentation remained intact over time. Many scholars argue China’s labour market becomes 
more competitive and Hukou status doesn’t matter anymore, they just highlight the apparent 
decreasing earnings gap between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-migrants 
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but fail to realize the still intact occupational segmentation which is the deep-rooted 
segmentation. Temporary migrants from rural to urban are more likely to be trapped in low-
skilled work, maintaining themselves at the bottom of the urban labour market. With some signs 
of competition, the China’s urban labour market is still segmented.  
     The latter two findings, the significant and positive effect of migration selection on 
individual’s earnings and occupational attainments and advantage of migrants with urban Hukou 
status in labour market returns, indicate that migrants in China are positively selected and 
migration experience contributes positive returns on earnings and occupational attainments. In 
studying internal migration in China, most studies highlight the essential role of  institutional 
rules in segregating migrants and urban non-migrants, this study not only examines the effects of 
the Hukou system but also points out the important and positive effects of migration experience 
on labour market returns which has been neglected by most migration studies in China. The 
advantage of permanent migrants (both from rural and urban areas) in labour market returns 
indicates that once overcome Hukou based separation and get urban Hukou status, permanent 
migrants will have higher returns than urban non-migrants and temporary migrants, after 
controlling for other factors.  
 
8.2 Significance of the Study  
   This thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, instead of comparing 
only rural migrants and urban residents, this thesis includes five groups with different migrant 
status into analysis. To classify urban labour based on their different migrant status other than 
different Hukou status, this study takes not only difference in Hukou type but also difference in 
migration experience and Hukou origin into consideration. Through comparing labour market 
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returns of five different migrant groups, this study proves the existence and positive effect of 
migration selection on labour market returns, highlights the two-track migration system which 
consists temporary and permanent migration in China and also separates effect of Hukou type 
from that of Hukou origin.  
    The labour market segmentation theory clearly suggests that market segmentation is the result 
of institutional rules that differ across labour market segments. In urban China, migrants and 
urban residents with different Hukou status belong to different segments, and migrants are placed 
in the lower tier of the market while urban residents have many advantages over migrants. On 
the contrary, from the perspective of migration selectivity, migrants in China are positively 
selected and they have qualities that may offer them some labour market advantages compared to 
those who are not migrants. They tend to be younger, more educated, have higher skills, and are 
more motivated, ambitious, and have relatively higher aspirations than non-migrants. Thus, 
migrants would have higher-level returns than non-migrants in urban China.  
   The findings in this thesis indicate that both institutional segmentation and positive migration 
selection exist in urban labour market in China. The interaction of positive migration selection 
and institutional segmentation leads to a complex relationship between migrants and urban non-
migrants in urban labour market. Migrants with urban Hukou status have advantage in labour 
market returns over urban non-migrants, while migrants with rural Hukou status still inferior to 
urban non-migrants in terms of occupational attainments. 
    Secondly, through examining two aspects of labour market return, earnings and occupational 
attainments, this study made a comprehensive analysis of effect of migrant status on labour 
market returns and revealed the transition nature of urban labour market. The declining and weak 
effect of migrant status on earnings and the intact and significant effect of migrant status on 
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occupational attainments indicate both segmentation and competition exist in urban labour 
market. Thirdly, by comparing data from two different years, my analysis reveals changing 
trends in the effect of migrant status on labour market returns.  
 
8.3 Policy Implications 
   
        Findings from this study reflect present conditions of relationships between Hukou system, 
inequality of labour market returns and stratification. On the one hand, migrants status have 
declining independent effect on earnings, on the other hand, occupational attainments are still 
segmented by migrant status, to get a “good job” in primary segment and truly become urban 
residents is still hard for temporary migrants from rural to urban, further, the social stratification 
in China as a whole remained largely unchanged (Chan, 2009). 
     Market economy reform has given rise to a variety of ownership sectors and promoted 
commerce and service.  As self-employment and jobs in commerce have become increasingly 
profitable, temporary migrants, whether from rural or urban, have succeeded in gaining 
economically by engaging in these sectors. At the same time, government takes measures to 
guarantee and improve income of labours, Regulations on Minimum Wages and Labour Contract 
Law, put into effect on April, 1st, 2004 and January 1st, 2008 respectively, contain clear-cut 
provisions on standardizing the distribution of wages. In this way, earnings gap among five 
groups is declining, migrant status had little independent effects on earnings in 2008. 
Although migrant status has declining independent effects on earnings, the differences 
between people with different migrant status are far more extensive. My estimates suffer from an 
inherent downward bias because it reflects only monetary gains. To the extent that there are 
substantial non-monetary benefits associated with occupations an urban Hukou. Findings from 
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this study indicate there are substantial differences in occupational attainments among five 
subpopulations, temporary migrants from rural to urban are less likely to be employed in 
professional and managerial jobs which means they won’t enjoy plentiful benefit provided by 
this kind of occupation. As scholar pointed out, non-Hukou residents (temporary migrants) in 
cities face acute problems caused by the lack of access to education, health care services, social 
security and housing (Chan, 2009). For example, unlike the “urban poor”, temporary migrants 
from rural to urban are excluded from the urban welfare and social security system, like 
minimum living allowance and unemployment insurance (see Chan and Buckingham, 2008). In 
terms of education, Education Law of the People’s Republic of China stated that compulsory 
education is the responsibility of the local government, thus migrant children without residency 
status in urban are not supposed to receive these educational benefits. According to Xinhua News 
Agency (2004), China’s migrant children drop out of school at a rate of 9.3 per  cent and migrant 
children in China who have never been to school represent 6.85 per cent of the total migrant 
children population. Besides the distinct differences in education, social security between urban 
non-migrants and temporary migrants, large disparities in the main opportunity structure remain 
today and may well have widened (Shue and Wong, 2007). Mostly employed in ordinary, service 
and sales works, temporary migrants from rural to urban would have smaller chance for upward 
mobility than other groups with urban Hukou status. At the same time, while the majority of 
population still resides in rural areas, the number of college students recruited from these areas 
has now dropped to about 18 percent, compared to about 35 percent in 1980 (Nongcun 
daxuesheng, 2009). Ostensibly, the inadequate and low quality of education received by children 
of rural migrant laborers has become a major social issue in China. (Chan, 2009).  
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 The hukou system, directly and indirectly, continues to be a major barrier in preventing 
China’s rural population from settling in the city and in maintaining the rural-urban “apartheid.” 
As Wang’s (2005b) earlier evaluation of the system as “adapted and adjusted” but “alive and 
well” remains true today. Despite the good intentions of the central Government, it is 
questionable that local Governments are ready to implement any sweeping change to the hukou 
system. China cannot abolish the system without a significant change of the rural-urban politics 
and economics (Chan, 2008).  
     The findings of the dissertation have implications for policy makers. First, lack of urban 
Hukou is and having difficulty in accessing education, health and social security are significant 
constraint that prevent temporary migrants from settling down in the city. Greater strides on 
implementing the Hukou reform, and ultimately abolishing the system, are needed. This is 
especially urgent as more women and children from the countryside participate in migration to 
cities and are staying for increasingly long periods of time. Second, while continuing Hukou 
reforms, city governments should address temporary migrants’ special needs and develop 
appropriate strategies to meet those needs. 
 
 
8.4 Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
   While being revealing, the findings in this dissertation have limitations in three aspects:  First, 
using nationally representative data, the findings in this study reflect overall and national trend of 
labour market returns of urban non-migrants and migrants groups. This study treats China as a 
homogeneous entity and neglects the regional variations. However, China is a county with large 
regional disparity. The pace of economic reforms and development has been regionally uneven, 
for example, per capita GDP in the inland regions averaged 13,513 Yuan, or less than half of that 
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in the coastal regions in 2008. At the provincial level, the difference is even larger, per capita 
GDP in Shanghai is 10 times as large as in Guizhou province. (China National Statistical Bureau, 
2008). Meanwhile, management of Hukou system has been moved from central control to local 
governments with the trend of devolution of fiscal and administrative powers to lower-level 
governments (Chan, 2009). Local governments implemented different Hukou policy to their 
respective administrative jurisdictions and their needs for economic development. For example, 
some provinces have eliminated the distinction between agricultural (rural) and non-agricultural 
(urban) Hukou (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2005; Chan and Buckingham, 
2008; Wang, 2004). In recent years, some cities in China have started to issue “resident card” to 
qualified migrants. The criteria of “residence card” are generally lower than that of Hukou. 
Migrants with “residence card” can enjoy some resources in the city as local residents. Other 
measures put into effect include easing hukou conversions to small towns where state-provided 
welfare is minimal (in 1997 and 2001) (Chan, 2009). The large regional disparity and 
localization of Hukou management would generate diversified Hukou effects and relationship 
between non-migrants and migrants. Impact of migrant status and Hukou system on labour 
market returns would vary among different regions and cities. In this study, however, regional 
variations in inequality of labour market returns between urban non-migrants and migrants were 
not examined.     
      Second, this study covers only two major dimensions of labour market returns, which are 
earnings and occupational attainments. However, welfare and benefit are important components 
of labour market returns in China. In the planned economy era, urbanites received plentiful 
benefits including housing, education and health care from state as a compensation for their low 
wage. In reform era, benefits continue to be important measures of labour market returns in 
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China (Fan, 2001). The relationship between migrant status and access to welfare and benefits 
was not examined in this study. 
    Third, the study does not address changes since 2010. Using data from CGSS 2003 and 2008, 
this study can’t reflect the latest changes in labour market and role of Hukou system in China. 
Another limitation in data is the small sample size for some groups. For example, using 
CGSS2008, only 364 temporary migrants from rural to urban and 183 permanent migrants from 
urban to urban are included in analysis. The small sample size for some groups may cause un-
coverage bias and finally affect the accuracy of the results.  
     This preliminary analysis suggests a number of pathways for future research. First, the 
interaction of regional disparity and non-migrants-migrants gap should be examined. To be 
specific, regional variations in impact of Hukou on labour market returns and regional variations 
in relationship between migrants and non-migrants could be investigated in the future research. 
Through comparing inequality in labour market returns between migrants and non-migrants in 
regions with different reform pace, we can better understand whether economic reforms increase 
or reduce inequality between non-migrants and migrants and inequality under Hukou system. 
Second, in measuring labour market returns, benefits and welfare should be taken into 
consideration. Wang and Zuo (1999) argued that what distinguishes the Chinese disparity 
between rural migrants and urban employees from that observed in other societies is not the 
wage difference, but the difference in state-subsidized benefits. Even with erosion in the 
disparity in recent years, urban employees still hold advantage. Migrants who work as contractor 
or self-employed can have fairly good earnings but they do not have access to welfare and 
benefits, such as health care, unemployment insurance, pension and education benefits. 
Therefore, to examine further the gap between non-migrants and migrants in getting welfare and 
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benefits, inequality between non-migrants and migrants and the role of Hukou system on labour 
market returns can be better revealed.  Third, Chinese society is complex and rapidly changing, 
thus more recent trends since 2010 should be examined.  It is important to examine further how 
the Hukou system has changed since 2010 and what role of  Hukou system in determining 
individuals’ labour market returns since 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
 
REFERENCES:  
Alexander, P. & Chan, K. (2004). Does China have an apartheid pass system?    
    Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(4), 609-29. 
Altonji, J. & Card, D. (1991). The effects of immigration on the labor market    
    outcomes of less- skilled natives. In Abwod, J., Freeman, M. &Richard, B. (Eds.),    
    Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market. (pp. 201-34). Chicago: University of    
    Chicago Press. 
Amsden, H. A. (1980). The economics of women and work. Harmonds worth: Penguin  
    Books 
Appleton, S., Knight, J., Song, L. & Xia, Q. (2004). Contrasting paradigms: 
Segmentation and competitiveness in the formation of the Chinese labour market. 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2 (3), 185–205. 
Averitt, R. T. (1968). The Dual Economy: The Dynamics of American Industry 
Structure. New York: Norton. 
Barth, F. (1956). Ecological relationships of ethnic groups in Swat, North Pakistan. 
American Anthropologist, 58, 1079-1089. 
Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Bauder, H. (2001). Culture in the labour market: segmentation theory and 
perspectives of place. Progress in Human Geography, 25(1), 37-52. 
Bean, F. D. & Bell-Rose, S. (1999). Immigration and opportunity: race, ethnicity and 
employment in the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Beck, E.M., Horan, P.M. & Tolbert, C.M. (1980). Industrial segmentation and labour 
market discrimination. Social Problems, 28(2), 113-30. 
133 
 
Becker, G. (1964). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with 
Special Reference to Education. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Becker, G. (1971). The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Bian, Y. & Logan, J.R. (1996). Market transition and the persistence of power: the 
changing stratification system in urban China. American Sociological Review, 61, 
739-58, 
Blau, P. M. (1994). Structural Contexts of Opportunities. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Blimder, A.S. (1973). Wage discrimination: Reduced form and structural estimates. 
Journal of Human Resources, 8(4), 436-455. 
Borjas, G. (1984). The impact of immigrants on the earnings of the native-born. In 
Vernon,M., Briggs, J., & Marta, T. (Eds)Immigration: Issues and Policies (pp.83-
126). Salt Lake City, UT: Olympus. 
Borjas, G. (1989). Economic theory and international migration. International 
Migration Review, 23(3): 457-85.  
Borjas, G. (1990). Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S.   
   Economy. New York: Basic Books. 
Borjas, G. (1993). The intergenerational mobility of immigrants. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 11, 113–35. 
Borjas, G. (2003). The labor demand curve is downward slopping: reexamining the 
impact of immigration on the labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118,1335–1374. 
Borjas, G., Freeman, R.& Katz, L. (1992). On the labor market effects of immigration 
and trade. In: Borjas, G., Freeman, K. (Eds.), Immigration and the work force: 
134 
 
economic consequences for the United States and source areas (pp213-44). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Borjas, G., Freeman, R.& Katz, L. (1996). Searching for the effect of immigration on 
the labour market. American Economic Review, 86, 246–51. 
Borjas, G., Freeman, R.& Katz, L. (1997). How much do immigration and trade affect    
    labour market outcomes. Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 1–90. 
Breman, J. (1976). A dualistic labour system? A critique of the informal sector 
concept. Economic and Political Weekly, 11(48), 1870-1875. 
Cai, F. (2000). The Invisible Hand and Visible Feet: Internal Migration in China. 
World Economy and China, Working paper series, No. 5. 
Calavita, K . (1992). Inside the state: The Bracero Program, immigration, and the 
I .N.S. New York: Routledge. 
Camarota, S. (1997). The effect of immigrants on the earnings of low-skilled native 
workers: evidence from the June 1991 Current Population Survey. Social Science 
Quarterly, 78, 417–31. 
Card, D. (2001). Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local market impacts of 
higher immigration. Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 22–64. 
Card, D.& Di Nardo, J. (2000). Do immigrants inflow lead to native outflows? NBER 
Working Paper No. 7578. 
Chan, K.W. (1994). Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in    
   Post-1949 China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Chan, K.W. (1996). Post-Mao China: A two-class urban society in the making.   
   International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 20, 134-150. 
Chan, K.W. (2001). Recent migration in China: Patterns, Trends and Policies. Asian 
Perspective, 25(4), 127-55. 
135 
 
Chan, K.W. (2009) The Chinese Hukou system at 50. Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 50(2), 197-221. 
Chan, K. W. (2010). The household registration system and migrant labor in China:   
    Notes on a  debate. Population and Development Review, 36(2), 357-64. 
Chan, K.W., Liu, T. & Yang, Y. (1999). Hukou and non-Hukou migrations in China:  
    Comparisons and contrasts. International Journal of Population Geography,    
    5, 425–48. 
Chan, K. W. & Buckingham, W. (2008). Is China abolishing the Hukou system?   
     China Quarterly, 195, 582–606. 
Chan, K.W. & Zhang, L. (1999). The Hukou system and rural-urban migration in 
China: process and changes. The China Quarterly, 160, 818-55. 
Chen, Y. (2010). Rural migrants in urban China: Characteristics and challenges to  
    public policy. Local Economy, 26, 325. 
Chen, Y. (2011). Occupational attainments of migrants and local workers: findings    
    from a survey in Shanghai’s manufacturing sector. Urban Studies, 48(1), 3-21.  
Cheng, T.& Selden, M. (1994). The origins and social consequences of China's Hukou 
system. The China Quarterly, 139, 644-68. 
China Labour Bulletin (2008). “Wages in China.” www.china-labour.org.hk , 
February. 
Christiansen, F. (1992). Market transition in China: The case of the Jiangsu labor 
market, 1978-1990. Modern China, 18 (1), 72-93. 
Constant, A., & Massey, D. (2005). Labour market segmentation and earnings of 
German guest workers. Population Research and Policy Review, 24 (5), 489-512. 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. (2005). Recent Chinese Hukou   
reforms. http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/Residency/hreform.php (last   
136 
 
 accessed 16 June 2006). 
Coverdill, J.E. (1988). The dual economy and sex differences in earnings. Social 
Forces, 66(4): 970–93. 
De Haan, A. (1995). Migration in Easter India-a segmented labour market. Indian 
Economic and Social History Review,32 (1), 51-93. 
Démurger, S., Fournier, M., Li, S. & Wei, Z. (2007). Economic liberalization with    
    rising segmentation in China’s urban labor market. Asian Economic Papers, 5(3),    
58-101. 
Deng, Q. & Gustafsson, B. (2006). China's Lesser Known Migrants. IZA Discussion   
    Paper No.2152. 
Dong, X. & Bowles, P. (2002). Segmentation and discrimination in China’s emerging   
   industrial labour market. China Economic Review, 14(2), 170–196. 
Espinosa, K. &Massey, D. (1997). Undocumented migration and the quantity and    
    quality of social capital. Soziale Welt, 12,141-62. 
Fan, C. C. (1999). Migration in a socialist transitional economy: Heterogeneity,  
    socioeconomic and spatial characteristics of migrants in China and Guangdong  
    province. International Migration Review, 33 (4), 950–83. 
Fan, C. C.  (2001). Migration and labour-market returns in urban China: Results from    
    a recent survey in Guangzhou. Environment and Planning, 33, 479-508. 
Fan, C. C.  (2002). The elite, the natives, and the outsiders: migration and labour 
market segmentation in urban China. Annuals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 92(1), 103-24. 
Fan, C. C.  (2004). The state, the migrant labour regime, and maiden workers in China. 
Political Geography, 23, 283-305. 
137 
 
Fan, C. C. (2005). Modeling interprovincial migration in China, 1985-2000. Eurasian 
Geography and Economics, 46(3), 165-84. 
Fan, L. (2011). Social Policy and Migration in China. New York: Routledge  
Farer, T. J. (1995).How the international system copes with involuntary migration: 
Norms, institutions and state practice. Human Rights Quarterly, 17 (1), 72-100. 
Feng, W. & Zuo, X. (2002). Rural migrants in Shanghai: Living under the shadow of 
socialism. The International Migration Review, 36(2), 520-45. 
Fichtenbaum, R., Gyimah-Brempong, K., Olson, P., & Fichtenbaum, G.R. (1994). 
New evidence on the labour market segmentation hypothesis. Review of Social 
Economy, 52(1), 20-39. 
Fields, G. (2008). Segmented labour market models in developing countries. In 
Kincaid, H. & Ross, D. (Eds). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics 
(pp476-510). Oxford: University of Press USA. 
Friedberg, R. (2001). The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1373–1408. 
Fu, Q. & Ren, Q. (2010) Educational inequality under China’s rural-urban divide: the 
Hukou system and return to education. Environment and Planning, 42, 592-610. 
Gagnon, J., Xenogiani, T. & Xing, C. (2009). Are all migrants really worse off in 
urban labour market: new empirical evidence from China. MPRA Paper No. 16109.  
Gewwnwood, M.J. (1997). Internal migration in developed countries. In Rosenberg, 
M.R. and Stark. O. (Eds), Handbooks of Population and Family Economics(647-
720). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Giles, J., Park, A.& Cai, F.(2005). How has economic restructuring affected China's 
urban workers? China Quarterly, 185, 61-95. 
Goldstein, S. & Goldstein, A. (1991). Permanent and temporary migration    
138 
 
     differentials in China. Honolulu, HI: East-West Population Institute. 
Gordon, I. (1995). Migration in a segmented labour market. Transactions, Institute of 
British Geographers NS, 20, 139-155. 
Granovetter, M. (1974). Getting a job: a study of contacts and careers. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.  
Granovetter, M.  (1981). “Toward a sociological theory of income differences.” In 
Berg, I. (Eds.), Sociological perspectives on labour markets (11-47). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 481-510. 
Granovetter, M. (1995). The economic Sociology of firm and entrepreneurs. In Portes, 
A. (Eds.) The Economic Sociology of Immigration (128-65). New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Granovetter, M & Swedberg, R. (1992). The Sociology of Economic Life. Boulder, 
CO: West-view Press. 
Gu, S. (1992). Two types of population migration in China: A comparative study.   
   Chinese Journal of Population Science, 4 (1), 75–84. 
Guo, F. & Zhang, Z. (2004). Rural migrants and shantytown communities in Chinese 
cities. 16th Annual Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Studies, 
Australia (ACESA). 
Gupta, M . R. (1993). Rural-urban migration, informal sector, an development 
policies: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Development Economics, 41, 137-151. 
Hanson, S. & Pratt, G. (1991). Job search and the occupational segregationof women. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81(2), 229-53. 
139 
 
Hare, D. (2002). The determinants of job location and its effect on migrants’ wages: 
Evidence form rural China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 50 (3), 
557-79. 
Harris, J. R., and M. P.Todaro. (1970). “Migration, unemployment, and development: 
A theoretical analysis.” American Economic Review, 60, 126-42. 
Hawley, A. H. (1945). Dispersion versus segregation: apropos of a solution of race 
problems. Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Hawley, A. H. (1950). Human Ecology. New York: Ronald Press. 
Hawley, A. H. (1970). The Metropolitan Community: Its People and Government. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hawley, A. H. (1986). Human Ecology: A theoretical Essay. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Hayter, R., & Barnes, T.J. (1992). Labour market segmentation, flexibility, and 
recession: a British Columbian case study. Environment and Planning, 10, 333-53. 
He, C. & Gober, P. (2003). Gendering interprovincial migration in China. The 
International Migration Review, 37(4), 1220-1251. 
He, K.M. (2009). Identity, Exclusion, and Remittance: State and the Migrant 
Household in Contemporary China. Columbia University. 
Hiebert, D. (1999). Local geographies of labour market segmentation: Montreal, 
Toronto, and Vancouver, 1991. Economic Geography, 75(4), 339-69. 
Huang, P. & Zhan, S. (2005). Internal migration in China: Linking it to development. 
Prepared for the regional conference on migration and development in Asia, in 
Lanzhou, China, 14-16 March. 
140 
 
Huang,Y.P., Guo, F. & Tang, Y.M. (2010). Hukou status and social exclusion of 
rural-urban migrants in transitional China. Journal of Asian Public Policy, 3(2), 
172-85. 
Hudson, K. (2007). The new labour market segmentation: Labour market dualism in 
the new economy. Social Science Research, 36(1), 286-312. 
Jaeger, D. (1996). “Skill differences and the effect of immigrants on the wages of 
natives.” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Economic Working Paper, 273. 
Jain, H. C., & Sloane, P. J. (1981). Equal employment issues. New York: Praeger 
Publishers 
Jalan, J. & Ravallion, M. (2001). Behavioral responses to risk in rural China. Journal 
of Development Economics, 66(1), 23-49. 
Kanbur, R. & Zhang, X. (1999). Which Regional Inequality? The Evolution of Rural-
Urban and Inland-Coastal Inequality in China from 1983-1995, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 27, 686-701. 
Kerr, C. (1954). The balkanization of labour markets. In Bakkea, E.W.& Hauser, P.M. 
(Eds). Labour mobility and economic opportunity (92-110). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Khan, A. R. & Riskin, C. (1998). Income and Inequality in China: 
   Composition, Distribution and Growth of Household Income. 1988 to 1995. 
   The China Quarterly,138, 221-253. 
Khan, A. R. & Riskin, C.  (2005). China's Household Income and Its Distribution,   
    1995 and 2002. The China Quarterly,182, 356-84. 
King, A.G., Lowell, L.B. & Bean, F.D. (1986). The effect of Hispanic immigrants on 
the earnings of native Hispanic Americans. Social Science Quarterly, 67(4), 673-89. 
141 
 
Knight, J. & Li, S. (2005). Wages, firm profitability and labor market segmentation in 
urban China. China Economic Review, 16 (3), 205–28. 
Knight, J. & Song, L. (1999). The Rural-Urban Divide. Economic Disparities and 
Interactions in China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Knight, J. & Yueh, L. (2004). Job mobility of residents and migrants in urban China. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 637-660. 
Knight, J. & Yueh, L. (2009). Segmentation or competition in China’s urban labour 
market? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33, 79–94. 
Lanonde, R. & Topel, R., (1991). Labor market adjustments to increased immigration. 
In Abwod, J., Freeman, M. & Richard, B. (Eds.). Immigration, trade and the labour 
market(201-34). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lardy, N. R. (1978). Economic Growth and Distribution in China. Cambridge, UK;    
     New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lardy, N. R. (1982). Food Consumption in the People's Republic of China. in The    
Chinese Agricultural Economy, edited by Randolph Barker, Rahda Sinha, and    
 Beth Rose. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Lardy, N. R. (1983). Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development. New    
     York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lee, C. K. (1997). Chinese Labor in the Reform Era: Changing Fragmentation  and    
     New Politics.  Pp. 237-49 in Regional Handbook of Economic Development: The    
    China Handbook, edited by Chris Hudson. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 
Leontaridi, M. (1998). Segmented labour market: Theory and evidence. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 12 (1), 103-09. 
Lewis, E. (2005). Immigration, skill mix and the choice of technique. Federal 
ReserveBank of PhiladelphiaWorking Paper No. 05-08. 
142 
 
Li, P. L. & Li, W. (2007). Economic status and social attitudes of migrant workers in 
China. China & World Economy,15(4), 1-16. 
Li, P. (2008). The role of foreign credentials and ethnic ties in immigrants’ economic 
performance. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 33(2), 29-48. 
Li, Q. (2004). Nongminggong yu zhongguo shehui fenceng (Urban Migrant Workers 
and Social Stratification in China). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe. 
Li, S. M. (1995). Population mobility and urban and rural development in Mainland   
    China. Issues and Studies,31 (9), 37–54. 
Li, S. M. (1997). Population migration, regional economic growth andincome 
determination: A comparative study of Dongguan and Meizhou, China. Urban 
Studies, 34(7), 999-1026. 
Li, S.M. & Siu, Y.M. (1997). Population migration, regional economic growth and 
income determination: A comparative study of Dongguan and Meizhou, China. 
Urban Studies,34(7), 999-1026. 
Liang, Z. (2001). The age of migration in China. Population and Development Review, 
27(3), 499-524. 
Liang, Z. (2004). Patterns of migration and occupational attainment in contemporary 
China: 1985-1990. Development and Society, 33(2), 251-74. 
Liang, Z. & Ma, Z. (2004). China’s floating population: new evidence from 2000 
census. Population and Development Review, 30(3), 467-88. 
Liang, Z. & White, M.J. (1996). Internal Migration in China, 1950-1988. 
Demography, 33(3), 375-84. 
Liu , Z.Q. (2005). Institution and inequality: the Hukou system in China. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 33, 133–57. 
143 
 
Lu, X.Y. (2003). Nongmingong wenti yao cong genbenshang zhili (The problem of 
migrant workers must be solved from its roots). Tequ lilun yu shijian, 7. 31-36. 
Lu, Y.L. (2008). “Shichang zhuanxing hui xiaochu huji bileima?” (Does transition to 
market economy bring down barriers of Huji?) In Li, L.& Bian, Y. (Eds.)Institution 
Transition and Social Stratification: Based on China General Social Survey 2003 
(250-268). Beijing: People’s University of China Press. 
Lu, Z.G.(2006). Rural-urban migration and wage determination: The case of Tianjin, 
China. China Economic Review, 17, 337-45. 
Ma, L. & Xiang, B. (1998). “Native place, migration and emergence of peasant 
enclave in Beijing.” The China Quarterly, September.  
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo,G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., and Taylor, J.E. 
(1993). Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. Population and 
Development Review, 19(3):431-66. 
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. & Taylor, J.E. (1994). 
An evaluation of international migration theory: the north American case. 
Population and Development Review, 20(4): 699-752. 
McGee, T. G. (1982). Labour markets, urban systems, and the urbanization process in 
Southeast Asian countries. Papers of the East-West Population Institute, 81, 1-28. 
Mc Lafferty, S., & Preston, V. (1992). Spatial mismatch and labour market 
segmentation for African-American and Latina women. Economic Geography, 
68(4), 406-31. 
Meng, X. & Kidd, M. P. (1997). Labor market reform and the changing structure of   
wage determination in China’s state sector during the 1980s. Journal of    
Comparative Economics,  25(3), 403-21. 
144 
 
Meng, X. & Zhang, J. (2001) The two-tier labour market in urban China: occupational 
segregation and wage differentials between urban residents and rural migrants. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 29,485–504. 
Mincer, J. (1958). Investment in human capital and personal income distribution. 
Journal political economy, 66(4), 281-302. 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: Columbia  
    University Press. 
Murray, J., Batalova, J., Fix, M. (2006). The impact of immigration on native 
workers:a fresh look at the evidence. Migration Policy Institute, Insight, No 18. 
Myrdal, G. (1987). Population policy in the underdeveloped world. Population and 
Development, Vol. 13, No.3,  
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). (2002). Tabulation on the 2000   
   Population Census of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing: China Statistical   
   Press. 
Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Nee, V. (1989). A theory of market transition: from redistribution to markets in state    
   socialism. American Sociological Review, 54, 663-81.  
Nee, V. & Y. Cao. (1995). Testing market transition theory in the urban context.    
   Paper presented at the Market Transition Debate Workshop at the University of    
    California, Los Angeles, May. 
Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-female wage differentials in urban labour markets. 
International Economic Review, 14 (3), 693-709. 
Olzak, S. (1992). The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Palo Alto, CA:    
    Stanford University Press.  
145 
 
Orrenius, P.& Zavodny, M. (2007). Does immigration affect wages: a look at 
occupation level evidence. Labor Economics, 14, 757–773. 
Parish, W.L. & Michelson, E. (1996). Politics and markets: dual transformations. 
American Journal of Sociology, 101, 1042-1059. 
Park, R. E. & Burgess, E.W. (1921). Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Piore,M . (1979). Birds of passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ports, A. & Zhou, M. (1996). Self-employment and the earnings of immigrants. 
    American Sociological Review, 61(2):219-230. 
Potter, S. H. (1983). The Position of Peasants in Modern China's Social  Order.    
    Modern China 9:465-99. 
Potter, S. H. & Potter, J. M. (1990). China's Peasants: The Anthropology of A   
    Revolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rawski, T. (1982). The Simple Arithmetic of Chinese Income Distribution. Economic    
    Research (Keizai Kenkyu) ,33,12-26. 
Reich, M., Gordon, M. & Edwards, R. (1973). A theory of labour market 
segmentation. American Economic Review, 63, 359-365. 
Reid, L.W. & Rubin, B.A. (2003). Integrating economic dualism and labour market 
segmentation: The effects of race, gender and structural location on earnings, 1974-
2000. Sociological Quarterly, 44(3), 405-32. 
Roberts, B.R. & Latapi, A.E. (1997). Mexican social and economic policy and 
emigration. In Bean, F.D., Garza, R.O., Roberts, B.R.& Weintraub, S.(Eds).At the 
Crossroads: Mexico and U.S. Immigration Policy(pp-177-200). New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield.  
146 
 
Sakamoto, A., & Chen, M.D. (1991). Inequality and attainment in a dual labour 
market. American Sociological Review, 56 (3), 295-308. 
Sassen, S. (1990). Economic restructuring and the American city. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 16, 465-90. 
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. American Economic Review, 5 (1) 
1-17. 
Shen, J. (2002). A study of the temporary population in Chinese cities. Habitat   
  International, 26 (3), 363–77. 
Shen, Y. M. & Tong, C.Z. (1992). Zhongguo renkou qianyi (China’s Population 
Migration). Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe. 
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962).The costs and returns of human migration. Journal of Political 
Economy, 70(5),80-93. 
Solinger, D.J. (1999). Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the 
state and the logic of the market. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 
Song, J. (2005). Fan zhusanjiao renkou liudong dui quyu laodongli shichang 
yingxiang de yanjiu (Study on the effects on population migration on labour market 
in Zhujiang delta area). Tequ Jingji (Economics in Special Economic Zones), 10, 
84-85. 
Stolzenberg, R.M. (1990). Ethnicity, geography and occupational achievement of 
Hispanic men in the United States. American Sociological Review, 55 (1), 143-54. 
Sun, L.P. (2003). Cleavage: Chinese Society since 1990s (duanlie: 20 shiji 90   
niandaiyilai de zhongguo shehui). Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press    
(shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe). 
Sun, M.J. & Fan, C.C. (2011). China’s permanent and temporary migrants: 
Differentials and changes, 1990-2000. The Professional Geographer, 63(1), 93-112. 
147 
 
Szelenyi, I. (1978). Social inequalities in state socialist redistributive economies. 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 19, 63-87. 
Szelenyi, I. (1983). Urban Inequalities under state socialism. Oxford University Press. 
Szelenyi, I. (1988). Socialist entrepreneurs: Embour geoisement in rural hungry. 
University of Wisconsin Press.  
Szelenyi, I. & Manchin, R. (1987). Social policy under state socialism. In Esping-
Anderson, G., Rainwater, L. & Martin, R. (Eds). Stagnation and Renewal in Social 
Policy (102-39). M.E. Sharpe. 
Taylor, J. E., Martin, P. L.& Fix, M. (1997). Poverty amid Prosperity: Immigration 
and the Changing Face of Rural California. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
Todaro, M. P. (1969). A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less 
developed countries. American Economic Review, 5 (9), 138-48. 
Todaro, M. P. (1976). Internal migration in developing countries: A review of theory, 
evidence, methodology, and research priorities. Geneva: International Labour 
Office. 
Todaro, M. P. & Maruszko, L. (1987). Illegal Migration and US Immigration Reform: 
A Conceptual Framework. Population and Development Review, 13(1), 101-14. 
Tolbert, C.M., Horan, P.M. & Beck, E.M. (1980). The structure of economic 
segmentation: a dual economy approach. American Journal of Sociology, 85(5), 
1095-1116. 
Walder, A.G. (1983). Organized Dependency and Cultures of Authority in Chinese   
    Industry. The Journal of Asian Studies 43:51-76. 
Walder, A.G. (1995). Local governments as industrial firms: an organizational 
analysis of China’s transitional economy. American Journal of Sociology, 101, 
1067-1073. 
148 
 
Waldinger, R. (1992).Taking care of the guests: The impact of immigrants on services. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 16, 97-113. 
Wang, D., Wu, Y.& Cai, F. (2004). Qianyi shiye he chengshi laodongli shichang   
fenge: weishenme nongcun qianyizhe shiyelvdi? (Migration, unemployment and   
 segmentation in urban labour market: Why urban migrants have the lowest   
 unemployment rate?)World Economic Forum, 1, 37-52. 
Wang, F. (2006). Boundaries and Categories: Income Inequality in Urban China, 
    1986-2000. Book manuscript. 
Wang, F. & Zuo, X. (1999). Inside China’s cities: institutional barriers and   
    opportunities for urban migrants. The American Economic Review, 89(2), 276-80. 
Wang, F. L. (2005). Organizing Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou 
System. California: Stanford University Press. 
Weber, M. (1958). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York：Oxford 
University  Press. 
Wen, T.J. (2006). The Migrant Rural Labor and China's Industrialization. Paper  
    presented at the Conference on Rethinking the Rural-Urban Cleavage in  
    Contemporary China. Fairbank Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
West, L. A. & Zhao, Y. (2000). Rural Labour Flows in China. Berkeley: University  
of California. 
Whyte, M. K. (1995). City versus Countryside in China's Development. Problems of      
   Post-Communism 43:9-22. 
Whyte, M. K. (2010). “One Country, Two Societies? Rural–Urban Inequality in   
   Contemporary China.” Paper presented at Conference on Rethinking the Rural-  
   Urban Cleavage in Contemporary China,” October 6–8, 2006, Harvard University,  
   Cambridge, MA. 
149 
 
Whyte, M. K. & Parish, W.L. (1984). Urban Life in Contemporary China. Chicago:      
     University of Chicago Press. 
Wolpert, J. (1965). “Behavioral aspects of the decision to migrate.” Papers and  
Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, 15, 159-169. 
Wong, L.& Huen, W.P. (1998). Reforming the household registration system: A      
     preliminary glimpse of the blue chop household registration system in Shanghai    
     and Shenzhen. International Migration Review,32 (4), 974–94. 
Wright, R., & Ellis, M. (1997). Nativity, ethnicity, and the evolution of the intra urban 
division of labour in metropolitan Los Angeles. Urban Geography, 18, 243-263. 
Wright, R., & Ellis, M. (2000). The ethnic and gender division of labour compared 
among immigrants to Los Angeles. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 24(3), 583-600. 
Wu, X. (2002). Work Units and Income Inequality: The Effect of Market Transition 
in Urban China. Social Forces, 80(3) , 1069-1099. 
Xu, W., Tan, K. & Wang, G. (2006). Segmented local labour markets in post-reform 
China: Gender earnings inequality in the case of two towns in Zhejiang province. 
Environment and Planning, 38(1), 85-109. 
Xie, Y. and Hannum, E. (1996). Variation in earnings inequality in reform-era urban 
China. The American Journal of Sociology, 101(4), 950-92. 
Yang, D. & Zhou, H. (1999). Rural-urban disparity and sectoral labour allocation in 
China. Journal of development studies, 35(3), 105-33. 
Yang, X. & Guo, F. (1999). Gender differences in determinants of temporary labour 
migration in China: A multilevel analysis. International Migration Review, 33(4), 
929-53. 
Yang, Y. (1994). Zhongguo Renkou Qianyi Yu Fanzhan Di Chanqi Zhanlue (Long    
150 
 
  term strategies of population migration and development in China). Wuhan, China:  
  Wuhan Chubanshe. 
Yang, Y. & Chan, K. (2000). Zhuanxin laodongli shichang de fenceng jingzheng: 
jiehe Wuhan de shizheng fenxi (Competition and segmentation in transitional 
labour market: empirical study in Wuhan). Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (Social 
Sciences in China), 5, 28-38.  
Yang, Y. & Chan, K. (2001). Wailai laodongli dui chengshi bendi laodongli shichang 
de yingxiang: Wuhan diaocha de jibenkuangjia yu zhuyaofaxian (The effects of 
migrants on native labour market: Survey in Wuhan and major findings). Zhouguo 
Renkou Kexue (Chinese Journal of Population Sicence),2, 52-58. 
Yu, D. 2002. Chengxiang Shehui: Cong Geli Zouxiang Kaifang—Zhongguo Huji    
Zhidu Yu Hujifa Yanjiu (City and countryside societies: From segregation to     
opening—Research on China's household registration system and laws). Jinan,     
 China: Shandong People’s Press. 
Zang, X. (2002). Labour market segmentation and income inequality in urban China. 
Sociological Quarterly, 43(1), 27-44. 
Zhan, S.H. (2011). What determines migrant workers’ life chances in contemporary    
    China? Hukou, social exclusion, and the market. Modern China, 37(3), 243-85. 
Zhang, L. (2001). Stranger in the city: Reconfigurations of space, power, and social 
   networks within China’s floating population. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
Zhao, R.W. (1993). Three Features of the Distribution of Income during the    
   Transition to Reform. in The Distribution of Income in China, edited by Griffin, K.   
    B. and Zhao, R.W. New York: St. Martin's. 
Zhao, Y. (1999). Labour migration and earnings differences: The case of rural China. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47(4), 767-82. 
151 
 
Zhao, Y.  (2003). The role of migrant networks in labour migration: The case of 
China. Contemporary Economic Policy, 21(4), 500-23. 
Zhao, Z. (2005). Migration, labour market flexibility, and wage determination in 
China: A review. The Developing Economies, 43 (2), 285–312. 
Zhou, X., Tuma, N.B. & Moen, P. (1996). Stratification dynamics under state   
     socialism: the case of urban China, 1949-1993. Social Forces, 74, 759-96. 
Zhou, X. (2000a). Economic transformation and income inequality in urban China:    
     Evidence from panel data.The American Journal of Sociology, 105(4), 1135-1174. 
Zhou, X.  (2000b). Reply: Beyond the debate and toward substantive institutional   
     analysis. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 1190-95. 
Zhu, L.J. (2003). The Hukou system of the People’s Republic of China: A critical    
appraisal under international standards of internal movement and residence.   
Chinese Journal of International Law, 2(2), 519–565. 
Zhu, Y. (2007). China’s floating population and their settlement intention in the cities:  
    Beyond the Hukou reform. Habitat International, 31(1), 65-76.                                                                  
 
 1
5
2
 
Appendix A. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban non-
migrants in 2003 
 
 
2003 LnWTMRU-LnWN-M=βTMRU(XTMRU-XN-M)+(βTMRU-βN-M)XN-M=0.092151-0.3776392=-0.2854882 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  Non-
Migrants 
○1  
TMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants ○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant -1.044 1.008   1   1 2.052   0 0 2.052 
Years of Schooling .169 .015 11.5042 9.5833 -0.154 -1.9209 -.0288135 -1.7716468 
Years of Working .022 -.029 24.6579 23.1726 -0.051 -1.4853 .0430737 -1.2575529 
Party Membership -.123 .170 .1648 .0893 0.293 -0.0755 -.012835 .0482864 
Gender .126 .280 .6011 .6071 0.154 0.006 .00168 .0925694 
State-owned Enterprises -.191 .194 .5817 .1607 0.385 -0.421 -.081674 .2239545 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.441 .338 .0900 .0417 0.779 -0.0483 -.0163254 .07011 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.200 .429 .2078 .6429 0.629 0.4351 .1866579 .1307062 
Foreign invested Enterprises -.153 1.291 .0235 .0238 1.444 0.0003 .0003873 .033934 
  1.3022016 1.0167136  .092151 -.3776392 
Total Gap  -.2854882   -.2854882 
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Appendix B. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between temporary migrants from rural to urban and urban 
non-migrants in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  Non-
Migrants 
○1  
TMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants 
○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant .515 .656    1   1 0.141 0 0 .141 
Years of Schooling .109 .089 11.02 9.97 -0.02 -1.05 -.09345 -.2204 
Years of Working .002 -.004 27.1040 16.3381 -0.006 -10.7659 .0430636 -.162624 
Party Membership .123 -.139 .1650 .0381 -0.262 -0.1269 .0176391 -.04323 
Gender .193 .182 .5281 .5667 -0.011 0.0386 .0070252 -.0058091 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.292 .295 .1205 .0714 0.587 -0.0491 -.0144845 .0707335 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.010 .080 .2855 .7810 0.09 0.4955 .03964 .025695 
Foreign invested Enterprises .068 .443 .0338 .0714 0.375 0.0376 .0166568 .012675 
  1.8568637 1.6909943  .0160902 -.1819596 
Total Gap  -.1658694   -.1658694 
 1
5
4
 
 
Appendix C. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  PMRU ○1  TMRU 
○2  
PMRU  
○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant -.433 1.008 1   1 1.441 0 0 1.441 
Years of Schooling .113 .015 11.7211 9.5833 -0.098 -2.1378 -.032067 -1.1486678 
Years of Working .008 -.029 24.7803 23.1726 -0.037 -1.6077 .0466233 -.9168711 
Party Membership .099 .170 .2987 .0893 0.071 -0.2094 -.035598 .0212077 
Gender .251 .280 .6263 .6071 0.029 -0.0192 -.005376 .0181627 
State-owned Enterprises .087 .194 .5605 .1607 0.107 -0.3998 -.0775612 .0599735 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.142 .338 .0947 .0417 0.48 -0.053 -.017914 .045456 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.064 .429 .1789 .6429 0.493 0.464 .199056 .0881977 
Foreign invested Enterprises .253 1.291 .0066 .0238 1.038 0.0172 .0222052 .0068508 
  1.3020356 1.0167134  .0993683 -.3846905 
Total Gap  -.2853222   -.2853222 
 1
5
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Appendix D. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between temporary migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from rural to urban in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  PMRU ○1  TMRU 
○2  
PMRU 
○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant .681 .656  1   1 -.025 0 0 -.025 
 
Years of Schooling .094 .089 10.31 9.97 -0.005 -0.34 -.03026 -.05155 
Years of Working 2.355E-5 -.004 32.0683 16.3381 -.00402355 -15.7302 .0629208 -.1290284 
Party Membership .127 -.139 .2842 .0381 -0.266 -.2461 .0342079 -.0755972 
Gender .299 .182 .5519 .5667 -0.117 0.0148 .0026936 -.0645723 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.300 .295 .0847 .0714 0.595 -.0133 -.0039235 .0503965 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.354 .080 .2459 .7810 0.434 .5351 0.042808 .1067206 
Foreign invested Enterprises .686 .443 .0191 .0714 -0.243 .0523 0.0231689 -.0046413 
  1.752651 1.690994  .1316157 -.1932721 
 
Total Gap  -.061657   -.0616564 
 1
5
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Appendix E. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban 
non-migrants in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  Non-
Migrants 
○1  
PMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants 
○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant -1.044 -.433   1 1 0.611 0 0 .611 
 
Years of Schooling .169 .113 11.5042 11.7211 -.056 .2169 .0245097 -.6442352 
Years of Working .022 .008 24.6579 24.7803 -.014 .1224 .0009792 -.3452106 
Party Membership -.123 .099 .1648 .2987 .222 .1339 .0132561 .0365856 
Gender .126 .251 .6011 .6263 .125 .0252 .0063252 .0751375 
State-owned Enterprises -.191 .087 .5817 .5605 .278 -.0212 -.0018444 .1617126 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.441 -.142 .0900 .0947 .299 .0047 -.0006674 .02691 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.200 -.064 .2078 .1789 .136 -.0289 .0018496 .0282608 
Foreign invested Enterprises -.153 .253 .0235 .0066 .406 -.0169 -.0042757 .009541 
  1.3022016 1.3020356  .0401323 -.0402983 
Total Gap  -.000166   -.000166 
 1
5
7
 
 
Appendix F. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and urban 
non-migrants in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  Non-
Migrants 
○1  
PMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants 
○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant .515 .681    1 1 0.166 0 0 0.166 
 
Years of Schooling .109 .094 11.02 10.31 -0.015 -0.71 -0.06674 -0.1653 
Years of Working .002 2.355E-5 27.1040 32.0683 -0.0019765 4.9643 .00011691 -.0535697 
Party Membership .123 .127 .1650 .2842 0.004 0.1192 0.0151384 0.00066 
Gender .193 .299 .5281 .5519 0.106 0.0238 0.0071162 0.0559786 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.292 -.300 .1205 .0847 -0.008 -0.0358 0.01074 -0.000964 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.010 -.354 .2855 .2459 -0.344 -0.0396 0.0140184 -0.098212 
Foreign invested Enterprises .068 .686 .0338 .0191 0.618 -0.0147 -.0100842 0.0208884 
  1.8568637 1.752651  -.0296943 
(28.5%) 
-.0745187 
(71.5%) 
Total Gap  -.104213   -.104213 
 1
5
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Appendix G. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  PMUU ○1  PMRU 
○2  
PMUU  
○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant -.961 -.433 1 1 0.528 0 0 0.528 
Years of Schooling .166 .113 12.5689 11.7211 -0.053 -0.8478 -0.0958 -0.66615 
Years of Working .009 .008 24.6892 24.7803 -0.001 0.0911 0.000729 -0.02469 
Party Membership .090 .099 .2514 .2987 0.009 0.0473 0.004683 0.002263 
Gender .124 .251 .5257 .6263 0.127 0.1006 0.025251 0.066764 
State-owned Enterprises .122 .087 .6662 .5605 -0.035 -0.1057 -0.0092 -0.02332 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.080 -.142 .0703 .0947 -0.062 0.0244 -0.00346 -0.00436 
Privately-owned Enterprises .020 -.064 .1149 .1789 -0.084 0.064 -0.0041 -0.00965 
Foreign invested Enterprises .494 .253 .0216 .0066 -0.241 -0.015 -0.0038 -0.00521 
  1.5240 1.3020356  -.08569 
(38.6%) 
-.13635 
(61.4%) 
Total Gap   -.222   -.22204 
 1
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Appendix H. Decomposing the Ln hourly earnings difference between permanent migrants from rural to urban and 
permanent migrants from urban to urban in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean Differences 
in 
Coefficients 
○5 =○2 -○1  
Difference
s in Mean 
○6 =○4 -○3  
Explained 
Gap 
○2 *○6  
Unexplaine
d Gap 
○5 *○3  PMUU ○1  PMRU 
○2  
PMUU  
○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant 1.396 .681 1  1 -.715 
 
0 0 -0.715 
 
Years of Schooling .067 .094 11.30 10.31 .027 -0.99 -.09306 0.3051 
Years of Working -.007 2.355E-5 35.667 32.0683 .00702355 -3.5987 -8.47494E-05 .250508958 
Party Membership .251 .127 .2517 .2842 -.124 .0325 .0041275 -.0312108 
Gender .032 .299 .4966 .5519 .267 .0553 .0165347 .1325922 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.025 -.300 .0952 .0847 -.275 -.0105 0.00315 -.02618 
Privately-owned Enterprises -.209 -.354 .1293 .2459 -.145 .1166 -.0412764 -.0187485 
Foreign invested Enterprises .631 .686 .0272 .0191 .055 -.0081 -.0055566 0.001496 
  1.970258 1.752651  -.116165549 
(53.4%) 
-.10144214 
(46.6%) 
Total Gap  -217607   -.2176077 
 1
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Appendix I Decomposing occupational differentials between temporary migrants rural-urban and urban non-migrants in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.878044-0.7154=0.16264 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.878044-0.760889=0.11716=72% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.760889-0.7154=0.04549=28% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
    A 
○2 *○3  
    B 
○2 *○4  
     C Non-
Migrants ○1  
TMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants ○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant 5.199 3.406 1 1 5.199 3.406 3.406 
Years of Schooling -.392 -.268 10.8032 8.9240 -4.23485 -2.89526 -2.39163 
Years of Working -.027 .020 30.1176 25.3600 -0.81318 0.602352 0.5072 
Party Membership -1.707 -2.708 .1743 .0840 -0.29753 -0.472 -0.22747 
Gender .454 .195 .5563 .5320 0.25256 0.108479 0.10374 
State-owned Enterprises .677 .496 .6113 .1360 0.41385 0.303205 0.067456 
Collective-owned Enterprises .854 -.750 .1009 .0440 0.086169 -0.07568 -0.033 
Privately-owned Enterprises 1.610 .885 .1776 .5920 0.285936 0.157176 0.52392 
Foreign invested Enterprises 1.426 1.114 .0209 .0160 0.029803 0.023283 0.017824 
      ∑?̂??̅?  0.921759 1.157557  1.974036 
  EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  2.513708 3.182150 7.199675
82 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 0.7154 
 
0.760889 
 
0.878044 
 
 1
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Appendix J. Decomposing occupational differentials between temporary migrants rural-urban and permanent migrants rural-urban 
in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.878044-0.607938=0.27011 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.878044-0.706611-=0.17143=63% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.706611-0.607938=0.09867=37% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
   A 
○2 *○3  
     B 
○2 *○4  
    C PMRU    ○1  TMRU 
○2  
PMRU   
○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant 6.166 3.406 1 1 6.166 3.406 3.406 
Years of Schooling -.469 -.268 10.5602 8.9240 -4.95273 -2.83013 -2.39163 
Years of Working -.035 .020 31.1196 25.3600 -1.08919 0.622392 0.5072 
Party Membership -1.368 -2.708 .2841 .0840 -0.38865 -0.76934 -0.22747 
Gender .166 .195 .5602 .5320 0.092993 0.109239 0.10374 
State-owned Enterprises .498 .496 .5658 .1360 0.281768 0.280637 0.067456 
Collective-owned Enterprises .508 -.750 .1156 .0440 0.058725 -0.0867 -0.033 
Privately-owned Enterprises 1.766 .885 .1549 .5920 0.273553 0.137087 0.52392 
Foreign invested Enterprises -.434 1.114 .0088 .0160 -0.00382 0.009803 0.017824 
      ∑?̂??̅?  0.438652 0.878981 1.974036 
  EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  1.550616 2.408444 7.199675
8 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 0.607938 
 
0.706611 
 
0.878044 
 
 1
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Appendix K. Decomposing occupational differentials between Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban and Urban non-Migrants in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.607938-0.7154=-0.107462 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.607938-0.6363=-0.028362=26% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.6363-0.7154=-0.0791=74% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
   A 
○2 *○3  
     B 
○2 *○4  
    C Non-Migrants   
○1  
PMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants  ○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant 5.199 6.166 1 1 5.199 6.166 6.166 
Years of Schooling -.392 -.469 10.8032 10.5602 -4.23485 -5.0667 -4.95273 
Years of Working -.027 -.035 30.1176 31.1196 -0.81318 -1.05412 -1.08919 
Party Membership -1.707 -1.368 .1743 .2841 -0.29753 -0.23844 -0.38865 
Gender .454 .166 .5563 .5602 0.25256 0.092346 0.092993 
State-owned Enterprises .677 .498 .6113 .5658 0.41385 0.304427 0.281768 
Collective-owned Enterprises .854 .508 .1009 .1156 0.086169 0.051257 0.058725 
Privately-owned Enterprises 1.610 1.766 .1776 .1549 0.285936 0.313642 0.273553 
Foreign invested Enterprises 1.426 -.434 .0209 .0088 0.029803 -0.00907 -0.00382 
      ∑?̂??̅?  0.921759 
 
0.559342 
 
0.438652 
  EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  2.513708 1.749521 1.550616 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 
0.7154 
 
0.6363 0.607938 
 1
6
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Appendix L. Decomposing occupational differentials between Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban and Permanent Migrants Urban-
Urban in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.607938-0.524913=0.08303 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.607938-0.465305=0.14263   
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.465305-0.524913=-0.059608 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
   A 
○2 *○3  
    B 
○2 *○4  
    C PMUU   
  ○1  
PMRU 
○2  
PMUU   
○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant 6.807 6.166 1 1 6.807 6.166 6.166 
Years of Schooling -.502 -.469 11.6352 10.5602 -5.84087 -5.45691 -4.95273 
Years of Working -.035 -.035 32.0800 31.1196 -1.1228 -1.1228 -1.08919 
Party Membership -1.238 -1.368 .2538 .2841 -0.3142 -0.3472 -0.38865 
Gender .297 .166 .4795 .5602 0.142412 0.079597 0.092993 
State-owned Enterprises .452 .498 .7044 .5658 0.318389 0.350791 0.281768 
Collective-owned Enterprises .299 .508 .0880 .1156 0.026312 0.044704 0.058725 
Privately-owned Enterprises 1.009 1.766 .0865 .1549 0.087279 0.152759 0.273553 
Foreign invested Enterprises -.276 -.434 .0137 .0088 -0.00378 -0.00595 -0.00382 
      ∑?̂??̅?  0.099735 -0.139 0.438652 
  EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  1.104878 0.870226 1.550616 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 
0.524913 0.465305 0.607938 
 1
6
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Appendix M. Decomposing occupational differentials between Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban and Urban non-Migrants in2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.873478-0.646195=0.22728 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.873478-0.740792=0.13269=58% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.740792-0.646195=0.0946=42% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
   A 
○2 *○3  
    B 
○2 *○4  
   C Non-
Migrants ○1  
TMRU 
○2  
Non-
Migrants ○3  
TMRU 
○4  
 Constant 4.997 5.619 1 1 4.997 5.619 5.619 
Years of Schooling -.374 -.393 10.80 9.47 -4.0392 -4.2444 -3.72171 
Years of Working -.019 -.023 27.0571 17.8966 -0.51408 -0.62231 -0.41162 
Party Membership -1.429 -.070 .1447 .0282 -0.20678 -0.01013 -0.00197 
Gender .570 .254 .5133 .4608 0.292581 0.130378 0.117043 
Collective-owned Enterprises .004 .379 .1246 .0533 0.000498 0.047223 0.020201 
Privately-owned Enterprises .236 .573 .2680 .6238 0.063248 0.153564 0.357437 
Foreign invested Enterprises .304 -.777 .0299 .0596 0.00909 -0.02323 -0.04631 
∑?̂??̅?  0.602356 1.050091 1.932066 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  1.826417 2.857911 6.903759 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 0.646195 
 
0.740792 
 
0.873478 
 
 1
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Appendix N. Decomposing occupational differentials between Temporary Migrants Rural-Urban and Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban 
in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.873478-0.585586=0.28789 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.873478-0.77384=0.09964=35% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.77384-0.585586=0.18825=65% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
   A  
○2 *○3  
     B 
○2 *○4  
    C PMRU       ○1  TMRU 
○2  
PMRU     ○3  TMRU 
○4  
 Constant 4.579 5.619    1 1 4.579 5.619 5.619 
Years of Schooling -.364 -.393   9.95 9.47 -3.6218 -3.91035 -3.72171 
Years of Working -.028 -.023 32.1083 17.8966 -0.89903 -0.73849 -0.41162 
Party Membership -1.057 -.070  .2442 .0282 -0.25812 -0.01709 -0.00197 
Gender .715 .254  .4989 .4608 0.356714 0.126721 0.117043 
Collective-owned Enterprises .741 .379  .0828 .0533 0.061355 0.031381 0.020201 
Privately-owned Enterprises .503 .573  .2335 .6238 0.117451 0.133796 0.357437 
Foreign invested Enterprises .533 -.777  .0191 .0596 0.01018 -0.01484 -0.04631 
∑?̂??̅?  0.345747 1.230122 1.932066 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  1.413045 3.421647 6.903759 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 0.585586 
 
0.77384 
 
0.873478 
 
 1
6
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Appendix O. Decomposing occupational differentials between Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban and Urban Non-Migrants in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.585586-0.646195=-0.060609 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.585586-0.585971=-0.000385=0.6% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.585971-0.646195=-0.060224=99.4% 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
   A  
○2 *○3  
     B 
○2 *○4  
     C Non-Migrants       
○1  
PMRU 
○2  
Non-migrants     
○3  
PMRU 
○4  
 Constant 4.997 4.579 1    1 4.997 4.579 4.579 
Years of Schooling -.374 -.364 10.80   9.95 -4.0392 -3.9312 -3.6218 
Years of Working -.019 -.028 27.0571 32.1083 -0.51408 -0.7576 -0.89903 
Party Membership -1.429 -1.057 .1447  .2442 -0.20678 -0.15295 -0.25812 
Gender .570 .715 .5133  .4989 0.292581 0.36701 0.356714 
Collective-owned Enterprises .004 .741 .1246  .0828 0.000498 0.092329 0.061355 
Privately-owned Enterprises .236 .503 .2680  .2335 0.063248 0.134804 0.117451 
Foreign invested Enterprises .304 .533 .0299  .0191 0.00909 0.015937 0.01018 
∑?̂??̅?  0.602356 0.347332 0.345747 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  1.826417 1.415287 1.413045 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 
0.646195 0.585971 0.585586 
 1
6
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Appendix P. Decomposing occupational differentials between Permanent Migrants Rural-Urban and Permanent Migrants Urban-
Urban in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Gap=C-A=0.585586-0.363397=0.22219 
Explained Gap=C-B=0.585586-0.45288=0.13271=60% 
Unexplained Gap=B-A=0.45288-0.363397=0.08948=40% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficients     Mean ○1 *○3  
    A 
○2 *○3  
    B 
○2 *○4  
    C PMUU       ○1  PMRU 
○2  
PMUU     ○3  PMRU 
○4  
 Constant 5.137 4.579 1    1 5.137 4.579 4.579 
Years of Schooling -.430 -.364 11.10   9.95 -4.773 -4.0404 -3.6218 
Years of Working -.037 -.028 34.8902 32.1083 -1.29094 -0.97693 -0.89903 
Party Membership -.197 -1.057  .2428  .2442 -0.04783 -0.25664 -0.25812 
Gender .804 .715 .4682  .4989 0.376433 0.334763 0.356714 
Collective-owned Enterprises -.438 .741 .0925  .0828 -0.04052 0.068543 0.061355 
Privately-owned Enterprises .333 .503 .1734  .2335 0.057742 0.08722 0.117451 
Foreign invested Enterprises .708 .533 .0289  .0191 0.020461 0.015404 0.01018 
∑?̂??̅?  -0.56065 -0.18904 0.345747 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)  0.570838 0.827753 1.413045 
EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
1 + EXP(∑?̂??̅?)
 
 
0.363397 0.45288 0.585586 
